Jumonville v. Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish

• Decision Date: 26 June 1926
• Docket Number: 241 and 242
• Citation: 4 La.App. 580
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: JUMONVILLE v. POLICE JURY OF TANGIPAHOA PARISH

4 La.App. 580

JUMONVILLE v. POLICE JURY OF TANGIPAHOA PARISH

Nos. 241 and 242

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

June 26, 1926

Appeal from the Twenty-first Judicial District Court of the Parish of Tangipahoa, Hon. Columbus Reid, Judge.

Action by James Jumonville against Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish Standard Highway Company, intervenor. R. D. Fellows against Police Jury of Tangipahoa, Standard Highway Company, Inc. intervenor, consolidated. There was judgment for plaintiffs and defendants appealed.

Intervention dismissed and judgment reversed.

Judgment annulled.

Harry Gamble and S. S. Reid, of Amite, attorneys for plaintiffs appellees.

A. L. Ponder, Jr., and Sr., of Amite, attorneys, for defendants, appellants.

Benton and Benton, of Baton Rouge, attorneys for intervenor.

OPINION

ELLIOTT, J.

On March 11, 1924, the Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish appointed James Jumonville, R. D. Fellows and D. T. Evans, the Supervising Board of Consolidated Road District A.

This Board recommended to the Police Jury that the contract for building and gravelling a road in the district be awarded to one S. A. Gano and the Police Jury acting on their recommendation awarded the contract accordingly. It afterwards turned out that Standard Highway Company, Inc. , had sent in to the supervisors a bid for the same work in amount some $ 17,000.00 less than the amount for which the work had been awarded to Gano.

Standard Highway Co., Inc., contested the award to Gano and the contract was annulled and set aside by the courts. See Standard Highway Co. Inc., vs. Police Jury, 158 La. 294, 103 So. 819.

The Police Jury at their meeting, following the decision of the Supreme Court by resolution duly adopted, removed Jumonville and Fellows from office.

Jumonville and Fellows then instituted this suit against the Police Jury contending that the resolution was null and void and of no effect. That the Police Jury had no power or authority to discharge them.

That even if the authority existed it could not be exercised except on proper grounds and after petitioners had been given notice and opportunity to appear and be heard in defense. That the charges set out in the resolution were false and untrue and had been adopted without notice to them and without their knowledge.

They prayed for and obtained an injunction restraining the Police Jury from enforcing the resolution removing them, and from interfering with them in the exercise of their duties and for judgment of recognition as supervisors.

The Police Jury in their answer admitted the appointment of plaintiffs, but denied that they had accepted the appointment and discharged the duties incumbent upon them as supervisors. They admitted removing plaintiffs without notice, and denied that their action was null and void and of no effect. They further alleged that the enumerated charges were true. That plaintiffs acting as the agents of the Police Jury had fooled them into accepting the Gano bid. That they presented the Police Jury with only one bid, that of said Gano, representing that it was the lowest bid, when such was not the case; and that they, acting on the faith of their recommendation, had awarded the contract to Gano and had thereby been placed in the attitude of violating the law. That plaintiffs created strife and confusion and inspired litigation to tie up the road work, which it was important to carry on in harmony and peace.

In an amended answer they urged that the Constitution makes Police Juries the governing authority over road districts; and that Act 99 of 1922, to the extent that it confers interfering authority on supervisors, if such construction be placed on the act, is unconstitutional and therefore null and void.

Standard Highway Co., Inc., intervened in the suits and joined the Police Jury in resisting the demand of the plaintiffs. It alleges that plaintiffs obstruct and interfere with it in the exercise of its rights under its contract with the Police Jury to construct and gravel the roads in said district. That plaintiffs fomented and inspired suits against it, are biased and prejudiced against it, preventing co-operation between them with resultant loss to intervenor and the tax payers.

Intervenor prays for judgment against plaintiffs rejecting their demand.

The plaintiffs moved to strike the interventions out, on the ground that intervenor has no interest in the suit.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against intervenor, striking out its interventions, and in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Police Jury, holding that the ordinance removing plaintiffs was null and void and without effect, recognized plaintiffs as members of said Supervising Board and enjoined the Police Jury from interfering with them in exercise of their duties as prescribed by law.

The Police Jury and Standard Highway Co., Inc., appealed.

Standard Highway Co., Inc., insists that it has an interest which gives it the right to intervene. C. P., Art. 390.

When the contract which had been entered into between the Police Jury and Gano was set aside, the Police Jury awarded intervenor the contract for constructing and gravelling the road, as the lowest bidder for the work.

Intervenor makes various charges against plaintiffs which it will serve no useful purpose to enumerate further than has been done.

It is necessary for an intervenor to allege a cause of action of his own, which will be subserved by the intervention. It is not permissible to intervene merely for the purpose of taking sides. Intervenor's contract with the Police Jury is not involved in this suit. Intervenor's petition does not allege any legal cause of action against plaintiffs. No legal reason for intervention appears. The judgment striking out the intervention is therefore affirmed.

The Constitution, Sec. 1, Art. 19, provides that all officers, before entering upon the duties of their offices, shall take the oath which the Constitution prescribes. The record does not show that plaintiffs had qualified by taking the oath of an officer. Luikart vs. Yazoo & M. V. R. Company, 148 La. 349, 86 So. 894; State vs. Rini, 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664; State vs. Moreau, 153 La. 671, 96 So. 527.

The Police Jury denies that plaintiffs accepted the appointment and discharged the duties incumbent upon them as supervisors; but it is alleged and shown by the evidence, that plaintiffs acted as supervisors, without question, and that the Police Jury appointed two citizens of the road district as supervisors in their place. The plaintiffs were at least de facto officers. The new appointees are not parties to these suits and it does not appear that they have qualified by taking oath and are claiming the office of supervisors against the plaintiffs. These suits are consequently not intrusion into, or usurpation of office suits under the Revised Statutes, Sec. 2593, etc. Act No. 39 of 1873 and C. P., Art. 867, etc. It therefore seems that the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State on that subject have no application.

The Police Jury admits in their answer that plaintiffs were removed without notice or hearing, therefore the reasons which the Police Jury may have had for the amotion need not be discussed. The plaintiffs were appointed by the Police Jury without request or suggestion on the part of the tax payers, and the only question for decision is, whether the Police Jury had the power of amotion without notice and opportunity to appear and show cause to the contrary.

The Constitution, Sec. 14 of Art. 14 (c) makes police juries the governing authority in all matters appertaining to the incurring of debts, issuance of bonds for the purpose of building and constructing public roads and of the work of constructing and gravelling roads.

Section 6, Act 118 of 1921, provides that:

"The governing authority of districts and sub-road districts created hereunder shall be: over road and sub-road districts composed of territory wholly within the parish: The Police Jury of the parish."

Section 1 (amd Act 39 of 1922):

"The police jury may and shall, at the request of 50 per cent or more of the property tax payers, resident in any road district, appoint a supervising board of three property tax payers residing in said district, and the property tax payers thus requesting will have the right to suggest the names of the members of said supervising board, and in the event of a contest or failure to suggest, the police jury will exercise discretion of choice. The said supervising board shall have the power and authority if a road bond or tax is voted, to provide the specifications...