Justice v. Gatchell

• Citation: 325 A.2d 97
• Parties: Danielle C. JUSTICE, By her father and next friend Danny Justice, Danny Justice in his own right, and Nancy Carol Justice, Plaintiffs Below, Appellant, v. Lois Lorraine GATCHELL, Defendant Below, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 13 August 1974
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 97

325 A.2d 97

Danielle C. JUSTICE, By her father and next friend Danny

Justice, Danny Justice in his own right, and Nancy

Carol Justice, Plaintiffs Below, Appellant, v. Lois Lorraine GATCHELL, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Argued March 15, 1974.

Decided Aug. 13, 1974.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

James P. D'Angelo and William H. Bennethum, III, Wilmington, for plaintiffs below, appellants.

Albert L. Simon, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellee.

Before HERRMANN, C.J., DUFFY, J., and QUILLEN, Chancellor.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

In this appeal, we are urged to strike down the Delaware Automobile Guest Statute (21 Del.C. § 6101(a)) ¹ as being in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

I.

This action involves injuries received by the minor plaintiff, Danielle C. Justice, in an automobile accident. The suit is brought on her behalf by her father who, together with his wife, has also brought suit in their own right. The defendant in the action is the grandmother of Danielle. At the time of the accident, Danielle was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defendant grandmother. The grandmother raised the Guest Statute as a defense. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment asserting that the Guest Statute is inapplicable on the facts of the case and, in any event, is unconstitutional. The Superior Court denied the motion for summary judgment; this appeal by the plaintiffs followed.

The plaintiffs make three arguments. We address ourselves to the most important first.

II.

The plaintiffs argue that the Delaware Automobile Guest Statute is violative of the Equal Protection Clause in that its denial of a cause of action to a non-paying guest injured through the negligence of the host driver, while permitting such a cause of action to a paying guest, establishes an arbitrary and invidious discrimination for which there is no rational basis. In support of that position, we are urged to follow Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973). This has become the leading case in a new judicial trend inimical to Automobile Guest Statutes.

The present Delaware Automobile Guest Statute was enacted in 1933 (38 Del.L. Ch. 26). ² At about the same time in the history of the evolution of the automobile, similar statutes were enacted in about half the States. ³ See 2 F. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, n. 4 (1956). ⁴

Over the years, almost universally until the advent of Merlo in 1973, Automobile Guest Statutes were upheld against constitutional attack. Early in the game, our Guest Statute was brought under constitutional scrutiny in Gallegher v. Davis, Del.Super., 7 W.W.Harr. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936). It was there assailed as being violative of the 'due course of law' provision of the Delaware Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 9, Del.C.Ann. ⁵ The holding in Gallegher, which has withstood the tests of time and challenge in this State, was that the Statute is constitutional. This conclusion was based principally upon Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929). In Gallegher, the Court had this to say as to the purpose and intent of the then recently-enacted Guest Statute of 1933:

'* * *. (T)he history and language of the act indicates sufficiently the legislative belief that the multitudinous actions brought by guest passengers in automobiles against owners and operators, not infrequently the parties, plaintiff and defendant, being near relatives, presented so many instances of collusion, utter indifference to results because of protective insurance, perjury and consequent fraud upon the courts, as to constitute a serious public evil to be mitigated by defining the degree of care to be required of an automobile host to a guest.' (183 A. at 622)

Is is noteworthy that the attack in Gallegher was based upon the 'due course of law' provision of the State Constitution and not upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case is of first impression here as a challenge of the Guest Statute on equal protection grounds.

The Silver case, relied upon in Gallegher, involved the Connecticut Guest Statute, much like ours, which was challenged on equal protection grounds. In Silver, it was stated that whether there had been a serious increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in automobile guest cases was for the Legislature to determine, and that the wisdom of legislation restricting liability in such cases was not the concern of the courts. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Connecticut Statute in Silver, stating:

'In this day of almost universal highway transportation by motorcar, we cannot say that abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits growing out of the gratuitous carriage of passengers in automobiles do not present so conspicuous an example of what the Legislature may regard as an evil, as to justify legislation aimed at it, even though some abuses may not be hit. (Citations) It is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most frequently occurs.' (50 S.Ct. at 59)

This remains the last word of the United States Supreme Court on the subject.

On the authority of Silver, until Merlo, Guest Statutes like ours have been consistently upheld against constitutional challenges, including those founded upon the Equal Protection Clause: Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937); Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960); Wright's Estate v. Pizel, 168 Kan. 493, 214 P.2d 328 (1950); Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E.2d 643 (1935); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Or. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935); Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935); Campbell v. Paschall, 132 Tex. 226, 121 S.W.2d 593 (1938); Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936); Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942); Delaney v. Badame, 49 Ill.2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971).

The Merlo case broke the pattern last year, reflecting a growing judicial impatience with, and disapproval of, Guest Statutes in general. See cases collected at 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, 15, n. 3 (Supp.1968). In Merlo, the Supreme Court of California held that, under today's changing conditions, its Guest Statute denies equal protection of the laws, under both Federal and State Constitutions, to non-paying automobile guests. The rationale of Merlo is that the classifications which the Guest Statute creates, between those denied and those permitted recovery for negligently inflicted injuries, ⁶ bear no substantial and rational relation ⁷ to the Statute's traditionally recognized purposes of protecting the hospitality of host-drivers and of preventing collusive lawsuits. In rejecting the protection-of-hospitality justification, the Court cited such considerations as the greatly changed conditions since the 1930's arising from almost universal automobile liability insurance coverage. ⁸ In rejecting the collusion-prevention thesis, the Court reasoned that in broadly prohibiting all automobile guests from instituting actions for negligence because a 'small segment' of that class may file collusive suits, the Statute 'presents a classic case of an impermissibly overinclusive ⁹ classification scheme'; i.e., a statutory classification that 'imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law aims'. The Court went on to say in this connection: 'Instead of confirming its disability to those who actually institute collusive suits, the provision reaches out beyond such persons and burdens the great number of honest automobile guests'; and it said 'Such a statute does not treat similarly situated individuals in like manner, but instead reaches out beyond the individuals 'tainted with the mischief' at which a statute is directed, and imposes its burden on innocent individuals who do not share the condemning characteristics'; and the Court concluded that '* * * in barring suits by all automobile guests simply to protect insurance companies from some collusive lawsuits, the guest statute exceeds the bounds of rationality and constitutes a denial of equal protection.' (106 Cal.Rptr. at 403, 506 P.2d at 227--228).

These novel, scholarly, and thoughtful rationales and conclusions in Brown v. Merlo have aroused a spirited dichotomy and wide divergence of judicial opinion in the several cases in which Guest Statutes have been tested against the Equal Protection Clause since Merlo appeared.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas unanimously declined to follow Merlo, and upheld the Texas Guest Statute. Tisko v. Harrison, Civ.App.Texas, 500 S.W.2d 565 (1973). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in a 4--3 decision, adopted the basic rationale and conclusion of Merlo, and held the Kansas Guest Statute violative of Federal and State equal protection constitutional guaranties. Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974). The Supreme Court of Utah declined to follow Merlo, and unanimously upheld the Guest Statute of that State against a similar equal protection assault. Cannon v. Oviatt and Martin, Utah Supr., 520 P.2d 883 (1974). The Supreme Court of Iowa, in a 5--4 decision, rejected the Merlo approaches to the problem and upheld the Iowa Guest Statute as constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, Keasling v. Thompson, Iowa Supr., 217 N.W.2d 687 (1974). The Supreme Court of North Dakota, declining to test their Guest Statute under the Federal Constitution, but following the Merlo approaches, unanimously found their Statute violative of the 'arbitrary classifications' provision of the State Constitution in view of changing conditions occurring since the Statute's enactment in 1931....