Juide v. City of Ann Arbor

• Decision Date: 15 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-71762-DT.,93-CV-71762-DT.
• Citation: 839 F. Supp. 497
• Parties: Charlotte JUIDE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, A. George Best, Robert Lane, Stephen J. Markman, and Tony P. Williams, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

839 F. Supp. 497

Charlotte JUIDE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, A. George Best, Robert Lane, Stephen J. Markman, and Tony P. Williams, jointly and severally, Defendants.

No. 93-CV-71762-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

December 15, 1993.

Douglas Spicer, Ypsilanti, MI, for plaintiff.

Stefani Carter, Asst. City Atty., Ann Arbor, Stephen Markman and Tony Williams, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, MI, for City of Ann Arbor, Lane and Williams.

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, Jr., Chief Judge.

On July 6, 1993, two of the Defendants, Stephen J. Markman and A. George Best II, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the bases of absolute and qualified immunity, improper defendant, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.¹ On July 30, 1993, the Plaintiff, Charlotte Juide, filed her opposition papers.

For the reasons that have been set forth below, this Court will grant the Defendants' motion in part.

I

This case stems from in rem forfeiture proceedings that had been initiated by the Government against an apartment in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A synopsis of the background of this case is in order:

On April 23, 1990, the United States commenced a civil in rem forfeiture against the premises at 850 South Maple, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, which consists of a public housing unit that had been leased to Charlotte Juide by the City's Housing Commission. The Complaint alleged that the Defendant property was used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, a controlled substance, and was therefore subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(7).

On April 23, 1990, a federal magistrate signed a seizure warrant which authorized the immediate removal of Juide from her premises, and the seizure of the property by the United States Government. The Government's application for the warrant was supported by an affidavit from the Ann Arbor Police Department.

On April 27, 1990, the United States Marshall seized the apartment and evicted Juide and her two children. Juide and her family, who were asleep when they were awakened by the shouting of Government agents inside their apartment, were not given any prior notice of this action....

Juide and her children were given less than fifteen minutes in which to gather their belongings before they were removed from their apartment. An unidentified person with a video camera filmed the activities in the apartment. In addition, several members of the news media were waiting outside the apartment unit with additional cameras when Juide existed.

United States v. Leasehold Interest in Property at 850 S. Maple, Ann Arbor, Mich., 743 F.Supp. 505, 506-07 (E.D.Mich.1990). In response to the seizure of her apartment, Juide brought several motions, including one to vacate the seizure. The Court granted the requested relief, finding that "Juide's due process rights were violated when the federal magistrate issued the warrant for seizure prior to holding a hearing in which she could appear and challenge the Government's position that probable cause existed." Id. at 511. On June 11, 1991, the forfeiture action was dismissed for mootness because Juide had moved from the premises.

Nearly two years later, Juide filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming, inter alia, that Markman and Best had (1) violated her constitutional rights, (2) conspired to violate her federal and state constitutional rights, (3) conspired to invade her privacy, and (4) intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. (Complaint at 7-10.)

Markman and Best have moved to dismiss Juide's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Their motion is now before the Court for resolution.

II

Markman and Best seek the protection of absolute immunity from any liability to Juide because they were acting within the "advocatory" scope of their duties at the time of the challenged incident. They also assert the defense of qualified immunity, arguing that it was not clearly established law at the time of their alleged violation of Juide's constitutional rights that (1) due process prohibited the issuance of a seizure warrant without prior notice and an opportunity to contest the probable cause issue and (2) the Government was precluded from initiating a forfeiture action whenever a claimant may risk self-incrimination by filing a claim for the property. Moreover, Markman and Best submit that they are improper defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 with regard to Juide's state tort claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, they argue that if the United States was substituted as the proper defendant, all of the pending state claims must be dismissed because of Juide's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.

In her opposition papers, Juide takes issue with the positions of Markman and Best, arguing that (1) these two individuals are not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity, and (2) the United States should not be substituted as a defendant in this case because 28 U.S.C. § 2679 is unconstitutional.

III

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to raise several defenses to a complaint, including the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order for a complaint to be dismissed on this ground, a court must conclude "beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 452 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam)). In making its decision, a court must liberally construe the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party and accept as true all well-pleaded allegations. Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1975).

A. Immunity From Suit

Every person acting under color of state law is subjected to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of any other person's rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution. However, this statute does not abolish common law immunities. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) (Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate immunities well grounded in history and reason); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2612-13, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (Congress would have specifically stated if it intended to abolish well established immunities).

1. Absolute Immunity

Recognizing the need for government officials to be able to make impartial or imaginative decisions without the threat of personal liability for actions that were taken pursuant to their official duties, the United States Supreme Court extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to certain government officials under limited circumstances. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (agency attorney); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (judge); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (prosecutors); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (legislators); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 367, 71 S.Ct. at 783 (legislators); but see, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2812, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (absolute immunity not extended to Attorney General from suit for damages arising of allegedly unconstitutional conduct in performing national security functions). This immunity only applies when the official is acting within the core functions of the office which is determined to fall within the auspices of this doctrine. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2704, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).

In determining whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity, the Supreme Court employs a functional approach. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542-543, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (functional approach applied to state court judge); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (functional test applied to prosecutors). Under this method, a court "examines the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and ... seeks to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions." Id. Some of the factors that a court may consider under this test include whether 1) there exists a historical or common law basis for the immunity in question; 2) the performance of the function subjects the official to a risk of vexatious litigation; and 3) there are other checks that help to prevent abuses of authority from going unredressed. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 521-522, 105 S.Ct. at 2812-2813; see also Burns, 500 U.S. at ___ - ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1942-44.

In any event, the burden is upon the official who seeks absolute immunity to demonstrate that the need is justified by overriding considerations of public policy. Burns, at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1939. Even if the immunity traditionally applies to a given function, the court must consider "whether § 1983's history and purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in § 1983 actions." Buckley, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2613 (citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2825, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984)).

It is well established that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420, 96 S.Ct. at 990. Hence, prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability in civil suits which challenge their decisions (1) to initiate prosecutions or (2) concerning the conduct of the trial and presentation of evidence. Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989). This immunity covers quasi-judicial functions such as actions taken in...