Judd v. Landin

• Decision Date: 02 January 1942
• Docket Number: No. 32935.,32935.
• Citation: 211 Minn. 465,1 N.W.2d 861
• Parties: JUDD v. LANDIN et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

1 N.W.2d 861

211 Minn. 465

JUDD v. LANDIN et al.

No. 32935.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 2, 1942.

Rehearing Denied January 22, 1942.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Mathias Baldwin, Judge.

Action by Anna Judd against Robert E. and Allyn K. Ford, the Woman's Christian Association of Minneapolis, Virginia R. Landin and others for injuries sustained in a fall upon the stairway of a hotel operated by the last-named defendant. From judgments in favor of the Fords and the Woman's Christian Association notwithstanding a verdict in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

O. A. Brecke and E. T. Chesnut, both of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Snyder, Gale & Richards, Kingman, Cross, Morley, Cant & Taylor, and E. L. Strand, all of Minneapolis, for respondents.

JULIUS J. OLSON, Justice.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries. Defendants Robert E. and Allyn K. Ford are the owners and lessors of Hotel Marquette in Minneapolis; defendant Woman's Christian Association of Minneapolis (hereafter referred to as W. C. A.) has been the lessee over a term of years; and defendant Virginia R. Landin is the sublessee of W. C. A. Plaintiff recovered a verdict for $1,500. The Fords and W. C. A. separately moved for judgment notwithstanding. Both motions were granted, and plaintiff appeals from the judgments.

During the afternoon of July 10, 1938, plaintiff, a guest at the hotel, left her room on the third floor to go to the street. When about halfway down the stairway between the third and second floors, the heel of her left shoe caught in a protruding slit in the rubber stair tread, causing her to trip and fall. In falling, she reached out with her right hand for something to avert her fall, but, there being no handrail on that side of the stairway, she fell violently against the floor of the stair landing below and was seriously injured.

The hotel was built during or prior to 1890, and for a year or more prior to February, 1931, had been vacant. During that month the Fords executed a lease of the building for a period of ten years, effective May 1, to the W. C. A., to be used as a club or hotel. By its terms the Fords agreed that "any changes required by present or future building ordinances will be complied with by owners." Suitable alterations and repairs were to be made to put the property in shape for its intended use. The estimated cost of alterations and repairs was stated to be $25,000. The Fords applied for and obtained from the building inspector's office a permit to make the improvements. The work progressed under the inspector's directions, with frequent inspection. Although an official record of the improvements, including plans and specifications, was to be filed and kept in his office, "there were no plans filed for this particular job."

The stairway on which plaintiff fell was 50 inches wide. When these improvements were made the 1916 building code was applicable. By § 111, it was provided that "stairways which are more than three feet six inches (3' 6") wide shall have not less than two handrails." The 1934 code provides (§ 604) that "the following general rules shall govern in all cases." And § 604.1 specifies that "handrails shall be provided on both sides of all stairs three feet six inches (3' 6") or more in width in all buildings except single family dwellings." After completion of the work, W. C. A. took over the premises and remained in possession under its lease until June 1935, when it sublet the premises, with consent of the owners, to defendant Landin and one Marguerite Hauser, who later assigned her interest to Miss Landin.

By § 3101 of the 1934 code, adopted April 3, 1934, the 1916 code was expressly repealed. By § 107.2 of the new code, it is provided: "Existing buildings may be maintained in their present condition and occupancy except that such changes as are specifically required hereby or may become necessary for safety, shall be made when ordered by the Inspector of Buildings." (Italics supplied.)

That the requirement in respect to two handrails has not been complied with here is conceded. Therefore, plaintiff claims, as the basis for imposing liability upon all defendants, that they were negligent in failing to install such handrails, and such negligence was the proximate, or a contributing, cause of plaintiff's accidental fall and consequent injuries. She does not claim that respondents are responsible for the condition of the rubber stair treads, since these oftentimes become frayed or torn and as such must be replaced from time to time.

Respondents contend that only the 1934 code is applicable in this action, and that, since the building inspector made no affirmative order requiring installation of a second handrail (§ 107.2), there was no duty imposed upon them to install it. So the first issue to be determined is whether the handrail sections of the codes to which we have referred imposed a duty upon respondents to comply therewith, absent official direction from the building inspector.

1. In construing legislative enactments, it is well to bear in mind that (Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 129, 84 N.W. 788, 789), "`canons of construction are not the masters of the courts, but merely their servants, to aid them in ascertaining the legislative intent'; and when it is ascertained the statute must be so construed as to give effect to such intention, even if it seem contrary to such rules and the strict letter of the statute."

We think it is clear from the terms of both codes that the legislative intent — its real purpose — was to prescribe minimum requirements to safeguard and protect from injury guests and occupants of buildings governed thereby which reasonably might result from defective construction or unsafe conditions.

2. Since § 101 of the 1934 code provides that "this ordinance is * * * hereby declared a remedial ordinance, and is to be construed so as to secure the beneficial purposes intended" (italics supplied), it is entitled to such fair and "large" construction as will meet the essential legislative purpose. As said in State ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 397, 108 N.W. 261, 266, 28 L.R. A.,N.S., 298, 120 Am.St.Rep. 581, 8 Ann. Cas. 1047 "`It is an old and unshaken rule in the construction of statutes that the intention of a remedial statute will always prevail over the literal sense of its terms, and therefore when the expression is special or particular, but the reason is general, the expression shall be deemed general.' * * * A `large construction is to be given to statutes having for their end the promotion of important and beneficial public objects.'"

There certainly is nothing "to justify our looking upon the law with strictness or aversion." State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 190 Minn. 162, 164, 251 N.W. 275, 276.

3. The adoption of these codes was induced by public considerations of safety. The motivating cause was to protect from injury those inhabiting defective or unsafe structures. The framers of these codes realized that they were required to provide rules and regulations for new structures as well as old ones which had been or were to be rehabilitated. Courts therefore should be careful not to apply such (98 Minn. page 396, 108 N.W. page 266, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 298, 120 Am. St.Rep. 581, 8 Ann.Cas. 1047) "a rigid and literal reading [as] would in many cases defeat the very object of the statute and exemplify the maxim that `the letter killeth, while the spirit keepeth alive.'"

4. Both §§ 107.2 and 604.1 of the 1934 code should be considered and interpreted together, since it is the duty of courts, even where a legislative act "is imperfectly drawn * * * to ascertain the legislative purpose from a consideration of the act as a whole, and to interpret it, if possible, so that it will accomplish" that purpose. "To bring this about obvious mistakes and omissions may be corrected or supplied, and contradictory expressions, and language of doubtful import should be given a meaning consistent with the legislative intention as disclosed by the act taken as a whole." Kempien v. Board of County Com'rs, 160 Minn. 69, 72, 199 N.W. 442, 443; State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. District Court, 134 Minn. 131, 158 N.W. 798.

5. Since § 604.1 expressly requires two handrails on stairways of the width here presented, we think it logically follows that it properly applies to the building in question. Such requirements should not be denied by any technical or mere fanciful interpretation of § 107.2 which has for its basis only a misplaced comma, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supplement § 8974; nor will bad grammar alone vitiate a statute, Id. § 8972. The net result of such narrow interpretation would be to deny recovery here to a guest in an old hotel, which is required to compete with others built later, and to impose such liability upon the latter only because it has a newer building. Such a deviation from the obvious intent of the framers of these codes would be to give these sections a meaning...