Judd v. Stockwell
| Decision Date | 11 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 16-0426,1 CA-CV 16-0426 |
| Parties | KELLEY C. JUDD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CYNTHIA STOCKWELL, et al., Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
MacQueen & Gottlieb, PLC, Phoenix
By Patrick R. MacQueen, Benjamin Gottlieb
Gordon & Rees, LLP, Phoenix
By Andrew S. Jacob
Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge James P. Beene joined.
¶1 Plaintiff Kelley Judd appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Cynthia Stockwell and Biltmore Lifestyles Real Estate Company, LLC, (BLRE) and awarding defendants attorneys' fees. For the reasons that follow, the judgment is affirmed, except to the extent it rejected Judd's conversion claim relating to his personal property, with that portion of the judgment vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶2 Judd and Stockwell were involved in a romantic relationship for more than a decade. During that time, the parties purchased a home together in Phoenix, shared many of their personal expenses and worked together at BLRE, the real estate business Stockwell formed. By early July 2015, Stockwell ended the relationship and Judd's position at BLRE ended.
¶3 On July 18, 2015, Judd and Stockwell signed a "Release," which reads in its entirety as follows:
¶4 In September 2015, Judd sued Stockwell and BLRE. The complaint, as amended, alleges Judd signed the Release "under duress" and asserts various contract, tort, equitable and statutory claims regarding BLRE, the house Judd and Stockwell purchased together and Judd's personal property. In November 2015, defendants filed a "motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment," arguing the Release barred Judd's claims as a matter of law. After briefing and oral argument, in a six-page minute entry, the superior court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. The court concluded that "[a]ll of the causes of action are predicated on acts preceding" the signing of the Release and that Judd's duress allegation failed as a matter of law.
¶5 The court later awarded defendants $31,250 in attorney's fees and entered final judgment reflecting these rulings. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c)(2017).2 This court has jurisdiction over Judd's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
¶6 In addressing defendants' motion, the superior court considered matters outside of the complaint, thereby treating the motion "as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Although Judd asserted in the superior court the motion was premature and additional discovery was needed, he does not press those arguments on appeal, meaning they are waived. See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011). Thus, the issue is whether defendants "show[ed] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that they are] . . . entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a), an issue this court reviews de novo, see Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, 316 (App. 1998).
¶7 Judd argues the superior court erred in rejecting his defense that he signed the Release under duress. Judd restates multiple alleged acts by Stockwell that he claims gave him "no choice but to execute the [R]elease." A contract entered under duress is voidable. State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 275 (App. 1985). A party to a contract may void the agreement if that party's "manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1979); see also Frank Culver Elec., Inc. v. Jorgenson, 136 Ariz. 76, 78 (App. 1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1)); USLife Title Co. of Ariz. v. Gutkin, 152 Ariz. 349, 357 (App. 1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(2)).
¶8 The superior court properly applied the facts as presented to the law as written in concluding that the evidence of defendants' actions Judd proffered was not wrongful, in the context of duress, as a matter of law. Accordingly, this court adopts the superior court's analysis. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993) ().3
¶9 Even assuming any of Stockwell's alleged acts were improper, Judd did not provide facts showing that he had no reasonable alternative but to sign the Release and accept the $20,000 payment. Among other things, he could have allowed Stockwell's offer to lapse and pursued legal remedies. See Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rudine, 137 Ariz. 62, 66 (App. 1983) (). Finally, Judd has not alleged that he returned the $20,000 payment to Stockwell or was prepared to do so. Cf. Gutkin, 152 Ariz. at 357 (). For these reasons, Judd's duress defense fails.
¶10 Judd argues the Release does not apply to BLRE, because it was not a named party or named in the Release, he and Stockwell were the only "undersigned parties" and BLRE's signature is "nowhere to be found" in the Release. Alternatively, Judd argues that the Release is ambiguous and that this alleged ambiguity should be construed against Stockwell as the drafter. See Leschorn v. Xericos, 121 Ariz. 77, 81 (App. 1978).
¶11 "The construction of a contract — including whether its terms are ambiguous or uncertain — is a question of law subject to de novo review." Hanson v. Tempe Life Care Vill., Inc., 216 Ariz. 26, 27 ¶ 7 (App. 2007). This court construes a contract in accordance with its plain language, in light of the parties' intentions and in view of all the circumstances. See In re Estate of Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, 250 ¶ 21 (App. 2005). "If the intention of the parties is clear from such a reading, there is no ambiguity." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
(Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding this broad language, Judd baldly states "I believed that the Release pertained only to Defendant Stockwell" and that he "was releasing Defendant Stockwell, only." He argues the phrase "business relationship" refers to portions of their personal lives that "were treated as business-like," such as splitting the costs of their cable and cell phone bills.
¶13 Notwithstanding these arguments, Judd has shown no ambiguity in the Release suggesting it did not apply to all claims arising from both the couple's personal and business dealings. Particularly at oral argument before this court, Judd claimed Hamada v. Valley Nat. Bank, 27 Ariz. App. 433 (1976) supports his argument that "business relationship" in the Release is ambiguous. Hamada, however, is distinguishable. The issues in that case included whether a letter was a purchase agreement or "a continuing guarantee" and the meaning of the phrase "a loan" used in the letter (given facts showing "a series of loans based on a continuing line of credit") in a case where summary judgment was first denied and then, after the case was assigned to a different judge, was granted. 27 Ariz. App. at 433-35. Here, by contrast, there was no showing of such ambiguities; as the superior court correctly noted, "[t]he only business involving both parties...
To continue reading
Request your trial