Juretich v. People
| Decision Date | 06 December 1906 |
| Citation | 223 Ill. 484,79 N.E. 181 |
| Parties | JURETICH v. PEOPLE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; George Kersten, Judge.
Joseph Juretich was convicted of obtaining money by means of the confidence game and he brings error. Affirmed.
Cantwell & Erbstein and Charles P. R. Macaulay, for plaintiff in error.
W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., John J. Healy, State's Atty., John R. Newcomer, and F. L. Barnett, for the People.
On November 15, 1904, the grand jury of Cook county returned an indictment against the plaintiff in error, Joseph Juretich, of two counts, the first charging him with obtaining money by means of the confidence game, and the second with obtaining money by false pretenses. A motion to quash the indictment was overruled, but the second count was dismissed, and upon a trial he was found guilty, and sentenced to the penitentiary. To reverse that judgment a writ of error has been prosecuted from this court.
It is insisted that, conceding the facts as proven upon the trial to be true, they do not constitute the offense of obtaining money by means of the confidence game; that the mere obtaining of money by a bogus check is not practicing the confidence game, within the meaning of the statute; that the gist of the offense is obtaining money by that kind of fraud commonly called the ‘confidence game,’ and that the use of a bogus check, or any other device, whatever it may be, is merely incidental to the crime; so that if money is obtained under circumstances that do not amount to what is commonly called the ‘confidence game,’ there can be no conviction of that offense, even though a bogus check be used. Section 98 of chapter 38 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 692) provides that every person who shall obtain or attempt to obtain from any other person or persons any money or property by means or by use of any false or bogus check, or by any other means, instrument, or device commonly called the ‘confidence game,’ shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than ten years. This statute does not in specific terms define the confidence game, but merely provides that every person who shall obtain from any other person any money by means of any false or bogus check, commonly called the ‘confidence game,’ shall be guilty, etc. It assumes that what is commonly called the ‘confidence game’ is well understood. Acts which will constitute the practice of the confidence game have been before us on several occasions, and we have held that it includes any swindling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence reposed by the victim in the swindler. It is very often practiced by the use of cards, dice, checks, or other means, instruments, or devices in which the victim gets nothing, but is simply swindled out of his money by some trick or device. Du Bois v. People, 200 Ill. 157, 65 N. E. 658,93 Am. St. Rep. 183;Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179,47 L. R. A. 731;Maxwell v. People, 158 Ill. 248, 41 N. E. 995.
The evidence in this case shows that Juretich conducted a saloon in the city of Chicago, where he met one Frank Hawkins, and asked him if he thought he could raise some money. Hawkins replied that he was ready to try. Juretich then drew a check for $19.30, payable to James St. Clair, and without authority signed the name of Charles T. Woods to it, and indorsed it on the back with the name of St. Clair, the payee. He then gave it to Hawkins, with instructions to get it cashed. The latter tried at two or three places, but failed to get the money, and returned to plaintiff in error with the check. One Max Goldenberg kept a furniture store in the city, and had gone to school with Hawkins, who was known to him by the name of Wells. Among the customers of Goldenberg was a man named Richard Moore, who was indebted to him in the sum of $19.30, being a balance due for furniture purchased. Juretich knew that Moore was indebted to Goldenberg in this amount, as Mrs. Moore had tried to borrow money from him with which to pay the bill. Juretich asked Hawkins kins if he knew Goldenberg. Hawkins replied that he did, and Juretich then told him to take the check to Goldenberg, pay $4 on Moore's account, and get the balance in cash. Hawkins went to the store and presented the check, but the clerk or cashier refused to pay it without Goldenberg's directions, who finally did order her to credit the amount and pay the balance. Hawkins received $15.30 in cash, of which amount he gave Juretich $8.30 and kept the balance.
It is difficult to see how it can be successfully contended that these acts within our common knowledge do not amount to obtaining money by means of the confidence game. The money was obtained by Hawkins from Goldenberg by means or by use of a false or bogus check under the direction of plaintiff in error. Hawkins had tried at other places to cash the check and failed. Juretich sought to take advantage of the peculiar acquaintance and relations between Hawkins and Goldenberg, and his knowledge of the indebtedness due the latter from Moore, to gain the confidence of Goldenberg and swindle him out of the money.
It is next insisted that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the conviction. The foregoing facts are substantially undisputed. Hawkins testified to them, and no one contradicts him. Evidence was offered of similar transactions in which Juretich had figured as one of the principal actors. This evidence was not competent, nor was it offered as tending to prove the defendant guilty of the crime charged in this indictment, but evidence of similar transactions practicedby the accused upon other parties was admissible to show guilty knowledge. Du Bois v. People, supra. Juretich seeks to weaken or destroy the testimony of Hawkins, who, he says, had become angry with him because he had refused to furnish an attorney to defend him on a charge of this offense, and that in order to ‘get even’ with the plaintiff in error, as he expresses it, Hawkins sought to connect him with the crime; also, that Hawkins had pleaded guilty, and was at the time of this trial awaiting sentence, and that he hoped to save himself from the penitentiary by implicating the plaintiff in error. The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if believed by a jury, is sufficient to support a conviction. Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9, 42 N. E. 123,50 Am. St. Rep. 134;Hoyt v. People, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315,16 L. R. A. 239. In this case, however, the testimony of Hawkins, the accomplice, does not stand alone, but is supported by other facts and circumstances. It...
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Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
...be contended that she was not charged with crime. It follows that the language used constituted slander per se. See Juretich v. People, 223 Ill. 484, 79 N.E. 181. Section 11411, supra, apparently was not considered by the federal court in determining this cause, but it did hold in its decis......
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Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
...... that she was not charged with crime. It follows that the. language used constituted slander per se. See Juretich v. People, 223 Ill. 484, 79 N.E. 181. . . Section. 11411, supra, apparently was not considered by the federal. court in ......