Julien v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands
| Decision Date | 04 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | D.Ct. Civ. App. No. 1996/0020. |
| Citation | 36 V.I. 165 |
| Parties | Sylvester H. JULIEN, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Roy L. Schneider, Governor; Lilliana Belardo de O'Neal, Senator; and Almando “Rocky” Liburd, Senate President, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Objector brought action against Government to enjoin, and declare void, any nomination or confirmation of members to Virgin Islands Casino Control Commission not in compliance with statutory notice and publication requirements. The Territorial Court of Virgin Islands dismissed. Objector appealed. The District Court held that objector did not have standing.
Affirmed.
Sylvester H. Julien, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., pro se.
R. Oliver David, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Appellees Belardo de O'Neal & Liburd.
Michael B. Law, V.I. Department of Justice, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Appellees Government of the V.I. & Governor Schneider.
Before MOORE, Chief Judge, FINCH, District Judge, and DIASE, Territorial Court Judge, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, Sitting by Designation.
This appeal arose out of a Territorial Court Order dismissing Sylvester H. Julien's [“appellant”] action to enjoin, and declare void, any nomination or confirmation of members to the Casino Control Commission [“Commission”] which was not in compliance with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 3, § 65b. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint due to lack of standing.1 For the reasons which follow, the December 12, 1995 ruling of the Territorial Court is affirmed.
On or about November 16, 1995, Governor Roy L. Schneider [“Governor”] submitted a list of nominees to the Commission for confirmation before the Legislature of the Virgin Islands.2 In response to these nominations, appellant wrote to Senator Lilliana Belardo de O'Neal [“Belardo”], as Chairwoman of the Rules Committee, to bring her attention to the requirement that there be notice and publication of vacancies for boards and commissions pursuant to 3 V.I.C. § 65b. Then, on November 21, 1995, appellant filed a complaint in the Territorial Court seeking to enjoin, and to declare void, any nomination or confirmation of members to the Commission which was not in compliance with Section 65b.3 A hearing on appellant's request for a temporary restraining order was initially scheduled for November 27, 1995, but was continued to December 12, 1995. On the 12th of December, appellees moved to dismiss appellant's complaint due to lack of standing.4 The trial judge, ruling from the bench, ordered that appellant's complaint be dismissed for lack of standing, stating in pertinent part:
The Court will note the Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to Paragraph Two as a citizen, as a taxpaying citizen, and also a resident of the Virgin Islands and the complaint asserts he has standing without, specifically, delineating what the basis of that standing is.
The Court will note it is an action for injunctive relief and, therefore, the Plaintiff would have to establish some harm that is the gravamen of any action for injunctive relief and the closest allegation the Court can find concerning an injury is in Paragraph 14, where there is an allegation of irreparable harm if the Governor is not ordered to publicize the vacancies because it's contrary to the best interest of the people of the Virgin Islands. There [are] also allegations that the absence of notice somehow sends a negative precedent to the community....
* * * * * *
The Court ... find[s] that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to show a specific particularize[d] injury as required by applicable law and therefore insufficient to confer standing upon the Plaintiff.
The Court ... further find[s] that ... the mere statement in a complaint that one has standing falls short of the requirement of law of establishing standing, but even if there was an allegation with respect to this Plaintiff not having the opportunity to apply to the Governor for consideration, by his own admission, that harm is the same harm suffered by everyone else who didn't receive notice and who may have been qualified. And by his own statement there were other qualified individuals.
Supplemental Appendix [“Supp.App.”] of Appellee at 38–43. The instant appeal followed.
The gravamen of this appeal is whether the Territorial Court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss due to lack of standing. This question, being one of law, is subject to plenary review.5
B. Standing to Sue
Appellant sought injunctive relief in the Territorial Court on grounds that appellees had violated 3 V.I.C. § 65b by failing to advertise existing vacancies on the Commission. Section 65b provides that
[p]rior to the submission of a nomination to the Legislature to fill a vacancy on a board or commission, which nomination requires the advice and consent of the Legislature; the Governor shall cause to be printed in a newspaper of general circulation in each island district, a public notice that a vacancy exists. Such notice shall state the name of the board or agency on which the vacancy occurs, the fact that the Governor will be submitting a nomination to the Legislature, any qualifications required by law of prospective nominees, and an invitation to the public and organized groups to recommend persons to the Governor for nomination to fill the vacancy. The public notice shall be published not less than twice a week for two consecutive weeks.
Without addressing the merits of appellant's case, this Court must now decide whether the trial court erred in deciding that appellant lacked standing to sue in the Territorial Court.
Appellant's complaint states that he “is a citizen of the United States of America, a taxpaying citizen of the Virgin Islands and [a] resident of St. Croix, Virgin Islands, and has standing to bring this action.” Supp.App. of Appellee at 45 (emphasis in original). Appellees, on the other hand, contend that appellant failed to allege any injury in his complaint which would affect him personally, and which would give him standing to maintain his action.
Standing to sue means that a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). This requirement of a “personal stake” has come to be understood to require not only a “distinct and palpable injury” 6 to the plaintiff, but also a “fairly traceable” 7 causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.8
At the hearing on December 12, 1995, appellant admitted that he had not established standing in his complaint. The following discourse took place:
Supp.App. of Appellee at 15–17.
Appellant suggests that as a pro se litigant, he should not be held to the strict standards applied to pleadings,9 and he also states that he believed he would have an opportunity at the hearing to explain the specific injury he suffered as a result of the Governor's failure to comply with 3 V.I.C. § 65b. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [“Rules”] provide that “an application to the court ... shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1).10 The Rules further provide that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall. contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The Rules also state that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct,” and that “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).
Courts are called upon to decide actual cases and controversies, not to issue advisory opinions. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). “There is no uncertainty as to the requirement that a plaintiff, in order to have standing, must allege that he himself suffers some ‘injury in fact’ by reason of the action sought to be challenged.” Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F.Supp. 1292, 1295 (D.C.D.C.1972), citing Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 601, 607 (1968). Injury in fact is what the Supreme Court has thought imparts that ‘adversary context’ to litigation...
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... ... See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Steven, 36 V.I. 176 (D.V.I.1997); Julien v. Government of Virgin Islands, 36 V.I. 165, 168-69, 961 F.Supp. 852, 854 (App. Div.1997); Vandenberg ex rel. Newman v. Williams, 32 V.I. 385, 387, ... ...