Juarez v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., CASE NO. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB
| Decision Date | 13 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB |
| Parties | ADAN JUAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Defendant Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. ("Suntrust") seeks to dismiss as legally barred and insufficiently pled plaintiffs Adan Juarez ("Mr. Juarez") and Rosa Juarez' ("Ms. Juarez'") claims arising from Suntrust's handling of the failed modification of the Mr. and Ms. Juarez' (collectively the "Juarezes'") loan secured by their Stanislaus County property ("property"). The Juarezes contend that they have pled "fact-specific allegations" to support their actionable claims. This Court considered Suntrust's F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record without a hearing. See Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES this action.
On March 10, 2008, the Juarezes obtained a $417,000 loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. The Juarezes made their $2,367.69 monthly payments up to April 2009 when they defaulted. Suntrust serviced the loan since its origination.
The Juarezes requested a loan modification, and Suntrust presented a Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan ("trial plan"), effective January 1, 2010 and which required four trial period payment of $790.03 per month. The Juarezes executed the trial plan and returned it to Suntrust. The trial plan addresses Suntrust's determination of loan modification and its section 2.G. states:
The Juarezes made the four trial payment under the trial plan. Suntrust failed to modify permanently the Juarezes' loan. The Juarezes continued to may 12 monthly trial plan payments and attempted to discover whether they would be given a permanent loan modification. The Juarezes were told to keep making trial payments.
After cashing 11 of the Juarezes' trial payments, Suntrust rejected the 12th payment and sent theJuarezes a letter to deny permanent loan modification based on the Juarezes' insufficient income, which the Juarezes were never told was an issue.
The Juarezes applied for another loan modification and received an offer for a monthly payment $80 less than their original payment. The Juarezes received no requested clarification and were asked to send additional or duplicate documentation. Suntrust sent the Juarezes what they characterize as a "slew of incoherent communications."
On January 19, 2012, property foreclosure was initiated with the recording of a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust. A notice of trustee's sale was recorded to set a May 16, 2012 sale date. Suntrust sent May 18, 2012 letters to ask the Juarezes for financial information to address loan modification. A foreclosure sale of the property was conducted, and a trustee's deed upon sale was recorded on October 23, 2012. The Juarezes are subject to unlawful detainer.
On May 16, 2012, Mr. Juarez filed a pro se voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy which was dismissed for failure to appear at a creditors' meeting. On September 11, 2012, Mr. Juarez filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy which was dismissed for failure to file timely documents. On October 11, 2012, Mr. Juarez filed a pro se voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy which was dismissed for failure to file timely papers.
On January 23, 2013, Ms. Juarez through counsel filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The petition's Schedule B lists no "Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature." On April 16, 2013, Ms. Juarez' bankruptcy was dismissed for failure to appear at a creditors' meeting.
On March 7, 2013, the Juarezes filed their complaint in Stanislaus County Superior Court prior to Suntrust's removal to this Court. The complaint alleges that the Juarezes "were led to believe for three years that they were candidates for a loan modification" and that Suntrust took advantage of the Juarezes' "trust and situation" to foreclose on the property. The complaint further alleges that "Suntrust misled Plaintiffs into believing they would be given a loan modification" and "continuously lost their documents, demanded documents which had already been produced, and provided misleadinginformation as to the status of the modification process." The complaint alleges negligence and breach of contract claims as well as claims under the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, et seq., and the California Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA"), Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 1788, et seq. The claims will be discussed in greater detail below.
Suntrust characterizes this action as "an attempt to stave off eviction" and seeks to dismiss the complaint's claims as legally barred and insufficiently pled. The Juarezes contend their claims survive dismissal given the allegations of Suntrust's mishandling of the loan modification process.
A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and must not "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if "it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment." Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
A plaintiff is obliged "to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' [which] requiresmore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court "will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action." Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)
After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit summarized: "In sum, for a complaint to survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a...
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