Judges of Municipal Court of City of Cedar Rapids, In re

• Decision Date: 22 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 51591,51591
• Parties: . Supreme Court of Iowa
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 553

130 N.W.2d 553

256 Iowa 1135

In the Matter of the JUDGES OF the MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa.

No. 51591.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 22, 1964.

PER CURIAM.

Article V, section 4, of the constitution of Iowa, I.C.A., so far as pertinent here, provides: 'The Supreme Court shall * * * exercise a supervisory and administrative control over all inferior Judicial tribunals throughout the State.'

In Hutchins v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 189, 216, 157 N.W. 881, 890, we had occasion to examine the meaning of the words 'supervisory control' as then found in the constitution. We said: 'To supervise is 'to oversee for direction; to superintend; to inspect with authority;' and to control means 'to exercise restraining or governing influence over; * * * to regulate; to govern; to overpower.' From these definitions that of supervisory control may be deduced, * * *.'

In Von Rosenberg v. Lovett, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W. 508, 514, it was held: 'To supervise does not mean to do the work in detail, but to see that it is done. It means to oversee, with power of direction.' This definition was quoted with approval in Egner v. States Realty Company, 223 Minn. 305, 26 N.W.2d 464, 471, 170 A.L.R. 500, 510.

The grant of the power of supervision and administration implies a duty to exercise it. In fact, the language of the constitutional is mandatory that we must do so. And necessarily this power must apply to something beyond the ordinary appellate procedure and correction of errors of law, which are also provided for in Article V, Section 4, of the constitution. The remedy for mistakes of law or fact in individual cases is by appeal, or certiorari, or other proper proceeding. A judge has a right to be wrong so far as any discipline by this court is concerned except as his decisions may be reversed or writs sustained.

But when there is apparent a pattern of procedure which shows a consistent disregard for the rights of litigants, or an arbitrary and capricious course of conduct in the handling of cases, or an oppressive and improper use of the power of the court, it is our duty to exercise our supervisory and administrative powers to insure the correction of such abuses. Complaints have been lodged with this court concerning the judicial conduct of the two judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Cedar Rapids. Our investigation discloses a need for correction.

JUDGE LOREN M. HULLINGER, JR.

The original complaint made to us concerned the dismissal of certain cases brought by the traffic weight department of the Iowa State Highway Commission which charged overloading by truckers in the City of Cedar Rapids. Several of these were dismissed by Judge Hullinger, for the stated reasons that he did not believe the statutes regarding overloading should be applied in cities and towns; that the City of Cedar Rapids should enact an ordinance following the state law if it wished its streets protected against overloads; the traffic weight department was carrying on 'a crusade'; and he referred to section 795.5, Code of 1962, I.C.A., as permitting the dismissal of criminal charges upon the court's own motion, 'in the furtherance of justice.'

It appears that Judge Hullinger has on many occasions dismissed criminal cases, both those charging violations of state statutes and of city ordinances, without hearing or giving the prosecuting authorities any opportunity to present their cases. While procedures in the handling of minor offenses may understandably be informal to a considerable extent, a fair opportunity for each side to present its case must be afforded. Arbitrary handling of cases in the manner stated above is not in the interest of proper administration of the courts. It is true section 795.5, Code of 1962, I.C.A., permits the court to dismiss criminal charges on its own motion, 'in the furtherance of justice.' However, justice is not 'furthered' by wholesale dismissals of cases with no opportunity for each side to be heard and for no better reason than that the presiding judge thinks the offended statutes are unfiar in their application.

Justified complaint is also made that Judge Hullinger has unduly delayed decision in several cases, both criminal and civil. Litigants are entitled to have their cases determined with reasonable expedition, and this has too frequently not been observed. There is also evidence that some cases, usually informations in criminal cases, have disappeared and cannot now be located. Whether this is due to fault of the judges or of inefficient handling of papers in the clerk's office has not been ascertained. In any event, no well conducted court should permit this to happen.

JUDGE HOWARD W. McLAUGHLIN. Many of the criticisms lodged against Judge Hullinger also apply to Judge McLaughlin. He has also arbitrarily refused to hear litigants, and has improperly criticized them. Trial of many cases has been delayed, and it has been difficult, if not...