Julian Volunteer Fire Co. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Prot. Dist., D076639

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HALLER, J.
• Citation: 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 849,62 Cal.App.5th 583
• Parties: JULIAN VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JULIAN-CUYAMACA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant; County of San Diego et al., Interveners and Respondents.
• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: D076639

62 Cal.App.5th 583
276 Cal.Rptr.3d 849

JULIAN VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
JULIAN-CUYAMACA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant;

County of San Diego et al., Interveners and Respondents.

D076639

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed March 30, 2021

Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs, San Diego, and Nora Pasin for Defendant and Appellant.

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Holly O. Whatley, Pasadena, Carmen A. Brock, and Liliane M. Wyckoff, Pasadena, for Intervener and Respondent San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Joshua M. Heinlein, Deputy County Counsel, for Intervener and Respondent County of San Diego.

HALLER, J.

62 Cal.App.5th 588

For many years, plaintiff Julian Volunteer Fire Company Association (Volunteer Association) through a local fire district (Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection District (District)) provided fire prevention and

276 Cal.Rptr.3d 852

emergency services to the Julian and Cuyamaca rural communities. In 2018, the District voted to seek to dissolve and be replaced by the County of San Diego (County) fire authority. This triggered a mandatory review process by a state agency (San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO)), and spawned several lawsuits by those opposing dissolution and the replacement of local volunteers with professional County firefighters.

In this lawsuit, Volunteer Association and related individuals (collectively Volunteer Association) alleged the District violated California's open meeting law (Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act)) when its board of directors (Board) first voted to begin the dissolution process. ( Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq. )¹ We determine these claims are barred because plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in prosecuting their lawsuit until after a districtwide special election approving the dissolution and this delay substantially prejudiced the parties and the general public.

OVERVIEW

On April 10, 2018, the District's Board approved a resolution requesting LAFCO to dissolve the District and have County assume fire prevention services in the area.² Two weeks later, Volunteer Association sued the District, alleging the Board's approval of the resolution violated the Brown Act. Volunteer Association sought a writ of mandate ordering the District to vacate the resolution.

While this Brown Act lawsuit was pending in the superior court, County and LAFCO engaged in legally required actions in response to the District's dissolution request. County voted to seek to expand its sphere of influence over the District's functions, and LAFCO complied with its statutory obligation to consider the District's request, which included holding public hearings and triggering a special election of affected residents on the District's dissolution request.

62 Cal.App.5th 589

As these County and LAFCO actions were proceeding, the District initially opposed Volunteer Association's lawsuit. But later—after its Board membership changed and a majority now disagreed with the earlier dissolution resolution—the District no longer contested Volunteer Association's claims.

LAFCO then held a special election of District voters, resulting in a majority vote favoring the District's dissolution. Shortly after this election result was announced, Volunteer Association filed an ex parte motion asking the court to immediately enter judgment in its favor on its Brown Act claims, without notifying LAFCO or County of this request. The District's new counsel (representing the new Board majority) told the court it did not oppose this motion. With only these two sets of parties before it (Volunteer Association and the District), the court entered judgment for Volunteer Association and issued a writ ordering the District to revoke its original dissolution resolution.

Three days later, the District relied on this judgment in seeking to preclude LAFCO from certifying the election result favoring dissolution. County and LAFCO then intervened in the Brown Act lawsuit as necessary and/or indispensable parties, and successfully moved to vacate the judgment

276 Cal.Rptr.3d 853

and the writ. The court stated it was not previously aware of these parties' direct interests in the litigation, and found there were irregularities in the earlier writ proceedings.

County and LAFCO then moved for judgment on the pleadings on Volunteer Association's Brown Act claims, arguing Volunteer Association's complaint was untimely; the claims were barred by the administrative exhaustion and laches doctrines; and any violations of the Brown Act were not prejudicial. Both Volunteer Association and the District opposed the motion, and the District moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming the Board had already voted to rescind its initial dissolution vote in response to the court's prior writ (before the writ was vacated).

After extensive briefing, the court granted the interveners' motion; denied the District's motion; and entered judgment against Volunteer Association. Volunteer Association and the District each appeal. We affirm.

We determine Volunteer Association's claims are barred by the laches doctrine, which precludes recovery when a plaintiff unreasonably delays in prosecuting its claims and prejudice results. Volunteer Association scheduled a hearing on its Brown Act claims early in the LAFCO approval process, but then took that hearing off calendar. It then waited until the special election results were announced to reschedule the hearing, requesting the court to immediately grant judgment in its favor and order the Board to

62 Cal.App.5th 590

rescind its earlier dissolution vote. It did not give County or LAFCO notice of this request, and was aware the only defendant given notice of this hearing (the District) no longer opposed the relief.

Under these particular circumstances, by waiting until after the voters had approved the District's dissolution to seek a ruling on the merits of its Brown Act claims involving only the Board's initial dissolution resolution, Volunteer Association unreasonably delayed prosecuting its claims and this delay caused substantial prejudice to LAFCO, County, and the general public. Additionally, for the reasons explained below, the court properly denied the District's motion to dismiss.

STATE LAW GOVERNING LOCAL AGENCY DISSOLUTION

Before describing the factual record, it is helpful to understand the law governing local agency dissolutions. A local district seeking to dissolve must apply to LAFCO under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Act of 2000 (Reorganization Act; § 56000 et seq. ) The Reorganization Act is the "sole and exclusive authority" for local agency structural changes, and contains a detailed scheme requiring LAFCO to take specific steps in determining whether to approve a proposed dissolution. ( §§ 56100, subd. (a), 56325, 56375, subd. (a)(1), (2)(B), 56668 ; see Southcott v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1026, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 ( Southcott ).)

As relevant here, a dissolution request is initiated by a "petition" or "resolution" ( § 56650 ) adopted "by the legislative body of an affected local agency" ( § 56654, subd. (a) ). After LAFCO accepts and finds the resolution complete, LAFCO "shall immediately issue a certificate of filing." ( § 56658, subd. (f).) Once that certificate is issued, the LAFCO "proceedings shall be deemed initiated." ( § 56651.) LAFCO's executive officer then must "set the proposal for hearing [within 90 days] and give published notice ...." ( § 56658, subd. (h).) LAFCO must consider numerous specified factors ( § 56668 ) and adopt a resolution making determinations on the proposal

276 Cal.Rptr.3d 854

( § 56881 ). Within 35 days, LAFCO must schedule a public hearing, known as a "protest hearing," and must consider all oral and written objections to the proposed action. ( §§ 57000, 57025, subd. (a).) If the protests exceed a specified threshold, LAFCO is required to request election officials to conduct a special election of the registered voters in the affected area, including publishing arguments for and against the measure in ballot materials. ( §§ 57052, subd. (a)(2), 57148.)

62 Cal.App.5th 591

If a majority of voters approve the dissolution, LAFCO must certify the vote and approve the dissolution. ( § 57176.) If a majority does not approve, LAFCO must deny the application. ( § 57179.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

As previewed, there were many twists and turns in the pathway leading to the final judgment in this case, and several different public entities were involved in the relevant decisions. Because this procedural context is important to a proper determination of the appellate issues, we set forth these facts and the...