Judd v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 24 January 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 151,31 Minn. 430 |
| Parties | Mary A. Judd v. Eugene A. Arnold and others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendants from a judgment for restitution in an action for unlawful detainer in the municipal court of Minneapolis.
Judgment affirmed.
Smith & Reed, for appellants.
To entitle plaintiff to recover, she was required to prove as alleged that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between her and the defendants, and that they were holding over after the expiration of the lease, without any other claim of right to the possession or occupancy of the same. Johnson v. Chely, 43 Cal. 299; Whitaker v Gautier, 3 Gilman, (Ill.) 443; Ballance v. Curtenius Id. 449; Sims v. Humphrey, 4 Denio, 185; Evertson v. Sutton, 5 Wend. 281; Benjamin v Benjamin, 5 N.Y. 383; People v. Howlett, 76 N.Y. 574; Chandler v. Kent, 8 Minn. 467, (524;) Steele v. Bond, 28 Minn. 267.
The authority of an agent to execute a lease need not be in writing. Minor v. Willoughby, 3 Minn. 154, (225;) Groff v. Ramsey, 19 Minn. 24, (44;) Brown v. Eaton, 21 Minn. 409; Dickerman v. Ashton, 21 Minn. 538. The authority may be inferred from the course of dealing. Lawrence v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 15 Minn. 313, (390.) Subsequent ratification, although oral, would validate the lease. McIntyre v. Park, 11 Gray, 102.
Babcock & Davis, for respondent.
Action under Gen. St. 1878, c. 84, § 11, to recover rented premises detained after the expiration of the term. It appears that plaintiff rented the premises to defendant Arnold for one year, terminating April 30, 1883; and February 5, 1883, he, assuming to act as plaintiff's agent, executed in her name to defendants Tibbitts and Myers a written lease of the premises; the term as to part of them to commence immediately, and as to the remainder to commence May 1, 1883, and to continue as to all till one year from the last date. Arnold had no authority in writing to rent the premises. The lease stipulated for a gross monthly rent for the rooms. It was therefore an entire and not a severable lease, and was for a term exceeding one year. By the terms of the statute it was required to be in writing, and, being executed by an agent, his authority to execute it was required to be in writing. "No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, * * * shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the parties creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by their lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing." Gen St. 1878, c. 41, § 10. Our statute of frauds is peculiar, among other things, in this: that while, by section 10, authority in an agent to execute an instrument creating or conveying the estate must be in writing, by section 12 his authority to make an executory contract to create or convey it need not be in writing. Minor v. Willoughby, 3 Minn. 154, (225.)
A ratification by the principal of the not properly authorized act of the agent must be by an act of the character required for original authority. Where that must be in writing, the ratification must also be in writing. Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 17; Fitch, Real Est. Ag. 57; McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts 129; Lawrence v Taylor, 5 Hill 107, 113; Ingraham v. Edwards, 64 Ill. 526; Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238. To permit an oral ratification would, in many cases, let in the very evils which the statute aims to exclude. The evidence of oral ratification by plaintiff of the lease executed by Arnold was therefore of no effect. Of course, a principal may, by his acts or declarations, lay the basis for an estoppel as to the due authority of the assumed agent. But, in a case like this, to make the assent and acquiescence of the principal, and acts of the lessees in reliance thereon, operate as an estoppel as to the authority of the assumed agent to execute the lease, it is essential that she should have known what sort of lease the agent had assumed to execute in her name. The lessees must be supposed to have known the law, -- that written authority in the agent was required to execute such a lease. And before they could rightfully rely and act on her assent to and acquiescence in a lease as evidence that she had authorized it in writing, they should have been sure that she was informed of the character of lease the agent had assumed to execute. The only evidence as to her...
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