Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union

• Decision Date: 28 September 1951
• Citation: 37 Cal.2d 760,235 P.2d 607
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 29 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2089, 20 Lab.Cas. P 66,584 JUNEAU SPRUCE CORP. v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION et al. S. F. 18410

Page 607

235 P.2d 607

37 Cal.2d 760, 29 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2089, 20 Lab.Cas. P 66,584

JUNEAU SPRUCE CORP. v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION et al.

S. F. 18410.

Sept. 28, 1951.

Gladstein, Anderson, Resner & Leonard, George R. Anderson and Lloyd E. McMurray, San Francisco, for appellants.

Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and Gordon Johnson, San Francisco, for respondent.

EDMONDS, Justice.

By an action commenced in Marin county, Juneau Spruce Corporation is suing International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local No. 16, both unincorporated associations, upon a foreign judgment. The union's appeal from an order denying a change of venue presents only the question as to whether its rights in this regard are to be determined by the rules of law applicable to a corporation or is the residence of the association's members the controlling factor.

The timely motion of I. L. W. U. to transfer the action to San Francisco was made upon the grounds that the association maintains its sole place of business there and it is being sued upon an alleged obligation which the complaint does not charge was either incurred or to be performed in Marin County. By supporting affidavit, it is averred that the I. L. W. U. is a resident of San Francisco and that Local 16 of the union does not maintain an office anywhere in California, nor does any member of Local 16 reside in California.

The corporation's affidavit in opposition to the motion states that I. L. W. U. 'is an unincorporated association consisting of several thousand members residing throughout the State of California'. Upon information and belief, it is alleged that over two hundred of the members reside in Marin County. The names and addresses in Marin County of two of them were given.

The association made no denial of the facts as to the residence of its members which were presented by the creditor. The motion was denied and the appeal is from that order.

Article XII, section 16, of the Constitution provides: 'A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.' The I. L. W. U. contends that the italicized phrase applies to both corporations and unincorporated associations. In any event, it asserts, an association of the type of a labor union should be treated as a corporation. The respondent argues that the latter portion of the constitutional provision applies solely to a corporation and relies upon section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure which fixes venue in the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the time of the commencement of the action.

The I. L. W. U. takes the position that the vanue of an action, not sounding in tort, against an association is controlled by the constitutional provision and not by the Code of Civil Procedure; venue in the county where a defendant resides can be had only in an action against an individual. The present action, it says, is in the nature of one upon a contract and the only proper place for trial, under the provisions of the Constitution, is the county of the association's principal place of business. Furthermore, according to the I. L. W. U., the action is solely against the association, binding only the joint property of the associates. No individual is sought to be held liable and there is no logical reason for the residence of an individual member to control the place or venue.

The respondent corporation, on the other hand, argues with compelling logic that (1) unincorporated associations are not regarded as entities for venue or other procedural purposes in the absence of a specific statutory provision; (2) Article XII, section 16, of the Constitution recognizes that an unincorporated association does not have a residence for venue purposes; and (3) the constitutional provision should not be interpreted contrary to its obvious meaning and without regard to the fact that its provisions are permissive rather than mandatory.

The decisions of this state have not declared an unincorporated association to be a jural entity for the purposes of venue. Obviously, the first four clauses of the constitutional provision apply to both corporations and associations, but it is conceded by the parties to this appeal that none of those clauses is here applicable. The fifth clause, which the I. L. W. U. contends is controlling, speaks only of 'such corporation'. No mention is made of the principal place...