Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W.
Decision Date | 30 August 2021 |
Docket Number | M2019-01243-COA-R3-CV |
Citation | 640 S.W.3d 182 |
Parties | JULIE C. W. v. FRANK MITCHELL W. Jr. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Helen Sfikas Rogers, Siew-Ling Shea, and Lawrence J. Kamm, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Julie C. W.
Gregory D. Smith and Brenton H. Lankford, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Frank Mitchell W., Jr.
D. Michael Swiney, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Thomas R. Frierson, II, and Kristi M. Davis, JJ., joined.
The Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order vacating our previous judgment in this matter solely with respect to the division of the marital estate and remanding for our further review consistent with its order. We find upon further review that the Circuit Court for Davidson County ("the Trial Court") abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate as it did. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court on this one issue and remand for a new and equitable division of the marital estate.
This matter concerns the divorce of Julie C. W. ("Wife") and Frank Mitchell W. Jr. ("Husband"). Husband, a partner at Bass, Berry & Sims, was awarded roughly 59% of the marital estate. Wife, a part-time hourly staff attorney at Bass, Berry & Sims, was awarded approximately 41% of the marital estate. This was out of a total marital estate of around $11,000,000. Wife appealed, raising several issues including whether the Trial Court erred in its division of the marital estate. In Julie C.W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr. , No. M2019-01243-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 745288 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2021), we affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court on all issues except its division of the marital estate. On that issue, we vacated and remanded for a "new and equitable division that is as close to a 50/50 division as possible, based upon the specific facts of this case." Pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 11, Husband timely filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court our decision regarding the Trial Court's division of the marital estate. Husband argued that, with respect to that issue, we improperly substituted our own judgment for the Trial Court's judgment. On August 11, 2021, the Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order on Husband's application in which it agreed with Husband. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated, in part:
This Court has repeatedly instructed the appellate courts to give great weight to the trial court's division of marital property and cautioned that they should be disinclined to disturb the trial court's decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures. See Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tenn. 2010) ; Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). We find that in its review in this case, the Court of Appeals failed to accord the trial court's decision regarding the division of the marital estate appropriate weight.
The Tennessee Supreme Court thus granted Husband's application for permission to appeal; vacated our judgment solely with respect to the division of the marital estate; and remanded the case for our further review consistent with its order. We now undertake that further review.
The sole issue we address on remand is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding roughly 59% of the marital estate to Husband and 41% to Wife.
In Keyt v. Keyt , 244 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. 2007), the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the appellate standard of review for a trial court's division of a marital estate as follows:
This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing marital assets and "we are disinclined to disturb the trial court's decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures." Herrera v. Herrera , 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court's findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn R. App. P. 13(d) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the trial court. Roberts v. Roberts , 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court's factual findings. In re M.L.P. , 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co. , 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999) ). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).
Keyt , 244 S.W.3d at 327 (emphasis added).
In Larsen-Ball v. Ball , 301 S.W.3d 228 (Tenn. 2010), the Tennessee Supreme Court effectively reasserted the deferential standard of review articulated in Keyt , stating:
Larsen-Ball , 301 S.W.3d at 234-35 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
In a published Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion authored by then-Judge and later-Justice William C. Koch, Jr., this Court discussed the standard of review at issue as follows:
The approach to dividing a marital estate should not be mechanical, but rather should entail carefully weighing the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) in light of the evidence that the parties have presented. Flannary v. Flannary , 121 S.W.3d [647] at 650-51 [(Tenn. 2003)] ; Tate v. Tate , 138 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ; Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at 230. Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, Jolly v. Jolly , 130 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tenn. 2004) ; Fisher v. Fisher , 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983), and appellate courts must accord great weight to a trial court's division of marital property. Wilson v. Moore , 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ; Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)]. Accordingly, it is not our role to tweak the manner in which a trial court has divided the marital property. Morton v. Morton , 182 S.W.3d [821] at 834 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)]. Rather, our role is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards, whether the manner in which the trial court weighed the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) is consistent with logic and reason, and whether the trial court's division of the marital property is equitable. Jolly v. Jolly , 130 S.W.3d at 785-86 ; Gratton v. Gratton , No. M2004-01964-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 794883, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d at 231.
Owens v. Owens , 241 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).
Tennessee law reflects that trial courts have considerable discretion in dividing the marital estate, although that discretion is not unbounded. Discretion may be abused. Abuse of discretion has been defined variously over time.2 In 2020, our Supreme Court, in the context of reviewing a ruling on a motion to alter or amend, applied the following abuse of discretion standard:
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