Judkins v. Carpenter

• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GROVES
• Citation: Judkins v. Carpenter, 537 P.2d 737, 189 Colo. 95 (Colo. 1975)
• Decision Date: 23 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. C--512,C--512
• Parties: Grant JUDKINS, Petitioner, v. Sheryl A. CARPENTER, Respondent.

Page 737

537 P.2d 737

189 Colo. 95

Grant JUDKINS, Petitioner, v. Sheryl A. CARPENTER, Respondent.

No. C--512.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 23, 1975.

Fischer, Wilmarth & Hasler, G. William Beardslee, Fort Collins, for petitioner.

Riffenburgh, Nelson & Porter, Alan R. Porter, Fort Collins, for respondent.

GROVES, Justice.

We granted certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals as to its opinion in Columbia Savings and Loan Association v. Carpenter and Judkins, Colo.App. 521 P.2d 1299 (1974). We agree with the dissent in that case and reverse.

This was an interpleader action brought by the Columbia Savings and Loan Association to determine the ownership of a savings account. The account had been in the name of Marion Judkins, mother of the petitioner and grandmother of the respondent. On March 13, 1972, the grandmother signed a card placing the account in the names of the grandmother and the granddaughter, in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The grandmother died on April 13, 1972. The grandmother and the granddaughter had resided in the same residence on, and prior to, March 13, 1972, and had a close relationship.

The case was tried to the court. In addition to a further conclusion which will be discussed later, the court made the following conclusions: that the son established a confidential relationship between the grandmother and the granddaughter; that this shifted the 'burden of proof' to the granddaughter 'to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she did not exert undue influence on' the grandmother; that the granddaughter did not overcome the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence; and that on March 13, 1972, the grandmother lacked requisite mental capacity to make the change in the account.

While the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, it agreed with the trial court's conclusion that there was a confidential relationship.

In the majority opinion of the court of appeals, there is an excellent discussion of the difference between Hilliard v. Shellabarger, 120 Colo. 441, 210 P.2d 441 (1949) (followed in Bohl v. Haney, 28 Colo.App. 55, 470 P.2d 603 (1970)), on the one hand, and Lesser v. Lesser, 128 Colo. 151, 250 P.2d 130 (1952), on the other. In Shellabarger, it was stated:

'At the time the deed was signed was there a fiduciary relationship existing between the aged and infirm grantor and the grantees which raised a presumption of undue influence in the procurement of the deed, requiring defendants to assume the burden of proving the transaction to have been in fact fair, just, and reasonable?

'This question must be answered in the affirmative.'

In Bohl, the court of appeals distinguished Shellabarger from Lesser because the word 'fraud' was used in Shellabarger. However, this term arose in the discussion of authorities cited, and insofar as we are concerned here, Shellabarger and Lesser are indistinguishable on the facts.

Rescission of a deed was involved in Lesser. The court held in effect that the burden of proof is upon him who seeks rescission. It further held that the confidential relationship between father and son raised a presumption of undue influence and placed upon the grantee of the deed the burden of going forward. Lesser controls and the quoted language in Shellabarger is rejected.

It is to be implied in the opinion of the majority of the court of appeals that it concluded that the granddaughter had rebutted the presumption. It also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support an independent finding of undue influence and that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of insufficient mental capacity. It, therefore, reversed the trial court.

We agree with the dissent in the court of appeals which reads as follows:

'I agree with the majority opinion in the analysis of prior decisions relating to the presumption of undue influence. However, I interpret the trial court's findings to be that, irrespective of the presumption, it found by a preponderance of the evidence that decedent made the subject gift as a result of the undue influence of appellant. In my view there is sufficient evidence in the record to support that finding. I would therefore affirm the judgment.'

As already indicated, the majority opinion correctly ruled that the trial court was in error, after finding that a confidential relationship existed,...