Jules v. State

• Decision Date: 31 March 1897
• Citation: 36 A. 1027,85 Md. 305
• Parties: JULES v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

36 A. 1027

85 Md. 305

JULES v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 31, 1897

Appeal from criminal court of Baltimore city.

Prof M. Jules was convicted of an offense, and appeals.Affirmed.

William H. Wicker, the prosecuting witness, being duly sworn testified as follows: "On Monday I went to see him [Jules] at the Eutaw House.I told the professor I wanted to see him, as I was sick for some time.The professor offered me paper, and told me to write my name and age upon it, and not to let him see what I wrote.I wrote my name and age on the paper, and he walked up and down the room, and looked out of the window, and took the paper, folded up, and placed it against his forehead, and then told me what I had written on the paper.He said: 'You suffer from stomach trouble, and I can and will cure you within six weeks.If not, I will return you your money.'He said: 'At the end of six weeks, if not cured, I will return you the money.'I asked him when I should call again, and he said 'Don't come.I will come and see you, and work on you four hours, and after that you will be well.'He also gave me a charm to wear.I wore it around my neck for one hour.He said to wear it was essential to the treatment.I am not over the stomach trouble yet.He never came to my house and worked on me.I paid him twenty-six dollars and thirty cents."The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony, as not supporting the charge set forth in the bill of particulars, but the court overruled the objection, and allowed the testimony to go to the jury.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and BRYAN, PAGE, BRISCOE, BOYD, and FOWLER, JJ.

Thomas C. Weeks, Wm. F. Campbell, and Charles Winternitz, for appellant.

Attorney General Clabaugh and Henry Duffy, for the State.

FOWLER J.

The appellant was indicted in the criminal court of Baltimore city on the charge of obtaining money under false pretenses.Availing himself of the provision of Code, art. 27, § 288, he demanded a statement of the false pretenses intended to be given in evidence, together with the names of the witnesses.This demand was complied with by the state's attorney.It appears by the record that a demurrer was filed, but it is not stated whether to the indictment or the bill of particulars.We think, however, that it clearly appears from an examination of the docket entries that the demurrer was directed entirely to the bill of particulars, and did not and could not have involved the indictment, except upon the theory that the former was part and parcel of the latter.The docket entries are as follows: "April 13th, 1896, demand for bill of particulars; April 15th, 1896, bill of particulars filed by state's attorney; April 16th, 1896, demurrer entered short; Sept. 29th, 1896, demurrer sustained; Sept. 29th, 1896, motion in open court by state's attorney for leave to file amended bill of particulars; same day, objections to motion made in open court by counsel for defendant; same day, objection overruled by the court, and leave granted to the state's attorney to file amended bill of particulars; Sept. 29th, 1896, amended bill of particulars filed; Sept. 29th, 1896, demurrer entered short; same day, demurrer overruled; same day, special exceptions overruled."The fact that, when the demurrer was sustained, the state's attorney immediately filed an amended bill of particulars, the trial was continued, and the appellant was convicted, and sentenced to three years' confinement in the penitentiary, would seem to be conclusive evidence that the demurrer was, as we have said, to the bill of particulars, and not to the indictment; for if a demurrer to the indictment had been sustained, as the defendant suggests, it would have been then and there quashed, and it would have been folly to file an amended bill of particulars, or proceed further with the trial.

It was contended, but we can hardly suppose seriously, that, the demurrer to the indictment having been sustained, the judgment on the first demurrer, in favor of the defendant, being final, and the appellant being entitled to his discharge, all the subsequent proceedings were without authority and absolutely void.But it would require more cogent proof than we have found in the record to induce us to believe that the learned judge below would permit, or the state's attorney would adopt, a course so preposterous and unwarranted as to proceed with the trial and conviction of the defendant after the indictment had been found insufficient.It would also follow, if the indictment had been or ought to have been quashed, that the learned counsel for the defendant would have been remiss in his duty to his client in allowing him, without objection, so far as the record shows, to be tried on an indictment which the court had declared insufficient in law.But we think the indictment was not only not demurred to, but we are all of opinion that a demurrer to it could not have been sustained.It is similar in form to the indictment in Carnell's Case (decided at last October term, and not yet officially reported)36 A. 117, in which we held that the indictment there considered was in the usual form, and free from objection.

2.If then, we are correct in saying the indictment is good, the next question to be considered is whether there is any foundation for the objections which have been so earnestly urged against the bill of particulars.The Code provides (article 27, § 288) that in any indictment for false pretenses it should not be necessary to state the particular false pretenses intended to be relied on, but the defendant, on application to the state's attorney before trial, shall be entitled to the names of the witnesses and a statement of the false pretenses intended to be given in evidence.Section 291 of the same article provides that on the trial of any of the offenses mentioned in that section, obtaining any property by false pretenses being one of them, it shall not be necessary to prove an intent on the part of the defendant to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove that the defendant did the act charged, with an intent to defraud.Does the statement of particulars, as amended, comply with the provisions of sections 288and291?We think, clearly, it does.Without quoting it at length, it is sufficient to say that it alleges that the appellant, with intent to defraud, falsely represented himself to the prosecutors as a physician possessing extraordinary and supernatural powers to cure certain infirmities, and particularly that he could cure and would cure the prosecutor of a certain malady from which he was then suffering, and that, further to induce him to part with a certain sum of money, the defendant delivered to him a written guaranty, by the terms of which the defendant was to refund the said sum of money if a permanent and total cure was not effected within a certain number of days; whereas in truth and in fact the defendant was not a physician with the powers he claimed to have, nor could he effect the cure, but all his representations were false, and he absconded before the time stipulated for the cure of the prosecutor.It is...