K.C. v. L.A.

• Citation: 128 A.3d 774
• Decision Date: 21 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 65 MAP 2015,65 MAP 2015
• Parties: K.C. and V.C. v. L.A. Appeal of: D.M. and L.N.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

128 A.3d 774

K.C. and V.C.
v.
L.A.

Appeal of: D.M. and L.N.

No. 65 MAP 2015

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Oct. 21, 2015.
Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

128 A.3d 775

Richard Ellis Santee Jr., Richard Eugene Santee, Shay, Santee & Kelhart, Bethlehem, for Appellant.

Harold J. Funt, Mosebach, Funt, Dayton & Duckworth, P.C., Bethlehem, Frances Gravish Sonne, Frances G. Sonne, Attorney-a-Law, P.C, Allentown, for Appellee.

L.A., pro se.

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice TODD.

In this appeal by allowance, we are asked to determine whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action is appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.¹ For the reasons that follow, we hold that such an order is, in fact, a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and, thus, we reverse the Superior Court's order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein.

This case arises out of an action for the custody of L.A. ("Child"). Child was born on December 9, 2011, to L.A. ("Mother")

128 A.3d 776

and Q.M. ("Father"). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody on February 9, 2012. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother's home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. ("Maternal Aunt"), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively "Appellants"). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. ("Paternal Grandparents").

On June 6, 2013, nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother,² seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to "preserve and maintain the status quo" and "so as not to disrupt the [C]hild's living arrangements." Complaint for Custody, at 3. Mother did not contest the matter; however, on June 25, 2013, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324³ to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents and, therefore, that they could not stand in loco parentis. On January 2, 2015, following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants' petition to intervene, noting that "relationships which are based on foster care do not give rise to in loco parentis status for purposes of custody." Trial Court Order, 1/2/15, at 1 n.1.

Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court's order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. The Superior Court nevertheless quashed the appeal in a per curiam order dated April 10, 2015, concluding the trial court's order denying the petition to intervene was "not a final order in the custody matter and thus not final or appealable."⁴ K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 499 EDA 2015, 1 (Pa.Super. filed 4/10/15) (order) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) ("A final order is any order that: (1) disposes

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of all claims and of all parties"); G.B. v. M.M.B., 448 Pa.Super. 133, 670 A.2d 714 (1996) (holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under Rule 341 ); Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg Savings Ass'n, 300 Pa.Super. 279, 446 A.2d 614 (1982) (quashing appeal from order denying intervention in action in assumpsit because order was not final)).

Thereafter, Appellants filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, raising the issues of whether their appeal from the trial court's order denying their petition to intervene was appealable as a final order under Rule 341 or, alternatively, as a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313. We granted allowance of appeal, limited to the following issue:

Whether an appeal from a trial court order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action is appealable as a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 because the order is separable and collateral to the main cause of action, the right involved is too important to be denied review, and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case the claimed right will be irreparably lost[.]

K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., ––– Pa. ––––, 121 A.3d 432 (2015) (order).

By way of background, prior to 1992, orders denying a party the right to intervene in an action were appealable as of right under Rule 341 because they "have the practical consequence of putting a litigant out of court," and, thus, were viewed as final with regard to that party. Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note. However, the 1992 amendment to Rule 341 abandoned this liberal "final aspect" approach to finality by generally limiting appeals as of right to only those orders which "end[ed] the litigation as to all claims and all parties." Id. As a result, appeals from several types of orders which were formerly permitted under Rule 341 were eliminated from the rule's scope, including appeals from orders denying a party's right to intervene. The Official Note to Rule 341 specifically identifies, inter alia, an order denying a party's right to intervene as one such order which is no longer appealable as a final order under the rule.

Nevertheless, although Rule 341 specifically precludes a party from appealing an order denying intervention before the underlying action becomes final under Rule 341's present formulation, the Official Note to Rule 341 also states that such an order may be immediately appealable as a collateral order under Rule 313 if it meets the criteria set forth in that rule. Otherwise known as the collateral order doctrine, Rule 313(b) provides that an interlocutory order is collateral and, therefore, immediately appealable, if it is: "[1] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where [2] the right involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) ; see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 621 Pa. 446, 78 A.3d 1070, 1077 (2013).

Before us, Appellants argue that the trial court's order denying their petition to intervene in the custody proceedings is a collateral order appealable as of right under Rule 313, and, thus, that the Superior Court erred in quashing its appeal. With respect to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, Appellants contend the order denying their petition to intervene is separable from the underlying custody action because it concerns the issue of whether they have standing to intervene, a question they claim is separate from the main issue in...