Jurgiewicz v. Adams .

• Decision Date: 20 July 1945
• Docket Number: Nos. 8702, 8703.,s. 8702, 8703.
• Parties: JURGIEWICZ v. ADAMS (two cases).
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

43 A.2d 310

JURGIEWICZ

v.ADAMS (two cases).

Nos. 8702, 8703.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 20, 1945.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alberic A. Archambault, Judge.

Actions by Jennie Jurgiewicz and by Josephine Jurgiewicz against Frank M. Adams for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Verdicts were returned for plaintiffs, motions for new trials were denied and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled in part and sustained in part and cases remitted.

Hogan & Hogan and Edward T. Hogan, all of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Sherwood & Clifford, Sidney Clifford, and Raymond E. Jordan, all of Providence, for defendant.

BAKER, Justice.

These are actions of the case for negligence. They were tried together to a jury in the superior court and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff Jennie Jurgiewicz for $100 and a verdict for the plaintiff Josephine Jurgiewicz for $8,000. After the trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial in each case, the latter duly prosecuted his bills of exceptions to this court, and they are now before us for determination.

The cases arise because of the collision of two automobiles, on September 12, 1943, at the intersection of Cole and University avenues in the city of Providence. From the nature of the defendant's exceptions, which we are about to consider, and the issues raised by them, it is not necessary that the facts of the collision, as appearing from the evidence, be set out in much detail. The same facts apply to both cases.

The accident happened on a Sunday morning shortly before 11 o'clock. The plaintiffs, who are sisters, were riding as guests on the front seat of an automobile operated by a Mrs. Palau and were on their way to a church which is located on Cole avenue a block beyond University avenue toward the north. This car was proceeding, just before the accident, in a northerly direction on Cole avenue near its intersection with University avenue. The defendant, a physician who was about to make a professional call, was alone in his car which he was operating in an easterly direction on University avenue approaching such intersection. At that point University avenue is about 24 feet wide and Cole avenue is about 40 feet wide. The two cars collided in the approximate center of the intersection. Thereafter the plaintiffs brought the instant cases to recover damages for alleged injuries which each claimed to have suffered by reason of the above-described accident.

In the case brought by the plaintiff Jennie the defendant moved that a verdict be directed in his favor, arguing that, irrespective of the question of liability, she had proved no damage. The trial justice denied this motion, which ruling is the basis of the defendant's fifth exception in that case. In so ruling the trial justice in our opinion was not in error.

The evidence showed that at the time of the accident the plaintiff Jennie was riding in the middle of the front seat of the car driven by Mrs. Palau. Jennie testified in substance that as a result of the accident she was nervous and ‘kind of shaken up’, and that a doctor looked at her after the collision but did not prescribe for her in any way and has not presented any bill. She also testified that she was not bruised or marked at all and that she lost no time from her work by reason of the accident.

Assuming liability, as the defendant does in making his motion, and assuming, as he argues, that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to show that the plaintiff Jennie was entitled to any compensatory damages, we are of the opinion that she would, under such circumstances, be entitled at least to nominal damages. This would prevent the granting of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict in his favor in her case. This court in Weaver v. Miner, R. I., 112 A. 425, a tort case based on a charge of negligence, held that where liability was shown, but the jury did not have any evidence from which they could ascertain the amount of compensation required to make the plaintiff whole, they should have been instructed that they were limited in their verdict to nominal damages. In our judgment this holding governs the instant case. The defendant's fifth exception in, Jennie's case is therefore overruled.

In that case the defendant is also pressing his exception to the refusal of the trial justice to grant his motion for a new trial. This exception is being urged solely on the ground that the fair preponderance of the evidence shows that the defendant was guilty of no negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident, but that the collision was due to the negligence of Mrs. Palau. The defendant is not now urging that a new trial should be granted on the ground that the damages in Jennie's case are excessive.

The evidence as to how the collision occurred was sharply conflicting and clearly presented a question of fact for the jury to determine. In substance the defendant contends that his car was stationary at the time of the collision and was sideswiped by car driven by Mrs. Palau, and also that the established physical facts support his contention. On the other hand, Mrs. Palau maintains that the defendant's car struck her car with force on its left side and almost tipped it over. The trial justice, who had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify, refused to grant the defendant a new trial on the question...