K.G. v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Cmty. Sch. Dist., C 15-4242-MWB
| Decision Date | 29 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. C 15-4242-MWB,C 15-4242-MWB |
| Parties | K.G., a minor, by and through his parents and next friends, SUZANNE GOSCH and KEVIN GOSCH, Plaintiffs, v. SERGEANT BLUFF-LUTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, MIRANDA RIEDIGER, KELLY ADAMS, and DOES 1-30, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 2
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 3
A. General Standards For A New Trial ............................................ 3
B. The Gosches' Grounds For New Trial .......................................... 3
III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 10
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Suzanne and Kevin Gosch brought this lawsuit on behalf of their seven-year-old autistic child, plaintiff KG, against defendants Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District (the District); Miranda Riediger, who was KG's special education teacher; and Kelly Adams, who was the principal at KG's elementary school. This litigation arose from an incident in which Ms. Riediger allegedly "dragged" KG across a classroom floor allegedly causing him serious carpet burns. At a jury trial, beginning October 4, 2017, the Gosches asserted the following claims: "unreasonable seizure" by Ms. Riediger in violation of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; "unreasonable seizure" by Ms. Adams, based on failure to supervise and train faculty and staff, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; "disability discrimination" by the District, in violation of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; "negligence" by Ms. Riediger in dragging KG across the floor; and "negligent supervision" by Ms. Adams. On October 13, 2017, the jury returned a defense verdict on all claims. On November 9, 2017, the Gosches filed a Motion For New Trial on "Counts I (a) (seizure) and (d) (negligence)" against Ms. Riediger.1 The defendants filed their Resistance on November 20, 2017, and the Gosches filed a Reply on November 27, 2017.
Before I turn to the merits of the Motion for New Trial, I want to compliment all the lawyers in this case on their exceptional preparation and superb presentation of evidence at trial. This was clearly one of the best tried cases I have ever presided over in 23 years. This is true in large part because three out of the four lawyers were Iowa trial lawyers. They displayed unsurpassed cooperation with each other and unparalleledcivility throughout the incredibly hard fought litigation. While virtually every fact in the case was hotly contested, the lawyers displayed the utmost professionalism throughout the pre-trial and trial proceedings.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. General Standards For A New Trial
Rule 59(a) provides, inter alia, "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party— . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). Thus, "[a] trial court 'may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues,' provided there is a good reason to do so." Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 809 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)). "'A motion for new trial is addressed to the judicial discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of that discretion.'" West Plains, L.L.C. v. Retzlaff Grain Co. Inc., 870 F.3d 774, 788 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 263 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1959)). "'[T]he key question [is] whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'" Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 421 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013)).
B. The Gosches' Grounds For New Trial
The Gosches argue, first, that the verdict on the two claims at issue was against the greater weight of the evidence in three respects: (1) no reasonable jury could have concluded that none of KG's injuries were caused by Ms. Riediger "dragging" KG; (2) no reasonable jury could have concluded that dragging KG on the floor in order toavoid him potentially coming into contact with a desk or other students was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the clear weight of the evidence established that no reasonable teacher would have "dragged" KG, as Ms. Riediger did, for the reasons she provided to justify the "dragging," so that she acted negligently. The defendants' response, in essence, is that there were no witnesses who testified that Ms. Riediger actually "dragged" KG; rather, the witnesses who were present during the incident testified that Ms. Riediger moved KG two steps, approximately four feet, and that she did so carefully and slowly, so as not to hurt him.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly explained, "'A motion for new trial based on sufficiency of the evidence should be granted only if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.'" S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581, 589 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bennett v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 721 F.3d 546, 552-53 (8th Cir. 2013)); Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC, 825 F.3d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 2016) . The standard is a high one, and "[w]here, as here, the motion for a new trial is based on an assertion that the verdict is counter to the weight of the evidence, 'the district court's denial of the motion is virtually unassailable on appeal.'" Bamford, Inc. v. Regent Ins. Co., 822 F.3d 403, 410 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir. 1994)). "That is because the district court had 'the benefit of hearing the testimony and observing the demeanor of witnesses throughout the trial.'" Two Rivers Bank & Tr. v. Atanasova, 686 F.3d 554, 563-64 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 932 (8th Cir. 2001)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and sustain the verdict unless no reasonable juror could have reached the same conclusion. Estate of Pepper v. Whitehead,780 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2015). Thus, "[r]eversal is only warranted if [the appellate court] determine[s] there is absolutely no evidence supporting the verdict after '[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Doe v. Young, 664 F.3d 727, 736 (8th Cir. 2011) ).
This was an exceptionally well-tried case by the lawyers on both sides. Each side thoroughly prepared and presented a literal mountain of compelling evidence. Had the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, there was more than sufficient evidence to support both liability and a large damage award. Perhaps another jury would have found for the plaintiff. If this case had been tried to a judge, I am confident some judges would have found for the plaintiff and some for the defendants. All of this is to say that the evidence in this case was very close and that a verdict for either side would have been reasonable for a jury to reach. See Estate of Pepper, 780 F.3d at 861. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and the verdict, see Doe, 664 F.3d at 736, the verdict is not against the greater weight of the evidence.
The Gosches are not entitled to a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
Next, the Gosches argue that defense counsel made three improper remarks, comments, or arguments during closings: (1) that the Gosches' counsel made a "send them a message" argument not contained in the jury instructions; (2) that pictures of the classroom identified as Defense Exhibit A showed "the classroom as it existed on that day"; and (3) that a myriad of speculative injuries could have occurred from items on the desk or if KG got under the desk and hit his head, and suggesting that, if Ms. Riediger had acted differently, the Gosches would still have sued her. The Gosches contend that the first remark urged the jurors to base their verdict on something other than the law inthe court's instructions. They contend that the remarks about Defense Exhibit A were improper, because that exhibit had never been discussed during trial in connection with what was on the teacher's desk on the day of the incident. They contend that the third remark was improper, because it urged the jury to decide the case, not upon the facts or the law, but upon a preconceived bias against lawsuits for money damages. The Gosches contend that all of these remarks were unwarranted and clearly injurious.
The defendants concede that the Gosches' counsel was right when he told the court, at the time of his objection to the first remark, that he did not use the word "message," but the defendants argue that the clear intention of the Gosches' counsel's opening remarks was, nevertheless, to invite the jury to send a message. The defendants contend that Defense Exhibit A, showing the classroom, was "pre-admitted," the photograph of the classroom was consistent with trial testimony from Ms. Riediger and other witnesses, and nothing suggested counsel's...
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