Jung v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: HUNTER
• Citation: Jung v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division, 199 N.E.2d 476, 136 Ind.App. 248 (Ind. App. 1964)
• Decision Date: 25 June 1964
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 20039,20039,2
• Parties: Esther Helen JUNG, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, Douglas J. Morris, David R. Oliver, and Oscar Alvord, as Members of and as constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Guthrie's Office Equipment, Inc., Appellees

Page 476

199 N.E.2d 476

136 Ind.App. 248

Esther Helen JUNG, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION Douglas J. Morris, David R. Oliver, and Oscar Alvord, as Members of and as constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Guthrie's Office Equipment, Inc., Appellees.

No. 20039.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

June 25, 1964.

Frank M. Fish, Evansville, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Keith Campbell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee Review Board.

HUNTER, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denying the claimant-appellant benefits under the Employment Security Act.

The issue before the Board was whether the appellant Esther Helen Jung left her employment voluntarily with good cause. The referee held that appellant had good cause for leaving her employment and appellee Guthrie's Office Equipment, Inc. appealed to the Review Board on the record of the evidence made before the referee. The Board thereupon reversed the decision of the claims referee, and held that the appellant left her employment voluntarily and without good cause, and denied her the unemployment benefits for which she had applied.

As a part of its findings the Board found that the president of the appellee Guthrie's Office Equipment, Inc. received a letter from the claimant appellant by mail under date of October 16, 1962 which reads as follows, to wit:

'Because I have been replaced at my regular job, I will not be at work. Effective 10/17/62. Respectfully (claimant).'

The appellant contends and the appellee Board does not deny, and in fact, admitted in oral argument that said letter does not appear in the evidence. No explanation has been made as to any circumstances warranting the Board in finding said purported letter as an ultimate fact, nor was any writ of certiorari prayed for to incorporate any such letter in the record evidence. We must therefore conclude that no such letter was received in evidence in the trial of this cause.

We are not apprised, of course, as to what, if any, influence said letter, or any permissible inferences therefrom, may have exerted upon the members of the Board in arriving at its expressed conclusions in this case. We are convinced, however, that said purported letter possessed some influence in the decision of the Board, because, otherwise there would be no logical reason or necessity for its presence as an ultimate fact found by the Board. In any event if substantial justice is to be obtained, there must appear no possibility nor opportunity that evidence extraneous the record may serve as any part of the factual foundation upon which the conclusion and ultimate determination of the Board may be premised.

Not only is this finding important in this case...