Julia v. Janssen, Inc., Civ. 96-1768(DRD).
Decision Date | 21 March 2000 |
Docket Number | No. Civ. 96-1768(DRD).,Civ. 96-1768(DRD). |
Citation | 92 F.Supp.2d 25 |
Parties | Roberto JULIA, Plaintiff, v. JANSSEN, INC., et. al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Mari C. Bosch-Alomar, McConnell Valdes, San Juan, PR, for defendant.
Pending before this court are two motions for summary judgment submitted simultaneously by Codefendants, Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Partners ("J & J"), and Carmen Rodríguez ("Rodríguez"). (Docket No. 34). Plaintiff, Roberto Julia ("Julia"), opposed. (Docket No. 30). J & J and Rodríguez have duly replied. (Docket No. 33).1
Although not evidence at this summary judgment stage, the Court draws extensively from the Complaint in order to set the stage for the analysis to follow. Plaintiff brought this action, on June 24, 1996, against Defendants claiming he was discharged from his employment in violation of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., ("ADA"); the Civil Rights Act of 1867 through 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988;2 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., ("ERISA"); the Puerto Rico Non-Occupational Disability Benefit Act, P.R.LAWS ANN. tit. 11, §§ 201-212 ("SINOT"); and the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, art. 1802-1803, P.R.LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5142.
The Complaint states that Julia had worked at Janssen, Inc., a subsidiary of J & J, since January 7, 1986 as a QA Technician, a Microbiologist, and most recently a Specification Specialist. Due to a mental impairment, depression with panic attacks, and unable to work, Julia utilized the company's short-term disability benefits from July 20, 1994 to January 4, 1995.
During November 1994, Ms. Nora González, Benefits Administrator, informed Julia that his short-term disability benefits ended on February 11, 1995. Julia was not informed that he could be terminated from his employment or lose his status of employee for failing to report prior to that given date.3
Julia reported to his employer on January 4, 1995, that he was ready to work. Julia obtained a medical certification issued by Doctor Lourido stating that Julia was "completely ready to return to work without limitation."
On January 11, 1995, Julia returned to the workplace where Mr. John Ortiz, Department Head, tells Julia that a place is waiting for him. However, on that same date, a Dr. Andres Fuentes informed Julia that Co-defendant Rodríguez had requested Julia's medical file. Also on that same date, Rodriguez made clear that J & J would not reinstate him because he was supposed to have reported back to work on January 5, 1995 and thus he had overextended his leave. The words and attitude of Rodríguez were to the effect that Julia has fabricated his disability and was pretending to return to work right at the expiration of the six-month term provided by the short-term leave plan. Julia replied that his medical condition could be medically corroborated, and that he had reported to the company on January 4, 1995. On that day he was informed that his leave would expire on the next day. Additionally, Julia informed Ms. Rodríguez that the entry date provided by the Benefit Administrator was February 11, 1995.
On January 26, 1995, Julia wrote a letter explaining that the company had deliberately miscalculated his leave expiration date and asked for a rectification of the error.
By letter, dated January 26, 1995, Julia was informed that the company not only denied his request but also proceeded to terminate him.
Julia contends that the true reason for his termination was not the reason adduced by the letter but rather his disability, discrimination against a person perceived to be depressive, and his past and possible future use of the company's disability benefits. At no time did the company attempt to accommodate the Plaintiff.
For the above, the Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, economic and compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
A court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ..." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). "In applying this formulation, a fact is `material' if it potentially affects the outcome of the case," Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997), and "`genuine' if a reasonable factfinder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997). The court should "`look at the record ... in the light most favorable to ... the party opposing ... the motion' ... [and] indulge all inferences favorable to the party opposing the motion." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)) (citations omitted). However, the nonmovant must "present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). "The court may consider any material that would be admissible or usable at trial." See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2721, at 361 (3d ed.1998). Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Furthermore, "[n]o credibility assessment may be resolved in favor of the party seeking summary judgment." Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted). "If, after this canvassing of the material presented, the district court finds that some genuine factual issue remains in the case, whose resolution one way or another could affect its outcome, the court must deny the motion." Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d at 895 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. at 2505).
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790-1791, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) ( ); see also William Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir.1995); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1988); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d at 895. "Under such circumstances [state of mind], jury judgments about credibility are typically thought to be of special importance." Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir.1983); see Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir.2000). However, "even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996).
As the Court mentioned previously two motions for summary judgment are currently pending: (A) Rodríguez'; and (B) J & J's. (Docket No. 34). Julia filed an opposition. (Docket No. 30). Rodríguez and J & J have responded. (Docket No. 33).
Rodríguez argues that: (1) Julia failed to file a charge against Rodríguez before the Antidiscrimination Unit of the Department of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico or the EEOC, for that reason the ADA claims against Rodríguez should be dismissed; (2) Julia failed to allege and/or prove that Rodríguez was his "employer" for ADA and SINOT purposes; (3) Julia failed to allege and/or prove that Rodríguez caused him any harm in her personal capacity apart from her actions as J & J's Human Resources Manager; and, (4) Rodríguez does not administer nor maintains a welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA.
Julia concedes that Rodríguez is not liable "under the Disability Act, ADA and ERISA" however, she is a proper defendant under the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, art. 1802-1803, P.R.LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5142. (Docket No. 30, p. 3). The Court agrees in part, and briefly explains.
(1) Julia's ADA claim.
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