Julius v. Druckrey
Decision Date | 03 April 1934 |
Citation | 214 Wis. 643,254 N.W. 358 |
Parties | JULIUS v. DRUCKREY. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Shawano County; F. A. Jaeckel, Judge.
Replevin by William Julius against Otto Druckrey. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]
Reversed and remanded.
Action of replevin begun February 24, 1933, to recover possession of an automobile owned by plaintiff which had been seized by the defendant, who at the time was sheriff of Shawano county. The defendant, as such sheriff and by virtue of an execution under a judgment obtained February 16, 1933, levied upon the property. The plaintiff claims that the automobile was exempt from execution, that he claimed it as exempt, that the defendant refused to recognize the exemption, and took possession of the car. The defendant in his answer admits the allegations of the complaint as to ownership and the levying of the execution upon the property, but denies that the property is exempt from seizure and sale on execution. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and, upon the evidence submitted, the trial court found that the plaintiff was the owner of the automobile, that the car had been sold under the execution at public sale to the highest bidder for $100, “that at the time the said automobile was so levied on and seized, the said automobile was not kept or used for the purpose of carrying on the trade or business of the said William Julius,” and directed judgment dismissing the complaint. Judgment was accordingly entered March 22, 1933.
Thereafter, because the judgment under which the execution was issued was vacated and set aside, the judgment in this case was reopened and judgment was entered declaring that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the automobile, and directing that he recover costs and damages assessed. Defendant appeals.C. B. Dillett and Winter & Winter, all of Shawano, for appellant.
Eberlein & Larson, of Shawano, for respondent.
The judgment under which the execution was issued was a valid judgment. Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius, 212 Wis. ___, 254 N. W. 355 (decided herewith). Therefore the proceedings which attempted to vacate the judgment originally entered in this case were without effect, and the findings, conclusions, and judgment determining whether or not this automobile was exempt are now before us on appeal. No question arises as to the value of the automobile. It is agreed that its value is less than $400, and the only dispute is in relation to whether the automobile was used in the trade or business of respondent within the meaning of the statute.
Section 272.18 (6), Stats., under which the respondent Julius claims exemption of his automobile, provides that the following personalty shall be exempt from execution: “Two cows, ten swine, fifty chickens, one yoke of oxen and one horse or mule, or in lieu of one yoke of oxen and a horse or mule, two horses or two mules, or any automobile used or kept for the purpose of carrying on the debtor's trade or business, not exceeding four hundred dollars in value, ten sheep, and the wool from the same, either in the raw material or manufactured into yarn or cloth; the necessary food for all the stock mentioned in this section for one year's support, either provided or growing or both, as the debtor may choose; also one wagon, cart or dray, one sleigh, one plow, one drag and other farming utensils, including tackle for teams, not exceeding two hundred dollars in value.”
The immediate question is whether the provisions of this statute are sufficiently broad to cover the automobile involved in this case.
The respondent some years ago suffered an injury to his foot which has severely crippled him. The record shows considerable conflict in the evidence concerning the extent of his incapacity. There is testimony, which he disputes, to the effect that he frequently engaged in driving a team, in hauling timbers, and in sawing and splitting wood. It was also testified that he was well able to walk to his place of work, located approximately one-half mile from his home, and that he frequently did so. Respondent admits walking to work, but only at the expense of considerable pain and difficulty, and states that he did so only because his car had been seized. He insists that he purchased the car for the primary purpose of his transportation to and from his place of work. He testified as follows:
Further evidence pertinent to the case is that he was generally driven to and from work by his wife or some other person, and his wife frequently used the car to take him his dinner. Also it is established that the car was used at least four times as much for pleasure or domestic purposes as it was for transporting him to and from work. To summarize, the situation presented to the trial court was as follows: The automobile was frequently used to transport respondent to and from his work, but the evidence is in conflict as to how often he walked to work even when transportation was available. Clearly, it was not an absolute necessity for that purpose, but again the evidence is conflicting as to the extent to which it was reasonably necessary. It was used predominantly for domestic and pleasure purposes rather than for transportation to and from work.
On this factual situation, the trial court held that the automobile was not kept or used for the purpose of carrying on the trade or business of the respondent within the meaning of the statute, and therefore was not exempt from execution. The trial court, however, gave no indication of the basis that it used in arriving at its conclusion. Any one of four theories may have been adopted by it: (1) That an automobile used in driving to and from a place of work is not “used or kept for the purpose of carrying on the debtor's trade or business” within the meaning of the statute; (2) that such use would not bring the automobile within the statute, unless it were absolutely indispensable to the owner's pursuit of his occupation; (3) that the predominant use to which the automobile is put determines whether or not it shall be exempt; (4) that, even if the statute be construed as including an automobile used to transport one to and from his place of work, and interpreted as intending that such use need not be absolutely necessary so long as it is reasonably necessary, and that the fact that it is used more for pleasure than business does not prevent the owner from claiming exemption, nevertheless, under the evidence as presented to and weighed by the trial court in its capacity as a trier of facts, it is found that respondent's automobile, even under this liberal construction of the statute, was not subject to exemption.
[1] In the absence of any indication by the trial court as to which one of these it based its decision on, it becomes necessary to inquire into the soundness of all four theories. If a proper interpretation of the statute supports all of them, the original judgment of the trial court holding that the automobile is not exempt must be affirmed. If, however, any one of them violates the meaning of the statute, interpreted in the light of its language and spirit, the cause must be remanded for more specific findings by the trial court. Section 270.33 (1), Stats.
[2][3][4][5] Before discussing the specific questions involved, a few general principles of statutory construction may be called to attention. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction. Gilbert v. Dutruit, 91 Wis. 661, 65 N. W. 511. It is only when there exists an obscurity, ambiguity, or other fault of expression that it becomes necessary to interpret the law in order to discover its true meaning. While the primary purpose of interpretation and construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, it must be borne in mind that this intention and meaning is to be...
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In re Bronk
...a charge upon the public.Opitz v. Brawley, 10 Wis.2d 93, 95–96, 102 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Wis.1960) (citing Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 649, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (Wis.1934)). At the same time, a liberal construction of authorized exemptions does not alter the fact that in the absence of a con......
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In re Woller
...SeeWis. Stat. § 815.18(1): Opitz v. Brawley, 10 Wis.2d 93, 95–96, 102 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Wis.1960) (citing Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 649, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (Wis.1934)). At the same time, the right to an exemption is a creation of statutory law and courts should not extend exemptions b......
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...statute, and must be given a fair and reasonable construction with the view of effecting that purpose and object. Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 254 N.W. 358, 94 A.L.R. 293;Lawrence v. Vilas, 20 Wis. 381, 386;Miller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 183, 113 N.W. 384;State ex rel. Min......
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...becoming a charge upon the public. Opitz v. Brawley, 10 Wis.2d 93, 95, 102 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Wis.1960) (citing Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 649, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (Wis.1934)). However, it is also true that in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision which provides otherwis......