Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne County

• Decision Date: 08 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 9,9
• Citation: 172 N.W.2d 436,383 Mich. 10
• Parties: , 66 Lab.Cas. P 52,668 The JUDGES FOR the THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT of the State of Michigan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Wayne, Board of Auditors of Wayne County, Treasurer of Wayne County, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 436

172 N.W.2d 436

383 Mich. 10, 66 Lab.Cas. P 52,668

The JUDGES FOR the THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT of the State of

Michigan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE and the Board of Supervisors of the County

of Wayne, Board of Auditors of Wayne County,

Treasurer of Wayne County, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 8, 1969. Opinion Superseded 190 N.W.2d 228.

Travis, Warren, Nayer & Burgoyne, by Harry M. Nayer, Tom Downs, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Aloysius J. Suchy and David R. Kaplan, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Sol Rubin, Counsel, NCCD, Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Robert E. Juceam, New York City, for National Council on Crime and Delinquency, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

BRENNAN, Chief Justice.

THE CASE

This action is brought by the judges of the third judicial circuit of Michigan against the defendant county and its officers, praying for mandamus and certain declaratory relief. The facts of the case will appear in the body of the opinion.

FIRST ISSUE: MANDAMUS

This Court declines to affirm the issuance of mandamus at this time as prayed. See Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia (1918), 246 U.S. 565, 604, 38 S.Ct. 400, 59 L.Ed. 1272.

SECOND ISSUE: DECLARATORY RELIEF

This Court has jurisdiction in the interest of the administration of justice, pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7), to act upon plaintiffs' petition for a declaration of rights.

'However, it should be noted that the plaintiffs, in their bill of complaint, ask for a declaratory decree, to settle controlling questions of law; and counsel for the city likewise ask that we decide the merits of the questions raised here in order to have an early decision, because of the need for prompt relief of congested traffic and parking conditions in Detroit and to avoid any further delay in the issuance of revenue bonds. With that in mind, instead of taking a short cut by deciding the matter on the ground that the plaintiffs have no standing in court, we have concluded to follow the method recently adopted in the Nichols Case, supra, and decide the merits of the questions raised.' City of Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 339 Mich. 62, 71, 62 N.W.2d 626, 631.

THIRD ISSUE: THE INHERENT POWER OF COURTS

The three powers of government are separated in Michigan by constitutional mandate. Const.1963, art. 3, § 2.

The judicial power of this State is vested in one court of justice. Const.1963, art. 6, § 1.

Judicial power is the power to decide cases between contending parties and to determine legal rights in other cases where permitted by law. See Const.1963, art. 3, § 8.

In Attorney General, ex rel. Cook v. O'Neill, 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445, reference is made to the separation of the three great powers of government, being as distinct and independent of each other as the It is the imperfection of human institutions which gives rise to our notion of inherent power. It is simply impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legislator to do nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute the laws. The proper exercise of each of these three great powers of government necessarily includes some ancillary inherent capacity to do things by which are normally done by the other departments.

nature of society and the imperfections of human institutions will permit.

Thus, both the legislative department and the judicial department have certain housekeeping chores which are prerequisite to the exercise of legislative and judicial power. And, to accomplish these housekeeping chores both departments have inherently a measure of administrative authority not unlike that primarily and exclusively vested in the executive department.

The inherent power of the judiciary is a judicial power, but only in the sense that it is a natural necessary concomitant to the judicial power.

The inherent power of the court is nonadjudicatory. It does not deal with justiciable matters. It relates to the administration of the business of the Court.

In the constitutional scheme of things, the largest measure of this inherent power is vested in the Supreme Court. To this Court falls the constitutional responsibility to superintend the administration of justice throughout the State. The assignment of judges, the advancement of judicial education, the maintenance of judicial statistics, the division of judicial business, the supervision of the Bar, are all technically administrative functions, but they are reposed in the Court by the same Constitution which declares the absolute separation of governmental powers. That this Court has the inherent power to fulfill its mandate cannot be doubted. Not the least of the duties of this Court is the function of assessing and declaring the needs of the administration of justice. In the discharge of this duty, the Court exercises its inherent power to prepare and submit a judicial budget and to support and urge in the executive chambers and the legislative halls those fiscal, organizational and other measures which are deemed expedient and needful to the convenient and efficient administration of justice.

Similarly, this Court and the circuit courts have the responsibility and the power to assess and declare the needs of the judiciary and the administration of justice on the local level.

This broad power to assess and declare the needs of administering justice does not usurp the fiscal authority of the legislative department. The courts do not levy taxes, or appropriate public monies. These things must be done by the legislative bodies, whose responsibility it is to supply the needs, not only of the administration of justice but also of all those other areas of public concern which are proper subjects for governmental action.

Nevertheless, the inherent power of courts is not exhausted when the needs of administration of justice have been declared and urged upon the legislative councils.

There remains a narrower area in which the courts have inherent power to go further than merely declare the existence of a need. It is an area in which the courts have inherent power to bind the State or the county contractually.

It is clear that our Constitution established an independent co-equal judicial branch of government. It is clear that the operation of this co-equal branch of government is one of the proper expenses of state government, for which taxes must be levied (Const.1963, art. 9, § 1), and with which executive fiscal policies may not interfere (Const.1963, art. 5, § 20).

If, therefore, a particular item of expense is necessary to the effectively continuing functioning of the Court, that item must be paid. In this context, we do not use the broader phrase 'needs of administration of justice.' Instead, we deliberately choose the narrower term 'necessary to the effectively continuing functioning of the court.' The test is not Relative need, but Practical necessity.

We do not purpose here to itemize those expenses which are necessaries. What may be deemed necessary for an appellate court may not be essential in a trial court. What may be crucial in a metropolitan court may be superfluous in the hinterlands.

FOURTH ISSUE: INHERENT POWERS, HOW THEY ARE EXERCISED

A judge by presuming to act contractually in the exercise of inherent powers does not adjudicate anything. He acts administratively. Tested judicially, his action may be Ultra vires if factually it should appear that the expense incurred was not practically necessary to the effectively continuing operation of the court.

A reading of article 9, § 22, Constitution 1963, together with the court of claims act, P.A.1961, No. 236 (M.C.L.A. §§ 600.6401--600.6475, Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. §§ 27A.6401--27A.6475), demonstrates that our Constitution and laws contemplates that the State can be bound even beyond existing appropriations Ex contractu no less than Ex delicto. See particularly M.C.L.A. § 600.6458, which provides for certification to the legislature of judgments against the State for the payment of which no appropriation has been made.

Stowell v. Board of Supervisors for Jackson County, 57 Mich. 31, 23 N.W. 557, makes it clear that the circuit judge does have authority to act contractually, and that the county is the proper arm of state government upon which the necessary expenses of operating the circuit court devolves. The authority of a judge to bind the county or the state is never broader than the necessity which prompts its exercise. Actual authority, not apparent authority is the criterion. Actual necessity must be alleged and shown by the claimant. Our re-affirmance of this ancient power will cause no rush to market by the judges. They are aware of the rule which makes an agent liable upon implied warranty of authority if his action exceeds his commission. Nor are vendors or employees likely to queue up for the prospect of litigating in the court of claims.

FIFTH ISSUE: LAW CLERKS

Under appropriate factual circumstances, a circuit court may exercise its inherent power for the purpose of employing a law clerk or law clerks. On the basis of the record before us in this case we hold that there is no practical necessity at this time for additional law clerks in the third judicial circuit. Further, we do not decide whether the judges of the third circuit are empowered by statute to employ law clerks in the absence of an appropriation for that purpose. C.L.S.1961, § 600.1471, Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 27A.1471.

As to superintendency of the judiciary, see Const.1963, art. 6, § 4. We are not persuaded that the judges of the third circuit have demonstrated the practical necessity of employing law clerks at this time. And accordingly, we will direct them to withdraw their request for such clerks, reserving the administrative jurisdiction to redetermine the necessity at a later date.

SIXTH ISSUE: THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANT

The question of the exercise of...