Juniper Development Group v. US, Civ. A. No. 89-2569-K.
Decision Date | 07 August 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-2569-K. |
Citation | 774 F. Supp. 56 |
Parties | JUNIPER DEVELOPMENT GROUP, a Massachusetts partnership, Olympia Nominee Trust; George Whitten, Amy Whitten, and Charles Whitten as trustees, and George D. Whitten, individually, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America and United States Environmental Protection Agency, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Louis N. Massery, Cooley, Manion, Moore & Jones, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.
Craig D. Galli, Environment and Natural Resources Div., Environmental Defense Section, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. This action arises out of the imposition of a lien on certain property in Woburn, Massachusetts by defendant Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The plaintiffs are present and former owners of the property and persons affiliated with them. The amended complaint seeks the following relief: first, a mandatory injunction requiring the EPA, Region I to enter into a de minimis landowner settlement with plaintiffs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g); second, a declaration of nonliability based on the plaintiffs' status as "innocent landowners," 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35); third, a declaration of nonliability based on the EPA's inaction before plaintiffs purchased the property, which they claim constituted a waiver of all claims; fourth, a claim that the EPA's acts amount to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation or due process of law; fifth, a claim that the EPA's imposition of the lien constitutes a deprivation of property without due process; and sixth, a request for an order dissolving and removing the lien with respect to two lots of the property.
The amended complaint states that this court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); § 133(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b); § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702; the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; and 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1).
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to undertake removal or remedial action whenever there is a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any hazardous substance or of "any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 9604. "Removal" is aimed at preventing environmental damage in the short term, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), and "remedial action" is focused on permanently cleaning up a site, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability for incurred response costs, including the costs of removal or remedial action, on "responsible parties," defined to include past or present owners or operators of a site, as well as parties who generated, transported or accepted hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section also provides that a federal lien can be placed on a site and used as a basis for recovery by the United States to the extent that response costs are not recovered from responsible parties; recovery on the lien may occur only through an in rem action filed by the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l).
Congress has provided special procedures for judicial review of EPA actions under CERCLA. Federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all such controversies. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). Under CERCLA's timing of review provision, however, federal courts have jurisdiction over challenges to EPA removal or remedial actions only if they fall within five narrow categories of actions, none of which applies in this case. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The purpose of this limitation on federal court jurisdiction over challenges to EPA activities under CERCLA is to prevent litigation that will delay the EPA's cleanup efforts. Statements in the legislative history of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 et seq. (1986), which added the timing of review provision, support this view:
132 Cong.Rec. § 14928-29 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond, chairman of the Judiciary Committee that drafted SARA's judicial review provision).
Plaintiffs contend that the timing of review provision is inapplicable because their challenge of their CERCLA liability is not a challenge to a "removal or remedial action." However, both removal and remedial actions are defined to include "enforcement activities related thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). To the extent plaintiffs challenge their liability, or the extent of such liability, they cannot obtain judicial review until the government brings a cost recovery action. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.1989). To the extent plaintiffs seek to remove or modify the lien, they are challenging an enforcement activity related to the EPA's planned remedial action. Therefore, plaintiffs' challenge to the lien is a "challenge to a removal or remedial action" and is precluded from judicial review at this time by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
Plaintiffs also rely on § 702 of the APA. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453-54, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984).
Plaintiff contends that the EPA has identified no language or specific legislative intent that would overcome the presumption in favor of judicial review, id. at 349, 104 S.Ct. at 2455. They argue that the EPA relies only on § 113(h), which they say is inapplicable. As discussed above, however, plaintiffs' claims do fall within § 113(h). A number of courts have interpreted § 113(h) to preclude judicial review under § 702 of the APA. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, supra; Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991, 110 S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989); Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974 (11th Cir.1987); Wheaton Industries v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.1986). This interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's own statutory scheme for judicial review, with its legislative history, discussed above, and with its objectives of facilitating prompt government cleanup of hazardous waste discharges and prevention of future releases. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359-60, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 1107-08, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). I conclude that § 702 of the APA does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.
Nor can plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1), which provides that the United States may be named a party in an action in federal court to quiet title. This provision "merely waives...
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