June v. Laris

• Decision Date: 03 November 1994
• Citation: 618 N.Y.S.2d 138,205 A.D.2d 166
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,103 William L. JUNE Jr., et al., Appellants, v. James LARIS et al., Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 138

618 N.Y.S.2d 138

205 A.D.2d 166, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,103

William L. JUNE Jr., et al., Appellants, v. James LARIS et al., Respondents.

(And a Third-Party Action.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Nov. 3, 1994.

Mary J. Kenny, Camillus, for appellants.

Mackenzie, Smith, Lewis, Michell & Hughes (Barney F. Bilello, of counsel), Syracuse, for James Laris, respondent.

Hancock & Estabrook (Alan J. Pierce, of counsel), Syracuse, for Carmel Chemical Corp., respondent.

Weitz & Luxenberg P.C. (William D. Fireman, of counsel), New York City, for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice P.C., amicus curiae.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MIKOLL, MERCURE, WHITE and YESAWICH, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Tait Jr., J.), entered September 8, 1993 in Madison County, which, inter alia, granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

June v. Laris, 158 Misc.2d 881, 602 N.Y.S.2d 778, affirmed.

On July 24, 1991, plaintiff William L. June Jr. (hereinafter June), Chief of the North Chittenango Volunteer Fire Department, responded to a fire call at defendant James Laris' farm at the intersection of Chestnut Ridge Road and Black Creek Road in the Village of Chittenango, Madison County. Near the intersection, June encountered a dense "smoke" cloud, later determined to be a thick pesticide fog caused by Laris' application of the insecticide formula MU-17. June suffered personal injuries as a result of his exposure to MU-17. Plaintiffs commenced this action against Laris and defendant Carmel Chemical Corporation (hereinafter Carmel), the manufacturer of MU-17. As against Laris, plaintiffs' amended complaint sets forth causes of action in negligence, failure to warn and strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. Plaintiffs also allege that Carmel negligently manufactured and distributed MU-17 and failed to warn June, among others, as to the hazards, risks and proper method for applying the chemical.

Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims. Plaintiffs opposed the motions and cross-moved for leave to serve a second amended complaint to include a cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-a against Laris and to amplify their negligence cause of action against Carmel. Supreme Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' cross motion to serve a second amended complaint (158 Misc.2d 881, 602 N.Y.S.2d 778). Plaintiffs appeal.

Initially, Laris argues that plaintiffs' negligence and failure to warn causes of action are barred by the principles enunciated in Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369, inasmuch as June's injuries were sustained in his capacity as a volunteer firefighter. We agree. It is a long-standing common-law rule--known as the "fireman's rule"--that a firefighter is barred as a matter of law from recovering damages for injuries sustained while confronting dangers associated with the performance of official duties (see, Cooper v. City of New York, supra, at 588-589, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369; Santangelo v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 393, 396-398, 526 N.Y.S.2d 812, 521 N.E.2d 770; Kenavan v. City of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 558, 566, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60, 517 N.E.2d 872; Raquet v. Braun, 201 A.D.2d 910, 607 N.Y.S.2d 799, lv. granted 84 N.Y.2d 803, 617 N.Y.S.2d 137, 641 N.E.2d 158), whether the firefighter is a paid public servant or, as here, an unpaid volunteer (see, Fiola v. Korman, 189 A.D.2d 798, 799, 592 N.Y.S.2d 429). In Cooper v. City of New York, supra, at 590, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369, the Court of Appeals observed that "the determinative factor is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers [or firefighters] are expected to assume as part of their duties" (id.).

The danger of being exposed to unhealthy substances while investigating a smoke condition and suspected fire, as here, is one of the particular dangers that firefighters are expected to assume as part of their duties (see generally, Ruocco v. New York City Tr. Auth., 204 A.D.2d 76, 611 N.Y.S.2d 513). In these circumstances, Laris cannot be held liable for creating or failing to warn of the condition that prompted the need for the firefighter's services and resulted in June's inhalation-related injuries (see, Santangelo v. State of New York, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 397, 526 N.Y.S.2d 812, 521 N.E.2d 770; Morrisey v. County of Erie, 198 A.D.2d 839, 603 N.Y.S.2d 1009, lv. dismissed 83 N.Y.2d 942, 615 N.Y.S.2d 869, 639 N.E.2d 409). Nor do the authorities relied upon by plaintiffs, including McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698, affd. on opn. below 20 N.Y.2d 921, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274, 233 N.E.2d 289, and Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503, premised on the now rejected "separate and distinct" exception (see, Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 589-590, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369, supra ), require a different result.

Plaintiffs' strict liability cause of action against Laris must also be dismissed. Even assuming that such claim is not barred by the "fireman's rule" (see generally, Benjamin v. Sodus Cold Stor. Co., 149 A.D.2d 937, 938, 540 N.Y.S.2d 70; Annotation, Products Liability: "Fireman's Rule" as Defense, 62 A.L.R.4th 727), the fact remains that MU-17 has been Federally approved since 1966 and, although posing certain risks if improperly applied (see, 7 U.S.C. § 136[bb]; § 136a[c][5][C], [D], its application on Laris' farm cannot be considered an abnormally dangerous activity requiring the imposition of strict liability (see, Mikula v. Duliba, 94 A.D.2d 503, 464 N.Y.S.2d 910; Bennett v. Larsen Co., 118 Wis.2d 681, 348 N.W.2d 540 [pesticide spraying not ultrahazardous activity]; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 520).

We now turn to plaintiffs' argument that Supreme Court erred in holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (see, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.) (hereinafter FIFRA) preempts plaintiffs' failure to warn cause of action against Carmel. We reject plaintiffs' contention that the proscription of 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) covers state regulation only and not state common-law claims. First, the plain language of FIFRA's preemption provision prohibiting a state from imposing "any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this Act" (7 U.S.C. § 136v[b] is equivalent to directing that "no" requirements may be imposed by states (see, Shaw v. Dow Brands, 994 F.2d 364, 370-371; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177, 1179, cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 60, 126 L.Ed.2d 30), including actions at common law (see, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d 407). Second, FIFRA, primarily a pesticide licensing and labeling law as enacted, was completely revised in 1972 to authorize regulation of most aspects of the development, manufacture, sale and use of pesticides (see, Warner v. American Fluoride Corp., 204 A.D.2d 1, 616 N.Y.S.2d 534), and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments supports our conclusion that Congress intended to accomplish a comprehensive regulatory scheme in which the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator would be responsible for determining whether to register a pesticide and, if so, under what circumstances (see, Senate Rep No. 92-970, 92d Congress, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3993, 4092-4096; see also, King v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349, cert. dismissed --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 490, 126 L.Ed.2d 440).

To be sure, prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2608, supra, courts were divided over the issue of whether 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) preempts state tort claims premised upon the failure to provide adequate warnings (compare, Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432, with Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3020, 120 L.Ed.2d 892). In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, supra, the preemption provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 provided that " '[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act' " (505 U.S., supra, at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334[b]. The Supreme Court concluded that the act expressly preempted state law action, whether based on state statutory law or common law, finding that the phrase "[n]o...