Justillian v. Versaggi, 157.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1954
• Docket Number: No. 157.,157.
• Citation: 169 F. Supp. 71
• Parties: Norval JUSTILLIAN, Libellant, v. Virgil VERSAGGI, d/b/a Versaggi Shrimp Company, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

169 F. Supp. 71

Norval JUSTILLIAN, Libellant, v. Virgil VERSAGGI, d/b/a Versaggi Shrimp Company, Respondent.

No. 157.

United States District Court S. D. Texas, Brownsville Division.

February 5, 1954.

Crain, Muggley, Hardy & Colvin, San Benito, Tex., for libellant.

Cox, Wagner, Adams & Wilson, Brownsville, Tex., for respondent.

ALLRED, District Judge.

Proceeding by libellant, a minor, through his father as next of friend, for personal injuries sustained on a shrimp boat owned by Versaggi Shrimp Company, a partnership of which respondent is a member. At pre-trial, libellant elected to proceed under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 and for maintenance during the period of his incapacity.

Libellant, 17 years old at the time, was injured on the Sea Raider, on October 3, 1952, while it was shrimping in the Gulf of Mexico south of Brownsville, Texas. The crew consisted of the Captain (Stevens), his son and nephew (libellant), operating under the "lay" plan, whereby respondent furnished the boat, fuel and rigging, receiving 50% of the profits, and the crew dividing the remaining 50%. In this instance Captain Stevens secured the crew, including libellant. The crew was to pay for the groceries and one-half of the ice out of their share. The Captain determined when and where to fish, but had no right to sell the shrimp. The owner attended to this and made statements to each member of the crew, showing the total number barrels of shrimp, the price for which it was sold, the amounts deducted for groceries, ice, union dues, withholding and social security taxes, cash advances and the net amount due. A check was then issued to each crew member for such amount. Respondent prescribed rigid safety rules and required the Captain to report when any equipment was out of order. His own testimony, quoted in respondent's brief, shows a rather firm and rigid control of the vessel by respondent.

Under these circumstances, I hold that libellant was a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C.A. § 688 and that Captain Stevens was not the owner "pro hac vice," as urged by respondent.¹

On the morning of October 3, 1952, the vessel was hauling in the net and preparing to hoist it on board by means of a power driven winch and two steel cables, 1050 feet long. The length of the cable had been increased from 900 feet to 1,050 feet about two months before. As the cables were reeled in, they wound around a drum or reel. On the previous drag one of the cables had jumped off the drum. The Captain, therefore, instructed libellant to watch the cable and to tell him if it got slack so he could slow down. He gave libellant no other instructions, figuring that he was sufficiently experienced to know what to do. The Captain testified it was dangerous to push the cable back with the hands if it...