Jucha v. City of Chi.
Decision Date | 06 August 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13 C 8629,13 C 8629 |
Citation | 63 F.Supp.3d 820 |
Parties | Jeffrey Jucha, d/b/a 4 Anchors Tattoo, Plaintiff, v. City of North Chicago, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
David G. Sigale, Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., Glen Ellyn, IL, for Plaintiff.
Julie M. Koerner, O'Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook LLC, Jane Marie May, O'Halloran, Kosoff, Helander & Geitner, P.C., Northbrook, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Jucha, a tattoo artist, sought to open his own tattoo parlor in the City of North Chicago, Illinois (the “City”). After Jucha failed to receive a permit from the City allowing him to open his tattoo parlor, he filed suit alleging that the City violated his and his customers' constitutional rights and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, Jucha brings parallel claims under the Illinois Constitution. Now before the Court is the City's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim [11]. Because Jucha has not adequately pleaded the elements, the Court dismisses Jucha's federal and state law equal protection claims. But the Court denies the motion with regard to all other claims, because the Court finds that the First Amendment protects tattoos, the act of tattooing, and the business of tattooing. Further, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the City violated Jucha's and his customers' First Amendment rights without providing due process of law.
Jucha owns and operates 4 Aces Tattoo Parlor and Body Piercing in Franklin Park, Illinois. Jucha sought to open a second studio, known as 4 Anchors Tattoo (“4 Anchors”), at 2314 Green Bay Road in North Chicago, Illinois. If allowed to open 4 Anchors, Jucha would “disseminate expressive body art in the form of the tattoos and body piercings it sells and applies to its customers.” Doc. 1 ¶ 4. Jucha has obtained a commitment from the owner of the property to provide Jucha with a lease if he receives necessary permitting from the City.
Under the City's zoning ordinance, body art establishments are presumptively not allowed. However, one such establishment currently operates within the City and has been allowed to remain open under a grandfather provision. In order to obtain permission to open 4 Anchors, Jucha sought a Special Use Permit from the City Council. On October 21, 2013, the City Council indefinitely tabled Jucha's application for a Special Use Permit, effectively denying him the opportunity to open 4 Anchors within the city limits. Jucha learned that his application failed because 4 Anchors was “not the kind of business” the City Council wanted in the City. Doc. 1 ¶ 9. The City Council also considered whether to amend the Zoning Ordinance to allow body art establishments, but this measure failed by a 5–2 vote. There was no public hearing with regard to Jucha's request for a Special Use Permit. The City Council did not hear any evidence or testimony with regard to the negative impact that might result from the presence of 4 Anchors in the City.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ; Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir.2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Although the City does not challenge Jucha's standing to sue on behalf of himself, it argues that Jucha lacks standing to sue on behalf of his potential customers. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “Ordinarily, of course, people have no standing to assert the rights of third parties.” Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 227 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.2000). “In the context of the First Amendment, however, ‘courts have taken a more liberal approach (under the prudential branch of the standing doctrines) to the ability of one party to assert the rights of another party.’ ” Covenant Media of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003) ). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000).
Additionally, businesses may represent their customers' constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) ( ); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) ( ); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir.2011) ( ). Therefore, the Court finds that Jucha has standing to sue the City on behalf of his customers.
In Count I, Jucha alleges that the City violated his and his customers' free speech rights by denying his request to open a tattoo parlor within the City's limits. The City moves to dismiss on the basis that the First Amendment does not protect an individual's right to apply tattoos. The question now before the Court is whether the First Amendment protects tattoos, the act of tattooing, and the business of tattooing. The Court finds that it does.
There is no doubt that the First Amendment protects artistic expression. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (); Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) ( ). It is also clear that the First Amendment does not protect “expressive conduct” to the same extent that it protects the written or spoken word. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) ( ). But the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the First Amendment protects various media of expression, including symbols and other non-verbal expression. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) ().
The Supreme Court reinforced this point in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2737, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011). In Brown, the video game industry brought a First Amendment challenge against a California law restricting the sale, rental, and labeling of violent video games. Id. at 2732–33. The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the state of California “correctly acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.” Id. at 2733. The Supreme Court went on to make clear that the First Amendment is not limited to traditionally refined works that one might find in a museum or library, but that “[c]rudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny.”Id. at 2737 n. 4 ; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948) ( ). Brown held that “[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world).” Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2733. Finally, Brown reiterated that “ ‘the basic principles of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke
...See Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 145 F.Supp.3d 921, 931 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ; Jucha v. City of North Chicago , 63 F.Supp.3d 820, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Treating grandfathered users differently also serves important governmental interests because grandfathered users ......
-
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phx.
...for art’s sake." Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515 , 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) ; see also Jucha v. City of North Chicago , 63 F. Supp. 3d 820, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("There is no doubt that the First Amendment protects artistic expression."). ¶60 Protection for pure speech is n......
-
Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC
...the defendant's actions meet the definitional requirements of § 2331(1) to establish primary liability); cf. Jucha v. City of N. Chicago , 63 F. Supp. 3d 820, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("While [the plaintiff] bears no burden of proof at the motion to dismiss stage, he must plausibly allege the e......
-
Holmes v. City of Chi.
...“Unknown Officers.” The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's federal due process and conspiracy claims against Defendant Acosta as well as 63 F.Supp.3d 820Plaintiff's state law claims for abuse of process, battery, assault, and conspiracy against Defendant Acosta. Plaintiff's false arrest/impri......