Jumper v. Goodwin

Citation239 S.C. 508,123 S.E.2d 857
Decision Date07 February 1962
Docket NumberNo. 17871,17871
PartiesMrs. Gladys R. JUMPER (Ruple), Respondent, v. Talmadge GOODWIN, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

E. Pickens Rish, Lexington, Nelson, Mullins, Grier & Scarborough, Columbia, for appellant.

R. Milo Smith, Lexington, Gressette & Gressette, St. Matthews, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a collision between respondent's automobile and a truck owned by the appellant, and being operated by his agent and servant. The collision occurred around noon on April 19, 1959, about one mile north of the town limits of Swansea, South Carolina, in Lexington County, at the intersection of Highway 321 and an unmarked, unpaved county road leading into the highway from the east at approximately a right angle. The respondent was driving in a southerly direction on Highway 321 and when she was attempting to pass appellant's truck, the driver thereof suddenly turned to the left into the path of respondent's automobile.

At the conclusion of the testimony the appellant moved the court for a directed verdict, the basis of the motion being the contention that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony was that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, which contributory negligence contributed as a direct and proximate cause to the accident.

The court overruled appellant's motion on two grounds; holding first that if the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident was a question for the jury, and, secondly, that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty of willfulness or recklessness, in which event, simple contributory negligence would not be a bar.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the respondent for thirty-six hundred dollars actual damages, after which the appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same basis as the motion for a directed verdict, but, on the hearing of this motion, since the trial judge had considered the question of willfulness in his ruling, also argued that if the appellant was guilty of any willfulenss under the undisputed facts, the respondent was also guilty of contributory willfulenss. This motion was refused by the trial judge and the appeal is from his refusal.

Although the exceptions are several in number, they really raise only one question, as follows:

Could any other reasonable inference be drawn from the testimony in this case than that the respondent was guilty of either contributory negligence or contributory willfulness as a matter of law so as to bar her recovery against appellant?

In considering the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, it is, of course, the well settled rule in this State that not only the testimony but all reasonable inferences therefrom must be taken most strongly against the appellant and considered in the light most favorable to the respondent. Wynn v. Coney, 232 S.C. 346, 102 S.E.2d 209; Melton v. Ritch, 231 S.C. 146, 98 S.E.2d 509; Cannon v. Motors Ins. Co., 224 S.C. 368, 79 S.E.2d 369.

Viewed in this light, the facts of this case, supported by evidence, are as follows. The collision occurred in or very near the intersection of U. S. Highway 321 and an unimproved, unpaved county road, there being on Highway 321 no yellow no-passing line or other sign to indicate an intersection. The evidence leaves no doubt that the respondent was guilty of negligence per se in violating Sec. 46-388 of the 1952 Code, which provides:

'No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:

'* * * (2) When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection * * *.' Reese v. National Surety Corp., 224 S.C. 489, 80 S.E.2d 47.

The respondent was familiar with the area, living in the community and knew of the existence of the intersecting dirt road, but was not thinking of it as she approached the scene, there being two other small dirt roads in the immediate vicinity, one of which leads to a private residence and the other of which leads into a cemetery.

Highway 321 is straight and level at the point except that there is a slight rise some distance north of the scene of the collision, estimates of the distance of the crest of this rise from the scene being expressed by the witnesses in hundreds of yards. As the respondent came over the crest of this rise, she saw appellant's truck ahead of her. At this time she was traveling between 50 and 55 miles per hour, the prima facie speed limit of 55 miles per hour being applicable at the location. The appellant's truck was then traveling at between 30 and 35 miles per hour and there were no other vehicles in sight in either direction. Due to the difference in the speeds of the vehicles, respondent overtook appellant's truck and when she was some thirty to thirty-five yards to the rear thereof, she turned on her blinker or turn indicator lights for the purpose of passing appellant's truck, and as she was about to pass, the driver of appellant's truck, without looking back and without giving any signal of any kind, made an abrupt left turn, following which the vehicles collided.

The respondent testified that immediately following the collision, she asked the driver of the truck, 'Why didn't you give a signal?', and that he said, 'I was in a hurry and wasn't paying any attention to what I was doing.' The truck driver, on the stand, denied this statement but two disinterested witnesses, who came immediately to the scene following the crash, testified that an admission to the effect that he was at fault or in the wrong had been made by the truck driver.

There are other conflicts in the testimony, but viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence established the foregoing facts.

Since it is clear that respondent was guilty of negligence per se, the question arises as to whether her negligence contributed as a proximate cause to the collision and respondent's ensuing damage. While violation of an applicable statute is negligence per se, whether or not such breach contributed as a proximate cause to a plaintiff's injury is, ordinarily a question for the jury. Green v. Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d 435; Howle v. Woods, 231 S.C. 75, 97 S.E.2d 205; Field v. Gregory, 230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E.2d 15; Culbertson v. Johnson Motor Lines, 226 S.C. 13, 83 S.E.2d 338; Chapman v. Associated Transport, Inc., 218 S.C. 554, 63 S.E.2d 465.

It must be borne in mind that the evidence established that the driver of the appellant's truck violated more than one statute. He turned his vehicle from a direct course and moved left upon the roadway without taking any care or precaution whatesoever to see that such movement could be made with reasonable safety, in violation of Sec. 46-405; he failed to give a signal indicating his intended left turn, in violation of Sec. 46-407; and he also failed to keep a proper lookput for approaching traffic.

The determination of the question of contributory negligence is controlled by the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the court will not decide it as one of law if testimony is conflicting or if the inferences to be drawn therefrom are doubtful. Bingham v. Powell et al., 195 S.C. 238, 11 S.E.2d 275; Anderson v. Hampton & Branchville Railroad & L. Co., 134 S.C. 185, 132 S.E. 47; Keistler Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 124 S.C. 32, 117 S.E. 70; Waring v. South Carolina Power Co., 177 S.C. 295, 181 S.E. 1.

In Seay v. Southern Railway, 205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133, this Court said:

'It is well settled that the injured person's negligence, in order to bar a recovery, must have contributed as a proximate cause to the injury. It should be emphasized that negligence is contributory in a legal sense only where it contributes proximately to the injury. If the negligence of plaintiff's decedent operated only remotely and not proximately to cause the injury, the plaintiff is not barred of redreses. This principle was made clear by this Court in Bodie v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co., 61 S.C. 468, 39 S.E. 715, 720. In that case the Court had this to say: 'In 7 Enc.Law (2d Ed.), pp. 383-385, the rule is stated--and, we think, correctly, after investigation--as follows: 'A want of ordinary care may be...

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14 cases
  • Broom v. Southeastern Highway Contracting Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 15, 1986
    ...verdict was to absolve the defendants from the charges of recklessness and willfulness. We believe, however, that Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857 (1962), dictates the result here, particularly since the facts in Taylor v. Bryant, supra, are completely different from the fact......
  • Collins v. Johnson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 13, 1965
    ...damages alone does not have the effect, as a matter of law, of exonerating a defendant from charges of willfulness. Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857; Saxon v. Saxon, 231 S.C. 378, 98 S.E.2d For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the jury by its ver......
  • Wise v. Broadway
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 11, 1992
    ...all of the other circumstances presented in the case, to determine whether a party was willful or merely negligent. Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857 (1962). Where only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, however, the question becomes one of law for the ......
  • Cooper by Cooper v. County of Florence
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1991
    ...have pointed out that the rule is only a general one, and that it does have limitations. For example, we held in Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 515, 123 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1962): The trial judge was also correct in submitting the case to the jury on the ground that there was evidence from w......
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