Julian v. Stony Creek Red Granite Co.
| Decision Date | 30 March 1899 |
| Citation | 42 A. 994,71 Conn. 632 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | JULIAN v. STONY CREEK RED GRANITE CO. |
Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; William T. Elmer, Judge.
Action by Samuel Julian against the Stony Creek Red Granite Company. Heard in damages after demurrer overruled. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, and upon the overruling of the demurrer a hearing in damages was had, upon which the court found the following facts: At the time of the accident alleged in the complaint the plaintiff was at work, by the direction of the defendant, in its yard, engaged in stonecutting. At this time Everett S. Grant was acting as superintendent of the defendant company in the state of Connecticut was also secretary and treasurer of said company, and had the management and control of its affairs in the state of Connecticut, controlled by the board of directors. The defendant at that time, and for a long time previous, had used and operated in its stone yard, in connection with its said business, a derrick for raising and lowering heavy stones in said yard, and moving them from place to place. Said derrick was operated by means of a crank worked by hand, this crank being attached to a shafting geared into a cogwheel upon a drum upon which a rope was wound. The raising or lowering of stones was effected by raising the boom by means of the rope attached to the drum. This gear from the shaft to the drum was liable to slip out of connection, and in such case the boom would fall. The only arrangement to prevent this was a clutch or pawl, which consisted of a curved piece of iron resting upon the shaft so as to prevent slipping on the shaft and disconnection of the gearing. This clutch or pawl upon this derrick had no weight attached to it, and was broken, so that it was liable to get out of place unless great care was exercised in superintending the operation of the derrick. The derrick in question was of the kind ordinarily in use for the purposes used by the defendant in this case, and in operation at the time of the accident. The defendant had in its employ at the time of the accident a foreman or superintendent of the yard, whose duty it was to superintend and supervise the operation of the derrick when in use. He had general charge and oversight of the derrick, and it was also his duty to inspect the derrick, and see that everything was all right connected with the machinery. This superintendent, William W. Kittredge by name, was not a fellow servant of the plaintiff, but was vice principal of the defendant. The plaintiff was a stonecutter in the employ of the latter, and was engaged in cutting stone at the time of the fall of the derrick which occasioned his injury. The said foreman was employed to supervise the derrick, and it was his duty to see to it that it was properly and carefully operated by some competent person. This foreman and the general manager knew that the derrick required such care whenever in use. This said foreman or superintendent of the derrick neglected to discharge his duty in the premises, and both the defendant and said foreman neglected to take proper precautions in regard to the persons who operated the same. The defendant allowed said derrick to be operated by any of the employes, including ignorant persons of little intelligence or mechanical skill, who happened to be convenient for the purpose. At the time of the accident, or just previous thereto, the defendant and the said foreman failed to inspect the machinery, and to see that it was in proper condition. It appeared from the evidence that defendant and its foreman knew of the defective condition of the derrick at the time of the accident, and were greatly negligent in failing to properly superintend the same, and in allowing it to be operated by inexperienced persons. I find also that the resident manager knew of these facts. The accident to the plaintiff was caused by the lifting or displacement of the clutch or pawl in such a way as to allow the gearing to slip, so that the arm of the derrick, just after the lowering of stone, fell, and struck the plaintiff. I find this accident resulted from the neglect of the defendant company in the manner as hereinbefore set forth. Just previous to the occurrence of the accident, the plaintiff had been working upon a large block of granite. A heavy stone had just been raised by the derrick, and moved from one place in the yard to another; and before the arm fell, which occasioned the accident, the stone had been lowered to the ground, so that no weight rested upon the derrick. When the operation of raising the stone began, the plaintiff, together with other men working in the yard, removed to a point beyond the reach of the derrick, and after the stone had been moved, and lowered to the ground, the work of the derrick finished, plaintiff returned to his work. He was then located nearly, but not quite, under the line, and about one foot lower than the arm of the derrick. Over him was a board used as a shelter from the rays of the sun. For some reason, never explained, the arm of the derrick did not fall during the operation of the latter, but a short time afterwards fell, striking the plaintiff, crushing him against the stone, and inflicting the injuries for which this suit was brought. I find that the falling of the arm of the derrick, after the placing of the stone in its place, and the manner of its coming down, was unusual, and unexpected by him and other employes at this place, at this time; and from the usual operations of the derrick in doing such work, with which the plaintiff was familiar from observation, he had a right to presume that it was safe for him to return to his work, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence in so doing. At the time when the accident occurred, the plaintiff knew of the condition of the derrick, but he did not know, nor did he anticipate, that there was any danger that the derrick would fall, as it did, after the stone had reached the ground, and the derrick had ceased operation. The plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care, and did not receive warning in time to escape the accident. The plaintiff, during his testimony as a witness, and after he had testified to having been employed in the...
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Lawler v. Hartford St. Ry. Co.
...Atl. 791; La Barre v. City of Waterbury, 69 Conn. 556, 37 Atl. 1068; Bergin v. Telephone Co., 70 Conn. 65, 38 Atl. 888; Julian v. Granite Co., 71 Conn. 632, 42 Atl. 994. The defendant failed to prove facts sufficient to sustain its claims The case therefore stood as if the plaintiff had pro......
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Morris v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co.
...the court must give to the facts it may find established by a preponderance of proof their legitimate legal effect. Julian v. Granite Co., 71 Conn. 632, 637, 42 Atl. 994; Lawler v. Railway Co., 72 Conn. 74, 85, 43 Atl. 545. In the present case the statutory notees were filed. Our statutes o......
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Davidson v. Max Ripps Co.
... ... was sanctioned by the court in Julian v. Stony Creek Red ... Granite Co., 71 Conn. 632, 640, 42 A. 994 ... ...
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Walsh v. Hayes
...only be taken at the time of making a motion for the correction or alteration of the finding, and as part of it. See Julian v. Granite Co., 71 Conn. 632, 640, 42 Atl. 994. The object of this statutory provision, that they are to be annexed to the motion (Pub. Acts 1897, p. 890, § 9), obviou......