Juvenile Officer v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re Interest of L.C.)

Decision Date24 November 2015
Docket NumberNo. ED 102694,ED 102694
Parties In the Interest of: L.C., a minor child. Juvenile Officer, Twenty–Second Judicial Circuit, Respondent, v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Matthew J. Laudano, Supreme Court Building, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for Appellant.

Christopher R. Brown, 920 N. Vandeventer Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63108, for Respondent.

ROBERT G. DOWD, Presiding Judge

The Children's Division of the Department of Social Services ("the Division") appeals from the trial court's judgment mandating that the Division provide all benefits and services to Cassandra Owens as would normally be given to a licensed foster care provider. We reverse and remand.

The juvenile court entered an order of temporary protective custody with respect to LC. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court held a protective custody hearing, at which it determined L.C. was to remain within the court's jurisdiction and in the legal custody of the Division.

Subsequently, the juvenile officer filed a first amended petition regarding L.C., which sought to have the court enter any orders, judgments, or decrees as may be found necessary in the best interest of L.C. The first amended petition alleged that "said juvenile comes within the provisions of Section 211.031.1(1)" because she was residing with her paternal grandmother, Owens, when the case began. In addition, the petition stated L.C. would be at risk of neglect if she were returned to the custody of her mother at that time. L.C.'s father was incarcerated and was, as a result, unable to care for L.C.

The court held a hearing on the juvenile officer's first amended petition and determined L.C. was "without proper care, custody or support and, therefore, is a Juvenile[ ] within the provisions of Section 211.031.1." Thus, the court found it was in L.C.'s best interests to remain in protective custody and be in the legal custody of the Division. The court also noted Mother was not an appropriate custodian for L.C. and that Father also was not an appropriate custodian.

The court then entered an order and judgment of disposition in which it ordered that legal custody of the L.C. shall be granted to the Division for appropriate placement and that placement with Owens is an appropriate physical placement. In this ruling, the court also ordered the Divisionto comply with the specific orders on Exhibit C. In Exhibit C, the court ordered the Division to, among other things, "license Owens once traffic matters are cleared up."

The Division filed a motion to modify the court's order and judgment of disposition. In particular, the Division requested that the court rescind the provision of its judgment ordering the Division to license Owens. The Division also filed a motion to rehear this issue, which was granted.

At the hearing on the motion to modify, the Division established that Owens had previously applied for foster care licensure and had her application refused. Owens did not file a petition for judicial review of the Division's denial.

In its subsequent judgment, the court found the Division had previously denied a license to Owens on grounds that the court found were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. However, the court noted it did not have discretion to order the Division to issue such a license no matter how unfounded the denial, unless an appropriate administrative review had been filed by Owens. The Division also found that, at this point, because she did not appeal the denial of her foster care license, Owens does not have an adequate remedy at law to redress the denial of a foster care license. The court noted, however, that it retained the authority to order that necessary services be provided. The court held that placement with Owens under Section 210.565 is in L.C.'s best interests and it was necessary for L.C.'s welfare for services to be provided to L.C. and Owens as if Owens was a licensed child care provider. Thus, the court ordered the Division to provide such services as the failure of Owens to receive these necessary services would render this ruling meaningless. In conclusion, the court ordered that "it [was] in the best interests of [L.C.] that the [Division] shall provide all benefits and services to [Owens], as caretaker of [L.C.] herein, as would normally be given to a licensed foster care provider." This appeal follows.

Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we note the parties disagree on whether the Division has standing to appeal the judgment here. We must address this question before we can address the merits of the appeal.

The juvenile officer asserts the Division does not have standing because, according to Rule 120.01(a), appeals from juvenile court proceedings are allowed as provided by statute. Section 211.261.1, the statute allowing appeals from juvenile court proceedings, provides in pertinent part:

An appeal shall be allowed to the child from any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter and may be taken on the part of the child by its parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend. An appeal shall be allowed to a parent from any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter which adversely affects him. An appeal shall be allowed to the juvenile officer from any final judgment, order or decree made under this chapter....

Section 211.261.21 provides an avenue to appeal from a juvenile court judgment. Because it does not include a provision allowing the Division to appeal, the juvenile officer is correct to point out the Division has no standing to bring the immediate appeal under Section 211.261. In the Interest of D.T. and L.T., 248 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Mo.App.W.D.2008).

However, we must also consider whether or not the Division may have standing to appeal pursuant to Section 512.020. Id. Section 512.020 provides "Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his or her appeal to a court having...

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