June-Il Kim v. Suk Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | 12 Civ. 1557 (ALC) |
| Parties | JUNE-IL KIM Plaintiff, v. SUK INCORPORATED D/B/A RAINBOW LIMO, SEONGBAE DAN, SOONKIL CHO Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff June-II Kim ("Plaintiff" or "Kim") drove passengers to their requested locations in a Lincoln Town Car for a business operated by Defendants SUK Incorporated, doing business as Rainbow Limo, and Seongbae Dan ("Defendants"). Kim insists that the Defendants failed to pay him overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL") and unlawfully deducted his wages. Defendants now seek summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims.1
Defendants claim exemption from the FLSA under the motor carrier exemption and the taxicab exemption. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's state law claims for unlawful deductions should be eliminated because the deductions were for Plaintiff's benefit. Lastly, Defendants profess that if any of Plaintiff's claims survive, the two-year statute of limitations under the FLSA should apply because the violations, if any, were not willful.
The motor carrier exemption does not apply because Plaintiff's car did not weigh enough or seat enough people. Since there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the taxicab exemption and whether the wage deductions were unlawful, summary judgment on these grounds is denied. However, Plaintiff has failed to produce enough evidence to demonstrate that the alleged FLSA violations were willful. Accordingly, the appropriate statute of limitations is two, instead of three, years.
The Court adopts the undisputed facts of the Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement and Plaintiff's Response thereto. See Dkt. No. 38 ¶¶ 1-7, 9-10. Although Defendants do not concede that Kim is an "employee" within the meaning of the FLSA, for the purposes of this motion, they assume arguendo that he is an employee.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue of material fact where the facts are irrelevant to the disposition of the matter. Speculation, conclusory allegations and mere denials are not enough to raise genuine issues of fact. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Walton Ins. Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and all inferences and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 of New York, N.Y. & Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. City of New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 543 (2d Cir. 2002). Oncethe moving party meets its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). To avoid summary judgment, a party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If "no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
Defendants seek dismissal of the remaining claims of the complaint contending that they qualify for the "motor carrier" exemption under which motor carriers are not responsible for overtime compensation over the maximum hours worked pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207.2 They also contend that they qualify for the "taxicab exemption" because the taxicab drivers do not receive overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(17). Based on the submissions of the parties and review of current law, Defendants are not eligible for either exemption and their motion for summary judgment is denied.
Exemptions to a remedial law like the FLSA are to be "narrowly construed against theemployers seeking to assert them." Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960). Furthermore, the employer invoking the exemption bears the burden of proving that its employees fall within the exemption. Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami. Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2002)); Powell v. Carey Intern., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ().
There is no basis to conclude that SUK qualified for the motor carrier exemption, which from 2006 to 2008 was limited to commercial vehicles (which Kim did not operate) and from 2008 to 2010, legislative amendment excepted drivers of small vehicles from the motor carrier exemption, foreclosing Defendants' summary judgment on this basis.
Under the so-called "motor carrier" exemption, an employee is not eligible for overtime compensation if the employer is a "motor carrier" providing interstate transportation. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) () A motor carrier is "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether "the Secretary of Transportation is authorized under the Motor Carrier Act to set maximum work hours for an employee." Fox v. Commonwealth Worldwide Chauffeured Transp. of NY, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 257, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). If so, "the FLSA's overtime provisions do not apply to that employee." Id. "[I]t is the existence of the power to set to set maximum hours, not its actual exercise, that triggers the motor carrier exemption." Id. (emphasis in original) (citationsomitted).
There is no dispute that during the entire period Kim worked for Defendants, he drove a Lincoln Town Car to provide transportation services. (Rule 56.1 Stmt ¶ 10). Specifically, Kim drove a 2003 Lincoln Town Car from 2006 to 2009 and drove a 2008 Lincoln Town Car from 2009 to 2010. (Declaration of June-II Kim dated June 24, 2013 ("Kim Decl.") ¶¶ 2-3). These cars weigh 4222 pounds and seat five people. (Declaration of HyoSung Bidol-Lee dated June 24, 2013 ("Bidol-Lee Decl.") ¶¶ 3-5 & Exhibits 2-4; Kim Decl. ¶ 4).
49 U.S.C. § 31132(1). Kim did not operate a commercial motor vehicle therefore the motor vehicle exemption did not apply for his employment through 2008.
Then between 2008 and 2010, Kim qualified for the "small vehicle" exception to the motor carrier exemption adopted in the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008 ("TCA"), Pub.L. 110-244, Title III, § 306. Plaintiff's Opp. Ex. 1. The TCA revised the applicability of FLSA protection and excluded "covered employees" from the motor carrier exemption. The TCA provides as follows: "Beginning on the date of enactment of this Act [June 6, 2008], section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 207) shall apply to a covered employee notwithstanding section 13(b)(1) of that Act [i.e., the motor carrier exemption]." P.L. 110-244, Title III, § 306(a). A "covered employee," then, still receives the benefit of maximum hour protection under 29 U.S.C. § 207. A covered employee is:
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