Junior v. Graham, S21G0578

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: BETHEL, Justice.
• Citation: 313 Ga. 420,870 S.E.2d 378
• Parties: JUNIOR v. GRAHAM.
• Docket Number: S21G0578
• Decision Date: 08 March 2022

313 Ga. 420
870 S.E.2d 378

JUNIOR
v.
GRAHAM.

S21G0578

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 8, 2022

Ben C. Brodhead, III, Ashley Brooke Fournet, John Wesley Ingram Nichols, Brodhead Law, LLC, 3350 Riverwood Parkway, Suite 2230, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, Michael Brian Terry, Michael Brandon Jones, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 3900, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3417, for Appellant.

Laurie Webb Daniel, Matthew D. Friedlander, Holland & Knight, LLP, 1180 W. Peachtree Street, NW Suite 1800, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3400, for Appellee.

Joseph Robb Cruser, Cruser Mitchell Novitz Sanchez Gaston & Zimet, LLP, Raymond Russell Grant, II, Cruser & Mitchell, LLP, Meridian II, Suite 2000, 275 Scientific Drive, Norcross, Georgia 30092, for Other Party.

BETHEL, Justice.

313 Ga. 420

This case involves the harmonization of two statutory provisions. The first, OCGA § 13-6-11, authorizes a jury in a civil suit to assess as damages certain legal expenses of a prevailing party when that party has specifically requested them and when the jury finds that the opposing party "has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense" prior to the initiation of litigation. The second, OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2), provides a sanction in the form of attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred after the failure to accept what the statute defines as a reasonable settlement offer. In Junior v. Graham , 357 Ga. App. 815, 817-818, 849 S.E.2d 536 (2020), the Court of Appeals determined that the sanction contemplated by OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) necessarily includes a set-off for the amount of damages awarded under OCGA § 13-6-11.

We granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff may receive a full recovery under both statutory provisions. Because we conclude that the provisions provide for different recoveries despite using somewhat similar measures for calculating the respective amount of damages or sanction, a prevailing plaintiff may recover under each statutory provision without regard to any recovery under the other. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case with direction that the case be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the plaintiff's claim for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) in a manner consistent with this opinion.

1. We begin by briefly discussing the history of this case.¹ The record shows that Joao Junior sued Sharon Graham for injuries sustained from a car accident in 2010. Junior's

870 S.E.2d 380

amended complaint sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and litigation costs under OCGA § 13-6-11. After Junior filed suit, but before trial, Junior served Graham with a document styled

313 Ga. 421

"Plaintiff's Offer to Settle Tort Claim to Defendant Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68." Junior's offer proposed to settle all of his claims against Graham for $600,000. The offer was rejected by operation of law after Graham failed to accept it within 30 days of its issuance. See OCGA § 9-11-68 (c) ("An offer [of settlement] that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 30 days shall be deemed rejected.").

The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in Junior's favor and awarded him $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, plus $1,200,000 in attorney fees and $51,554.95 in litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11. The attorney fee award was consistent with Junior's fee agreement with his counsel, which called for counsel to be paid 40 percent of any compensatory damages award. The combined total of attorney fees and litigation expenses awarded by the jury was $1,251,554.95. This amount equaled Junior's total obligation for attorney fees and expenses of litigation preceding the verdict in the case.

Because the jury's award of compensatory damages exceeded Junior's offer to settle the suit for $600,000 by more than 125 percent, he filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68. That statute provides in relevant part:

If a plaintiff makes an offer of settlement which is rejected by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such offer of settlement, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff's behalf from the date of the rejection of the offer of settlement through the entry of judgment.

OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2). Graham opposed the motion, arguing that Junior's settlement offer was not made in good faith, and that an award under OCGA § 9-11-68 would give Junior a prohibited "double recovery."

The trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, denied Junior's motion and concluded that "allowing [Junior] a further award of attorney's fees would permit a double recovery." The court reasoned that even though OCGA §§ 9-11-68 (b) (2) and 13-6-11 contemplate awards based on different conduct, the total of attorney fees and litigation expenses used to measure the awards was incurred as to the same cause of action against the same defendant. The court also determined that Junior had already been "fully compensated"

313 Ga. 422

for the entire amount of attorney fees and litigation expenses that he incurred in this lawsuit. On that basis, the court determined that no additional recovery was permitted under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2).²

Junior appealed the denial of his request for attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2), arguing that the trial court erred by determining that the jury award under OCGA § 13-6-11 precluded the imposition of an award under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2). The Court of Appeals affirmed based on different reasoning. See Junior , 357 Ga. App. at 817-818, 849 S.E.2d 536.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's rationale that receiving attorney fee and litigation expenses awards under both OCGA § 13-6-11 and OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) in the same proceeding would necessarily amount to a double recovery. Instead, it affirmed the trial court's ruling based on the conclusion that Junior could not demonstrate that he was entitled to an award under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) because he had no longer "incurred" the $1,251,554.95 in attorney fees and litigation expenses as he had been awarded that amount as damages under OCGA § 13-6-11 and therefore had no uncovered expenses to which a sanction would apply. Id. at 818, 849 S.E.2d 536 (quoting OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) ). The Court of Appeals

870 S.E.2d 381

reasoned that "[i]n some instances, ... a claimant may have incurred fees after a jury verdict but prior to entry of the final judgment by the trial court, in which case a subsequent award under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) by a judge for such fees would be appropriate." Id. But because the Court of Appeals determined that "Junior ... d[id] not contend that he incurred such fees," it affirmed the ruling of the trial court denying Junior's motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2). Id. at 818, 849 S.E.2d 536.

We granted Junior's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2) requires the trial court to deduct from the sanction any amount awarded by the jury as damages under OCGA § 13-6-11. Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hold that the statutory schemes at issue do not provide for or compel any such set-off because they address different conduct of the defendant despite using a similar measure – attorney fees and litigation expenses – to calculate their respective amounts.

313 Ga. 423

2. (a) In interpreting OCGA §§ 9-11-68 (b) (2) and 13-6-11,

we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). Moreover, "[w]hen we consider the meaning of a statutory provision, we do not read it in isolation, but rather, we read it in the context of the other statutory provisions of which it is a part." City of Marietta v. Summerour , 302 Ga. 645, 656 (3), 807 S.E.2d 324 (2017) ; see also Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc. , 235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975) ("[A] statute must be viewed so as to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part."). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. See State v. Coleman , 306 Ga. 529, 530, 832 S.E.2d 389 (2019).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory provisions at issue. OCGA § 13-6-11³ provides:

The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a

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