Judd v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development

• Decision Date: 27 November 1995
• Citation: 663 So.2d 690
• Parties: 95-1052 La
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 690

663 So.2d 690

95-1052 La. 11/27/95, 64 USLW 2359

Marleen M. JUDD, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, et al.

No. 95-CC-1052.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 27, 1995.

Kevin Conrad Schoenberger, New Orleans, for Applicants.

Russell D. Holwadel, Jesse R. Adams, Jr., Adams & Johnson, New Orleans, for Respondents.

Robert L. Roland, Peter T. Dazzio, Baton Rouge, amicus curiae, for Louisiana Hosp. Ass'n.

Leroy Harvard Scott, III, Shreveport, amicus curiae, for CSX Transp. Inc.

Christopher James Bruno, Joseph Michael Bruno, New Orleans, amicus curiae, for Wilbert Bolds.

[95-1052 La. 1] CALOGERO, Chief Justice. ^*

We granted writs in this case to consider whether blood alcohol test results, as part of a hospital's medical record, should be admitted into evidence by virtue of La.R.S. 13:3714. ¹ Prior to trial, the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court granted defendants' motion in limine to admit into evidence a blood alcohol test result as part of a medical record, and denied plaintiffs' motion to exclude it. Thereupon, plaintiffs petitioned the court of appeal for supervisory writs, which the court of appeal denied. [95-1052 La. 2] Thereafter, this Court granted plaintiffs' writ application.

Under the facts of this case and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court. The court correctly decided to admit into evidence plaintiff's blood alcohol test result as part of the medical record of Ochsner Foundation Hospital, certified copy of which R.S. 13:3714 recites "shall be received in evidence ... as prima facie proof of its contents." LA.REV.STAT. § 13:3714.

On December 21, 1991, at approximately 5:30 a.m., plaintiff Marleen M. Judd ("Judd") was on her way home from partying when she lost control of her Ford Taurus and collided with a utility pole on Hickory Avenue in Harahan, Louisiana. Judd admitted in discovery that she had been drinking and was exceeding the posted speed limit at the time of the accident. Shortly thereafter, Judd was taken to Ochsner Foundation Hospital, where a number of tests were performed, including blood alcohol. The test revealed a blood alcohol level of .219 milligram per deciliter.

Initially, Judd and her husband filed suit against the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development ("DOTD"), Michelin Tire Corporation ("Michelin"), Sears, Roebuck and Company ("Sears"), and Louisiana Power & Light ("LP & L"). Subsequently, LP & L and DOTD settled with the plaintiffs, leaving only Michelin and Sears as defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants Michelin and Sears manufactured a defective tire which caused Judd's automobile accident.

Plaintiffs argue that the lower courts erred in ruling that R.S. 13:3714 applied to blood alcohol test results contained in hospital records. The Louisiana Legislature originally enacted R.S. 13:3714 in 1938, ² a statute which applied to "the Charity Hospital of this State." The statute has been amended several times since, broadening its scope to encompass certified copies of the medical records of any hospital.

[95-1052 La. 3] "The statute's purpose is to save a litigant the difficulty and expense of producing as a witness each person who assisted in the treatment of the patient." Holmes v. Caeser, 528 So.2d 1391, 1392 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). "It provides that the opposing party may defend against the record by calling those who made the record as witnesses under cross-examination." Holmes, 528 So.2d at 1392. "It provides for an exception to the hearsay rule with respect to those who made the medical record." Id. "Once LSA-R.S. 13:3714 is complied with, the records are admissible." Aites v. State through Department of Transportation, 512 So.2d 865 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 133 (1987). Accordingly, the court of appeal in Aites held that the trial court erred in ruling that hospital records signed by its administrator are inadmissible without a foundation first being laid, explaining that "[t]he weight given the records is determined by the presence of expert testimony to interpret those records." Id.

Plaintiffs' primary complaint, relying on State v. Rowell, 517 So.2d 799 (La.1988) and Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931 (La.1991), is that defendants failed to establish an adequate chain of custody ³ for the introduction into evidence of the blood alcohol test result. This Court in Rowell, a criminal case, stated the following:

In order for the state to avail itself of the statutory presumption of a defendant's intoxication arising from a [95-1052 La. 4] chemical analysis of his blood under La.R.S. 32:662, ⁴ it must show that the state has promulgated detailed procedures which will insure the integrity and reliability of the chemical test, including provisions for repair, maintenance, inspection, cleaning, certification, and chemical accuracy.

Id. at 800. What plaintiffs in this case failed to note, however, is that this is not a criminal case, nor is there involved here the statutory presumption of intoxication.

As stated by this Court in State v. McElroy, 553 So.2d 456, 458 (La.1989) and later in State v. Honeyman, 560 So.2d 825, 828 (La.1990), "Rowell is not pertinent when the state does not rely on the statutory presumption of intoxication." As stated in McElroy:

[W]ithout the benefit of the statutory presumption of intoxication, the state may nonetheless endeavor to prove that a defendant was ... intoxicated, and, in the process, attempt to use all admissible evidence, including the hospital record, ...

553 So.2d at 458. And, "[g]enerally, the blood alcohol test result, as part of a hospital record, is admissible [even] absent compliance with Rowell." Id. at n. 1. Therefore, the Rowell reasoning does not control our resolution of the issue in this case.

Likewise, plaintiffs' reliance on Socorro is not persuasive. Admittedly, this Court in Socorro gave short shrift to a serious argument in large measure because we agreed with the court of appeal's treatment on the subject. 579 So.2d at 945. We were impressed with the court of appeal's declaration that even if admissible, the probative value was lacking. Our treatment in Socorro hardly stands for a considered resolution of the legal issue we now seriously entertain for the first time.

Interestingly, although this Court has never precisely decided this issue, the lower courts in a number of instances have admitted evidence of blood alcohol tests under the medical records statute. For instance, the court of appeal in Gore v. City of Pineville, 598 [95-1052 La. 5] So.2d 1122, 1124 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 681 (La.1992), specifically held that "under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:3714 the blood test results were properly admitted without laying a foundation." See generally Brown v. Collins, 223 So.2d 453 (La.App. 3d Cir.1969) (affirming the admission of blood test results pursuant to the hospital exception to the hearsay rule recognized in R.S. 13:3714); Hunter v. Benson Chevrolet Co., Inc., 572 So.2d 672, 673 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990) ("Compliance with the statute eliminates the need for a showing of chain of custody."). See also Jones v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 568 So.2d 1091 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 72 (La.1991).

Indeed, absent the medical records exception, proponents of a blood alcohol test result are required to lay a proper foundation, ⁵ which foundation relates not only to the chain of custody, but also to the integrity and reliability of the chemical test. For example, in Wells v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 573 So.2d 223, 227 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), the court stated that "[t]he requirements for the introduction of a blood test analysis are very stringent; the party seeking to introduce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation for its admission." Pearce v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 534 (La.App. 3d Cir.1970). "This predicate must connect the specimen with its source, show that it was properly taken by an authorized person, properly labeled and preserved, properly transported for analysis and properly tested." Id. The purpose of the chain of custody rule is to assure the integrity of the evidence. Bufkin v. Mid-American Indemnity Co., 528 So.2d 589, 592 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988) (citing Schwab v. Galuszka, 463 So.2d 737 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1386 (La.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 37, 88 L.Ed.2d 30 (1985)).

[95-1052 La. 6] On the other hand, the medical records exception obviates the need for laying a foundation for admissibility. The language of R.S. 13:3714 is clear that a certified copy of any hospital record shall be received in evidence as prima facie proof of its contents. "Courts and commentators alike generally consider medical records, including records reflecting a patient's [blood alcohol concentration] BAC, to be inherently reliable because medical personnel rely on the information in those records in making life and death decisions." ⁶ Raymond P. Ward, Admissibility Under Louisiana Law of the Results of Chemical Tests of a Person's Blood Alcohol Concentration, 35 LOY.L.REV. 1402, 1419 (1990).

Louisiana, like other states, considers hospital records to be inherently reliable. Id. No foundation, beyond certification, is required for the admission of certified hospital records. See LA.REV.STAT. § 13:3714. "Consequently, the Pearce requirement of connecting the specimen with its source, ... properly labeled and preserved, ... and properly tested, does not apply when the results of a BAC test sought to be admitted into evidence appear in a hospital record." Ward, supra, at 1420. And, on the same note, the Rowell requirements do not apply when the state does not rely upon the statutory presumption of intoxication. McElroy, 553 So.2d at 458.

"The purpose of section 13:3714 is to eliminate the requirement that the proponent of hospital records lay such a foundation for...