Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, AFSCME, AFL- CIO
| Citation | 585 N.W.2d 587,221 Wis.2d 630 |
| Decision Date | 04 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CI,R,No. 96-2816,P,H,96-2816 |
| Parties | JUNEAU COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, v. COURTHOUSE EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1312, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,ighway Department Employees, Local 569, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,rofessional Employees, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,espondents-Respondents-Cross-Appellants- Petitioners. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the respondents-respondents-cross-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Bruce F. Ehlke, Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, Madison and oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke.
For the petitioner-appellant-cross-respondent there was a brief by Mark B. Hazelbaker and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Mark K. Hazelbaker.
¶1SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 216 Wis.2d 283, 576 N.W.2d 565 (Ct.App.1998), affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Juneau County, William M. McMonigal, Judge.
¶2 The circuit court granted a motion for summary judgment to the Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and other unions (hereafter referred to collectively as the Unions) Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. (1995-96) in the manner requested by the defendant Unions. The circuit court ruled that the binding interest arbitration provisions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. apply to all "municipal employes" as defined in § 111.70(1)(i) except insofar as they may have been modified by § 111.70(4)(cm)5s. pertaining to "school district professional employes." This part of the judgment was not appealed to the court of appeals and is not before this court.
¶3 The issue in this court is the portion of the circuit court's judgment awarding attorney fees to the Unions under Wis. Stat. § 814.025(3)(b) (1995-96), which pertains to frivolous actions. 1 The circuit court held that Juneau County's commencement of its action for interpreting Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. was not frivolous but that continuing the action became frivolous after the Unions offered not to seek attorney fees or costs if Juneau County would voluntarily dismiss the action with prejudice. The court of appeals affirmed that part of the judgment holding that the commencement of the action was not frivolous and reversed that part of the judgment holding that the continuation of the action was frivolous.
¶4 The only issue before this court is whether the commencement or continuation of the declaratory judgment action by Juneau County or its attorneys was frivolous. 2 The question presented is whether the declaratory judgment action was commenced or continued by Juneau County or its attorneys "without any reasonable basis in law or equity." Wis. Stat. § 814.025(3)(b). We affirm the court of appeals holding that neither the commencement nor continuation of the action by Juneau County or its attorneys was frivolous.
¶5 For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the facts are not in dispute. On October 12, 1995, Juneau County commenced a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04 seeking a declaration that the binding interest arbitration provisions of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. apply only to school district professional employes and not to other county or municipal employes as defined in § 111.70. According to Juneau County, the legislature intended to limit the scope of binding interest arbitration solely to disputes involving school district professional employes. As support for its interpretations of the statute Juneau County relies on the language of § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. italicized and quoted below, which was adopted by 1995 Wisconsin Act 27 and reads in pertinent part as follows:
Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6. 'Interest arbitration.' a. If in any collective bargaining unit a dispute relating to one or more issues, qualifying for interest arbitration under subd. 5s. in a collective bargaining unit to which subd. 5s. applies, has not been settled after a reasonable period of negotiation ... either party, or the parties jointly, may petition the commission, in writing, to initiate compulsory, final and binding arbitration, as provided in this paragraph (emphasis added). 3
¶6 Section 111.70(4)(cm)5 § ., which is referenced in Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a., was created in 1993 4 and states in relevant part as follows:
'Issues subject to arbitration.' a. In a collective bargaining unit consisting of school district professional employes, the municipal employer or the labor organization may petition the commission to determine whether the municipal employer has submitted a qualified economic offer.
¶7 Juneau County's declaratory judgment action asked the circuit court to declare that Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a., as amended in 1995, does not require Juneau County to participate in binding interest arbitration with the Unions because none of the employes who are members of the defendant Unions are school district professional employes. The Unions argued that the binding interest arbitration provisions apply to all county and municipal employes and that the italicized portion of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. limits the circumstances under which binding interest arbitration is available to school district professional employes. 5
¶8 Juneau County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the statutory language is plain and unambiguous. The circuit court concluded that the statute was ambiguous because it was capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses. The circuit court then ordered Juneau County and the Unions to supplement the pleadings with materials relating to the intention of the Wisconsin Legislature in enacting the 1995 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a.
¶9 Juneau County advised the circuit court that it would not be submitting additional materials because it had not found any legally relevant evidence of the legislature's intent in enacting the revised version of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. The Unions submitted materials that will be discussed later. The Unions further offered to forego attorney fees and costs if Juneau County would voluntarily dismiss the action with prejudice. Juneau County refused to dismiss the action.
¶10 The essence of the Unions' position is that had Juneau County and its attorneys examined materials relating to legislative intent at the commencement of the action and thereafter, they would have known or should have known that all the evidence contravened their interpretation of the 1995 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. and that there was no reasonable basis in law or equity for their position.
¶11 Although Juneau County presented no evidence of legislative intent to counter the materials submitted by the Unions, Juneau County made two arguments to the circuit court. First, Juneau County asserted that none of the materials offered by the Unions was admissible evidence of legislative intent. Second, Juneau County argued that the statutory provisions at issue should be construed by evaluating their interaction with other portions of Wis. Stat. § 111.70 relating to the same subject matter. In this court, Juneau County further contends that adoption of the Unions' position would chill creative, innovative arguments that serve to advance the development of law.
¶12 Following their unsuccessful attempt to get Juneau County to voluntarily dismiss the action, the Unions moved for summary judgment, seeking attorney fees and costs on the ground that Juneau County's action was frivolous. The circuit court granted the Unions' motion, noting that Juneau County's continuation of the action was frivolous after the Unions had submitted evidence of legislative intent and offered to forego attorney fees or costs if the action were dismissed. The circuit court granted the Unions' motion and awarded the Unions $7,150 in costs and attorney fees.
¶13 We examine first the standard of review to be applied in this case. A claim is frivolous when a party or attorney "knew or should have known" that the claim lacked "any reasonable basis in law and equity." Wis. Stat. § 814.025(3)(b). A court uses an objective standard to determine whether an action is frivolous. The standard is "whether the attorney knew or should have known that the position was frivolous as determined by what a reasonable attorney would have known or should have known under the same or similar circumstances." Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis.2d 220, 241, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (quoting Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis.2d 789, 799, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981)).
¶14 Inquiries about frivolousness involve a mixed question of law and fact. Stern, 185 Wis.2d at 241, 517 N.W.2d 658 (citing State v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis.2d 582, 601-602, 302 N.W.2d 827 (1981)). The determination of what a party or attorney "knew or should have been known" is a factual question, and the circuit court's findings of fact will not be reversed by an appellate court unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).
¶15 The ultimate conclusion of whether the circuit court's factual determinations support the legal determination of frivolousness is, however, a question of law, which this court determines independent of the circuit court or court of appeals, benefiting from the analyses of both courts. Id. (citing State Farm, 100 Wis.2d at 602, 302 N.W.2d 827).
¶16 In determining whether an action is frivolous a court should keep in mind that a significant purpose of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 is to help maintain the integrity of the judicial system and the legal profession. Sommer, 99 Wis.2d at 799, 299...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In the Matter of A Privately Filed Criminal Complaint, 2004 WI 58 (WI 5/25/2004)
...of the statute should be fulfilled. 9. For a discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic sources, see Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 642-43, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998). In Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86 ¶15, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893, t......
-
Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz)
...veto message is part of the legislative history and is evidence of legislative intent”); Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis.2d 630, 649, 585 N.W.2d 587, 594 (1998) (same). Despite the unambiguous statutory language and contrary legislative history, the Debtors argue ......
-
In the Matter of A Privately Filed Criminal Complaint, 2004 WI 58 (Wis. 5/25/2004), 02-2490-W.
...should be fulfilled. 20. For a discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic sources, see Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 642-43, 585 N.W.2d 587 In Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86 ¶15, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893, the court described "ex......
-
Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin Inc.
...(1999). What an attorney knew or should have known is factual. Id. at 562-63, 597 N.W.2d 744 (citing Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 221 Wis.2d 630, 638-39, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998)). A circuit court's determinations of historical facts will be overturned only if they are clearly errone......