Julien v. Comm. of Bar Examiners for the Practice of Law, Civil Nos. 1994–0150

• Citation: 34 V.I. 281
• Decision Date: 15 April 1996
• Docket Number: 1995–0061.,Civil Nos. 1994–0150
• Parties: Sylvester H. JULIEN, Plaintiff, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS FOR the PRACTICE OF LAW, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

34 V.I. 281

Sylvester H. JULIEN, Plaintiff,

v.COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS FOR the PRACTICE OF LAW, et al., Defendants.

Civil Nos. 1994–0150, 1995–0061.

District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix.

April 15, 1996.

Bar applicant sued Virgin Islands Committee of Bar Examiners, its members, attorney that represented bar applicant in hearing before Committee, and Virgin Islands Territorial Court judge challenging denial of his application for admission to Virgin Islands bar based on claims of constitutional violations, arbitrary and capricious conduct, and violations of Sherman Anti-trust Act. On defendants' motion to dismiss, the District Court, Finch, J., held that: (1) Committee and its members had judicial immunity to extent that they were engaged in determining qualifications of applicant for admission to bar and holding hearings for this purpose; (2) Committee and its members were entitled to legislative immunity with respect to promulgation of rules governing bar admission; (3) Territorial Court's decision denying bar applicant's writ of review of Committee's decision refusing his admission to bar was res judicata of all claims against Committee and its members that could have been brought in Territorial Court; and (4) federal court did not have jurisdiction over bar applicant's claims which were purely local civil actions.

Motion granted. Alan D. Smith, Hodge and Francois, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Defendants the Committee of Bar Examiners for the Practice of Law et al.

Kwame O. Motilewa, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Defendant Stylish Willis.

Sylvester H. Julien, Kingshill, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, pro se.

OPINION

FINCH, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court will grant the defendants' motion.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

This action arises from plaintiff Sylvester Julien's repeated attempts to gain admission to the Virgin Islands Bar. Plaintiff first sat for the Virgin Islands bar examination in July 1991. The Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners, U.S. Magistrate Judge Geoffrey Barnard, informed plaintiff by letter that he had failed to pass. Defendant Barnard attached to this letter a copy of the “Bar Examination Review Procedures,” detailing the steps plaintiff was to take if he wished a review of his examination. Pursuant to these Procedures, an applicant, upon written request, could review the essay questions, his answers, and the model answers. Where the applicant desired further review, he would be permitted to appear before the full Committee of Bar Examiners (“the Committee”).

Plaintiff Julien requested a review by the full Committee. His request was granted, and on May 15, 1992, plaintiff appeared before the Committee. ¹ Attorney Stylish Willis was also present at this hearing, although for how long and for what purpose is unclear. According to plaintiff, defendant Willis was to have represented him, but declined at the hearing to do so. Plaintiff then attempted to represent himself but, as plaintiff asserts, was unable to do so without Willis' aid. Ultimately, the Committee declined to change plaintiff's score, and by letter dated May 28, 1992, advised plaintiff that he was required to retake the examination.

The following month, plaintiff filed a “Complaint for Writ of Review” in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. In his Complaint, plaintiff recounted the obstacles he encountered while securing a review of his answers to the 1991 bar examination. More particularly, plaintiff contended that his answers were unfairly graded and that he did not have an adequate opportunity for review before the full Committee. Plaintiff requested that the court regrade his examination and, on that basis, recommend his admission to the Virgin Islands Bar. In June 1993, the Territorial Court denied plaintiff's request. Julien v. Committee of Bar Examiners, Civ. No. 665–92 (June 28, 1993).

In July 1992, after filing his Territorial Court action but prior to the court's decision, plaintiff again took the Virgin Islands bar examination. Defendant Barnard, by letter of January 21, 1993, informed plaintiff that although he had passed the essay portion of the exam, he had failed the Multi–State portion and his combined score was insufficient to yield a passing grade. According to plaintiff, his written requests to defendant Barnard for a review of this grade were ignored. In February 1994, plaintiff for the third time took the Multi–State portion of the Virgin Islands bar examination. Plaintiff again failed. Plaintiff alleges that he requested from defendants a breakdown of his Multi–State score, but has yet to receive a reply to his request.

In December 1994, plaintiff filed his first complaint in this matter (“ Julien I ”) against the Committee, its individual members, and attorney Stylish Willis. Plaintiff's complaint asserted eight separate causes of action: that (1) defendants the Committee and its members “have engaged in a combination and conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce ... by establishing arbitrary, capricious, and unauthorized admission requirements for potential competitors such as plaintiff” in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; (2) defendants Willis, Barnard, Steele, White, and Rich, in conspiring to deny plaintiff a full and fair hearing before the Committee, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; (3) defendants denied plaintiff his rights under the Equal Protection Clause, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) defendants have deprived plaintiff of due process of law; (5) defendants' interpretation of Rule 56 of the District Court Rules “fails to state a set score required for passing both the MBE and the essay portion of the Bar Examination” and is therefore arbitrary and capricious; ² (6) defendants' interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Bar Examination Review Procedures, “which requires applicants' raw score on the MBE to be blended with his average grade on the essay in order to achieve a passing score” is arbitrary and capricious; ³ (7) “[a]s a result of defendants' willful, malicious and retaliatory actions ... plaintiff was denied the opportunity to be admitted to the practice of law”; and (8) the 1991 and 1992 bar examination essay questions “were so subjective (vague) that some of the questions failed to test the ability of an applicant....” To remedy these alleged wrongs, plaintiff requests both compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.

Six months prior to filing Julien I, in July 1994, plaintiff sat a fourth time for the Virgin Islands bar examination. Defendant Barnard again wrote to plaintiff Julien, in September 1994, informing him that although he had passed the essay portion of the exam, he had failed the Multi–State portion and had attained a combined score insufficient to pass. Plaintiff subsequently reviewed his essay scores. Plaintiff also wrote to defendant Barnard, with a copy to Territorial Court Judge Verne Hodge, requesting a review of his essay results before the full Committee.⁴ According to plaintiff, his request went unanswered. When plaintiff called the office of defendant Barnard, on December 14, 1994, plaintiff alleges that he was told that the procedures had been changed and that he could no longer receive a review before the full Committee. Under the new procedures, as set forth in Rule 304(g) of the Rules of the Territorial Court, an applicant's request for review would be sent to a single examiner, who would review the challenged grade to determine if a higher score was merited.

Plaintiff was subsequently informed by defendant Barnard that a review of his examination had been done and that plaintiff had failed to achieve a passing score. Defendant Barnard also informed plaintiff that he would have to comply with Territorial Court Rule 304(h)(1) before he could retake the bar examination. Pursuant to Rule 304(h)(1), an applicant who had failed the bar examination three times could retake the exam only with “leave of the Presiding Judge of the Territorial Court upon a showing that he has completed a current, accredited bar review course of at least six weeks duration.”

Aggrieved anew, on May 16, 1995, plaintiff filed a second suit in this Court (“ Julien II ”) against the Committee, its newly-named individual members, and Judge Hodge. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that (1) defendants, “through misuse of their official positions ... and in their individual capacity in engaging in a combination and conspiracy with defendant Judge Verne A. Hodge,” violated plaintiff's due process rights; (2) defendants similarly conspired to deprive plaintiff of his equal protection rights; (3) defendants denied plaintiff equal protection of the laws, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) defendants denied plaintiff due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) defendants denied plaintiff equal protection, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (6) Rule 304 is a “retrospective rule/law” analogous to an Ex Post Facto law; (7) defendant Barnard is illegally in office, as are several other Committee members; and (8) the actions of defendants were arbitrary and capricious and plaintiff is thus entitled to a writ of review pursuant to V.I.Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1421 et seq.

Defendants the Committee of Bar Examiners, its members, and Judge Hodge have filed a motion to dismiss in both Julien I and Julien II. Defendant Stylish Willis joined in the motion filed in Julien I. The Court has consolidated these actions and proceeds to analyze the motions on their merits.

DISCUSSION

The Court notes at the outset that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint is subject to a stringent standard of review. “The appropriate standard for deciding...