Jusic v. Saul
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-CV-003306-SEP |
| Parties | AGAN JUSIC, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Andrew M. Saul, the Commissioner of Social Security, denying the application of Plaintiff Agan Jusic for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Because there is substantial evidence to support the decision denying benefits, the Court will affirm the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff's application.
On October 13, 2016, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that he had been unable to work due to disability since July 23, 2015. (Tr. 160-72). He alleged disability based on diabetes mellitus, high cholesterol, depression, anxiety, irregular heartbeat, ischemic heart disease, and hypertension. (Tr. 272). His applications were initially denied on March 6, 2017. (Tr. 78-88). Plaintiff subsequently filed a Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 96-100).
Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified at his hearing that he is unable to work due to his heart condition. (Tr. 45). He further testified that he is "always tired" and he has to "sit all the time." (Tr. 46). He testified that he does nothing but lie down, and that during the day he gets up only to use the restroom. (Tr. 47, 49). He also testified that it was difficult to walk; when the ALJ asked him how far he could walk, he stated that he could walk around 100 meters. (Tr. 48). In his Adult Function Report, Plaintiff states that on a typical day he does nothing other than wake up, take his medications, lie back down, watch television, and go back to sleep. (Tr. 292). He states that he requires assistance from others in order to use the toilet, bathe, shave, get dressed, and feed himself, and that his son and daughter-in-law provide such assistance. Id. He further states that he does not cook because of back problems, and that his back hurts if he stands for long. (Tr. 293). He indicates that he does not do any chores in his house or yard, again attributing his inability to do so to back problems. (Tr. 293-94). He states that he does not drive, only leaves the house for doctor's appointments, and never goes out alone. (Tr. 294-95).
In a Third-Party Function Report completed by Plaintiff's daughter-in-law, she reports that she helps him every day due to his depression, anxiety, back problems, and short-term memory difficulties.1 (Tr. 258). She indicates that she helps him with all aspects of personal care, including bathing, dressing, and feeding him, but that her husband, Plaintiff's son, helps him with "guy stuff." (Tr. 259). She states that Plaintiff cannot drive and only leaves the house to go to doctor's appointments and to sit outside. (Tr. 261).
In an opinion issued on May 15, 2019, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined in the Act. (Tr. 11-25). Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Appeals Council. (Tr. 157-59). On October 24, 2019, the SSA's Appeals Council denied his Request for Review. (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
As to Plaintiff's testimony, work history, and medical records, the Court accepts the facts as provided by the parties. The Court will address specific facts related to the issues raised by the parties as needed in the discussion below.
To be eligible for benefits under the Act, a claimant must prove he or she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Act defines as disabled a person who is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a);2 see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (). At Step One, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity"; if so, then he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities"; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "listings"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's "residual functional capacity" (RFC), which is "the most a claimant can do despite [his or her] limitations." Moore v.Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work by comparing the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next step. Id. At Step Five, the Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy; if he cannot make such an adjustment, he will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is disabled. Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that, given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012).
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, April 1, 2016; that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, hypertension, ischemic heart disease, left posterior cerebral artery distribution subacute infarct, and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood/major depressive disorder; and that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 13-14). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), except that he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs or balance, kneel, stoop, crouch, and crawl; he should avoid concentrated exposure to wetness, humidity, vibration, pulmonary irritants, extreme heat and cold; he should avoid all exposure to workplace hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights; and he is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks. (Tr. 17).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (Tr. 23). But considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, and in reliance on the testimonyof a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform occupations including product inspector (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) No. 669.687-014, sedentary exertion level, 11,000 jobs in the national economy), assembler (DOT No. 706.684-030, sedentary exertion level, 34,000 jobs in the national economy); and production worker (DOT No. 734.687-018, sedentary exertion level, 45,000 jobs in the national economy). (Tr. 24). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from the alleged onset date through May 15, 2019, the date of the decision. (Tr. 24-25).
This Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Richardson v. Perales, ...
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