Juneau v. Intel Corp.

Citation2006 NMSC 002,127 P.3d 548
Decision Date23 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 29,093.,29,093.
PartiesKirk A. JUNEAU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of New Mexico

Hannah Best & Associates, Hannah B. Best, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Gilkey & Stephenson, P.A., Duane C. Gilkey, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

BOSSON, Chief Justice.

{1} In this retaliation claim under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (1969) (as amended through 2004), Plaintiff Kirk Juneau appeals from a summary judgment entered by the district court against him. The court also rejected Plaintiff's request for a jury trial. We conclude that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence below to create genuine issues of material fact. We also hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on his claim of retaliation. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff was employed at Intel as an equipment engineering technician. In June of 2001 Stephanie Cannaday, a co-worker of Plaintiff, reported to her superior, Judy Russell, that over the last few months she had been bothered by inappropriate conversations of a sexual nature that she had overheard around her work cubicle. Cannaday asked only that the conversations be stopped or that she be moved. After she complained, the conversations ceased.

{3} Intel's Human Resources Department launched a sexual harassment investigation into the allegations. Plaintiff was one of the people implicated by Cannaday. Plaintiff denies participation in the alleged conversations, and claims that he was included in the allegations only because Cannaday suspected him of having an extramarital affair of which she did not approve. Earlier, Cannaday had complained about a screen saver featuring women in bikinis on Plaintiff's work computer.

{4} Despite requests from his superiors during the course of the investigation that he admit to sexual harassment, Plaintiff steadfastly maintained his innocence. Although Plaintiff was present during some of the conversations in question, no one alleged that Plaintiff actually made any inappropriate remarks. According to Plaintiff, the Intel investigators prejudged him as guilty, and incorrectly interpreted his protestations of innocence as evidence of being uncooperative with the investigation and displaying a bad attitude. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the investigators had contemplated his termination from the beginning, as a means of sending a strong message to other employees regarding the evils of sexual harassment. In essence, Plaintiff claims that Intel was out to make an example of him.

{5} During the course of the investigation, Lin Harris, a Human Resources supervisor who knew Plaintiff from church, initiated a meeting with Plaintiff outside of work. Harris was a superior of the employees who were investigating the claim against Plaintiff. During the meeting, Harris allegedly threatened Plaintiff with repercussions if he continued to contest the allegations against him and pursued litigation. Harris denied these statements and claims the meeting was to discuss the two men's personal relationship. On the day after the meeting with Harris, August 14, 2001, Plaintiff received a permanent written warning regarding sexual harassment and attendance problems. Instead of accepting the warning, Plaintiff followed procedure and requested an open door investigation of the manner in which the Human Resources Department had conducted the sexual harassment investigation.

{6} Two weeks later, on August 30, 2001, despite the alleged threat from Harris, Plaintiff filed the present claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Shortly thereafter, beginning on September 6, Plaintiff's supervisor, Russell, began documenting claims of substandard performance on Plaintiff's part. On September 13, Russell was mistakenly advised that the EEOC complaint was specifically against her, and she immediately canceled her supervisory meetings with Plaintiff. A day later, on September 14, and acting against the advice of the Human Resources Department, Russell initiated the process for a second written warning regarding Plaintiff's work performance. Russell based the need for the warning on multiple alleged inadequacies including inconsistent performance, missed completion dates and lack of accountability. On December 4, Russell initiated a third warning, which according to Intel's established policy, would result in Plaintiff's termination. On January 23, the third written warning actually issued, and Plaintiff was terminated.

{7} On February 28, 2002, Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with the New Mexico Human Rights Division and filed the present action in state court, claiming that Intel had retaliated unlawfully against him for having filed his complaint with the EEOC, among other reasons. Ultimately, Intel moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim which the district court granted. Earlier, the district court had rejected Plaintiff's request for a jury trial as being untimely. Plaintiff appeals both rulings directly to this Court pursuant to Section 28-1-13(C) (1987) (amended 2005) (prior to 2005 appeals made directly to Supreme Court).

DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment

{8} "Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582; see also Rule 1-056(C) NMRA 2004. All reasonable inferences from the record should be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Celaya v. Hall, 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 7, 135 N.M. 115, 85 P.3d 239. Summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo. Id.

{9} When considering a violation of the NMHRA, we have previously considered helpful federal burden-shifting methodology under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517, 787 P.2d 433, 436 (1990). For a claim of unlawful discrimination, this Court has used the methodology from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Gonzales v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 20-22, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination, which then shifts the burden to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550; see also McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (same). The employee then has the opportunity to rebut the employer's proffered reason as pretextual or otherwise inadequate. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550.

{10} On appeal, Intel defends summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and even if he did, Intel then demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for all its actions. As we shall see, the core question before us is not whether Intel is ultimately proven correct on the merits, but whether the district court could make that determination on summary judgment without affording Plaintiff the benefit of a trial. The answer to that question depends on whether Plaintiff sufficiently presented evidence to the district court to establish "genuine issues of material fact" for resolution by a jury. Self, 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582; see also Rule 1-056.

{11} Plaintiff's claim of discrimination is linked, in turn, to his allegations of unlawful retaliation. The NMHRA, Section 28-1-7(I)(2), declares it an unlawful discriminatory practice for "any person or employer to ... engage in any form of threats, reprisal or discrimination against any person who has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice or has filed a complaint... under the Human Rights Act." Prohibited acts of "threats, reprisal or discrimination" are considered together under the general label of unlawful retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he was subject to adverse employment action subsequent to, or contemporaneous with the protected activity, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550.

{12} On appeal, Intel challenges the first and third elements of the prima facie case: both protected activity and causal connection. However, when Intel filed its motion for summary judgment in the district court, it did not adequately raise a challenge to the first element, whether Plaintiff was engaged in protected activity. Intel only made a passing reference in a footnote to concerns about whether protected activity had been shown, specifically arguing that "[i]t is doubtful that Plaintiff engaged in `protected activity' because his discrimination charge was frivolous." However, Intel did not ask the court to take any action on the issue or award Intel any relief on that basis. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must clearly raise the issue in the lower court "`by invoking a ruling from the court on the question.'" Ciup v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1996-NMSC-062, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 537, 928 P.2d 263 (quoting State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 418, 882 P.2d 1, 9 (1994)). Not having requested or received a ruling on the question of protected activity, Intel failed to preserve any such challenge for consideration by this Court.

{13} We assume, therefore, for purposes of summary judgment that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated two out of the three elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. We assume that Plaintiff has shown protected activity, which includes his claim filed with the EEOC. And it is undisputed that Plaintiff has demonstrated...

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