Jump v. Speedway LLC
| Decision Date | 15 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 13–2809 PAM/JJG. |
| Citation | 23 F.Supp.3d 1024 |
| Parties | Stewart P. JUMP, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY LLC, SuperAmerica, Northern Tier Energy, LP, and Northern Tier Retail, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Peter A. Carlson, Andrew T. James, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, PA, Eden Prairie, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Marko J. MrKonich, William E. Parker, Littler Mendelson, PC, Forrest Tahdooahnippah, Andrew J. Holly, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Defendant Speedway LLC operated gas stations under the assumed name SuperAmerica until December 2011, when Defendants Northern Tier Energy, LP and Northern Tier Retail, LP1 purchased Speedway's SuperAmerica stores.
Plaintiff Stewart Jump worked for Speedway in two of its SuperAmerica stores from 1990 to February 2012, most recently as a manager. When SuperAmerica stores transitioned to Northern Tier, Jump had to decide whether to retire from Speedway or terminate his employment with Speedway and become a Northern Tier employee. As a Speedway employee, Jump participated in the Speedway Health Plan (“Speedway Plan”), which is a qualified plan under ERISA. Under the Speedway Plan, Jump would have been entitled to a subsidy to cover up to 80% of his premiums on retirement from Speedway.
The Northern Tier Energy LLC Employee Benefit Plan (“Northern Tier Plan”), also a qualified ERISA plan, provides coverage for retirees between the ages of 55 and 65 who had ten or more years of service with Speedway. The parties agree that Jump's employment with Speedway counted towards the ten-year period and that he would be eligible to receive continuing health care coverage at group rates. Unlike the Speedway Plan, the Northern Tier Plan does not necessarily include a subsidy for retired employees.
In order to determine whether he should retire from Speedway before the transition of SuperAmerica stores to Northern Tier, Jump alleges that he attended benefits meetings and reviewed materials provided to him. (1st Consol. Compl. ¶ 24.) Jump claims that Northern Tier and Speedway misled him about the Northern Tier Plan's lack of subsidy. He claims that he would have simply retired from Speedway, rather than transition to Northern Tier, if he had known that he would not have been eligible for a subsidy under the Northern Tier Plan. Jump specifically alleges that Defendants intentionally misled him on two occasions.
First, in December 2010, Jump attended a company-wide meeting held to address the upcoming transition from Speedway to Northern Tier. At that meeting, Jump was provided with a document with the headings “FAQs Relating to Employment with Speedway SuperAmerica” and “FAQs Relating to Employment with Northern Tier Energy.”2 (Tahdooahnippah Decl. (Docket No. 56–1) Ex. B.) Jump alleges that Speedway and Northern Tier “jointly prepared” the document. (1st Consol. Compl. ¶ 27.) Both portions of the document answer the following question:
(Id. )
The Northern Tier portion of the documents says, in part, that “Northern Tier Energy will implement a similar retiree health plan that is currently in place for SSA employees. We will also offer a subsidized pre–65 years of age retiree benefits to those hired before 2005 and who retire after age 55 with at least ten years service. ”(Id. (emphasis added).) The document concludes by inviting employees to submit questions via e-mail to Speedway. (Id. ) Jump does not allege that he submitted any questions following the meeting or that he asked any questions during the meeting.
Second, in September 2011, Jump attended an informational meeting during which he alleges that representatives from both Speedway and Northern Tier presented benefits information with the aid of a document entitled “SuperAmerica Stores: Employee Transition—Effective October 20, 2011.” (1st Consol. Compl. ¶ 37.) In relevant part, the document says that “[Northern Tier] will recognize Speedway service for eligibility and vesting in benefit plans [.]” (Tahdooahnippah Decl. Ex. A at 4.) The document is silent as to premium subsidies and Jump does not allege that the subject was discussed at the meeting. Jump also does not allege that he inquired as to premium subsidies before or after the meeting. He does allege, however, that the presenters “made oral representations that Northern Tier Defendants would offer the same benefits to SuperAmerica employees, including with regard to vesting in benefits plans.” (1st Consol. Compl. ¶ 39.) Jump alleges that he “understood the representations ... to mean that even if he did not retire in November of 2011, he would still be eligible to receive subsidized retirement benefits.” (Id. ¶ 40.)
Jump alleges that based on the information provided to him by Defendants, he decided to transition from Speedway to Northern Tier at the end of 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 47.) He then retired from Northern Tier in February 2012, at age 59 after more than 21 years of service. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 52.) Jump's official date of retirement was March 28, 2012, because he had 290 unused vacation hours that kept him on the payroll until that date. (Id. ¶ 53.)
When Jump contacted Northern Tier about his benefits under the Northern Tier Plan, he was told that he was not eligible for a subsidy. (Id. ¶ 55.) In other words, Jump could receive benefits under the Northern Tier Plan, but would be solely responsible for paying the premiums. Jump then contacted Speedway to see if he could obtain benefits under the Speedway Plan and was told that he was ineligible to do so because he had terminated his employment. (Id. ¶ 57.)
On March 29, one day after Jump's official retirement, Northern Tier adopted “Amendment Number One” to the Plan. The Amendment, effective January 1, 2012, states, in part, that “[w]ith respect to Category A Eligible Retirees ... the Employer will subsidize up to 80% of the Eligible Retiree's contributions for retiree medical coverage under the Plan for himself[.]” (Ort Decl. (Docket No. 57–2) Ex. B. at A–4.) In contrast, “Category B Eligible Employees ... must pay 100% of the cost of retiree medical coverage under the Plan.” (Id. ) Category A retirees are defined as employees coded under “CORP, REFN, or TERM” and Category B employees include those coded as “RETA, RETC, or RETE.” (Id. at A–1.) Defendants contend that Jump was a Category B employee, but Jump does not know whether he was designated as a Category A or Category B employee.
Jump alleges that he lost his health insurance coverage as a result of the alleged misrepresentations made by both Speedway and Northern Tier as to whether he would be entitled to a subsidy, and that he is unable to afford other insurance. Jump filed suit in Hennepin County Conciliation Court seeking $10,000 in damages. Defendants removed the matter to this Court.
Jump has brought eleven claims as follows: Count I alleges breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA against Speedway, Count II alleges breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA against Northern Tier, Count III alleges wrongful denial of employee benefits under ERISA against Northern Tier, Count IV alleges equitable estoppel under ERISA against Speedway and SuperAmerica, Count V alleges equitable estoppel under ERISA against Northern Tier, Count VI alleges interference with protected rights under ERISA against Speedway and SuperAmerica, Count VII alleges common-law fraud against Northern Tier, Count VIII alleges common-law fraud against Speedway and SuperAmerica, Count IX alleges negligent misrepresentation against Northern Tier, Count X alleges negligent misrepresentation against Speedway and SuperAmerica, Count XI alleges tortious interference with contract against Northern Tier. Defendants now move to dismiss all claims.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). The Court must construe the factual allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the complaint favorably to the plaintiff and will grant a motion to dismiss only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.” Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). The complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Defendants argue that the state law fraud, misrepresentation, and tortious interference claims should be dismissed because they are preempted by ERISA. The Court agrees. “ERISA supercedes ‘any and all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan.’ ” Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439...
To continue reading
Request your trial