K.J. v. J.P.D.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-14177 |
| Parties | K.J., Plaintiff, v. J.P.D., K.M., GALLOWAY TOWNSHIP POLICE, TOWNSHIP OF GALLOWAY, JOHN DOES 1-10, ABC CORPORATIONS Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Township of Galloway (“Galloway”).[1] [Dkt. 44]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Galloway's motion in part and deny the motion in part.
Plaintiff is a thirty-eight-year-old man who currently resides in Mays Landing, New Jersey. [Am. Compl. ¶ 1]. In 1995, when Plaintiff was approximately eleven years old and while his parents were going through a divorce, Plaintiff came to know Defendant J.P.D., a Galloway Township Police Officer who J.P.D. responded to multiple domestic violence calls at Plaintiff's home. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-15]. J.P.D eventually gave Plaintiff his pager number so that Plaintiff could notify J.P.D. before Plaintiff's father visited Plaintiff's house. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18]. J.P.D. developed a rapport with Plaintiff and his family over several months, brought snacks to Plaintiff's house and brought Plaintiff and his brother to a professional basketball game. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23- 25].
When Plaintiff's parents finalized their divorce, Plaintiff's mother lost the family home and moved in with a relative. [Am. Compl. ¶ 27]. J.P.D. “offered to allow Plaintiff and his younger brother to live with him.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 28]. J.P.D. “utilized his status as a Galloway Police Officer to convince Plaintiff's mother to allow Plaintiff and his brother to stay with Defendant J.P.D.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 30]. As a result, Plaintiff and his brother moved to J.P.D.'s home in November or December of 1995. [Am. Compl. ¶ 31]. According to the Amended Complaint, another Galloway Township police officer, K.M., who was a friend of J.P.D., was aware of this living arrangement because J.P.D. spoke with K.M. by phone about the living arrangement and J.P.D.'s activities with Plaintiff and his brother. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-36]. K.M. “failed to report this to any local police unit or supervisor.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 33]. J.P.D. and K.M. also did not report this living arrangement to the Division of Child Placement and Permanency. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 37]. The Amended Complaint alleges “on information and belief” that “other employees, supervisors, agents, and officers” of the Galloway Township Police knew that Plaintiff was living with J.P.D. [ ].
After Plaintiff and his brother moved in with J.P.D., J.P.D. began sexually abusing Plaintiff. [Am. Compl. ¶ 42]. The abuse began when J.P.D. groped Plaintiff while Plaintiff and his brother were play wrestling with J.P.D. [ ]. Later that night, J.P.D. asked Plaintiff to go to J.P.D.'s bedroom, where J.P.D. took out his police-issued handgun, “gave Plaintiff a lengthy instruction on how the gun operates,” placed the gun on his nightstand, and instructed Plaintiff to go onto J.P.D.'s bed. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-47]. J.P.D. then removed Plaintiff's pants and “forcibly masturbated Plaintiff.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 50]. Plaintiff feared that J.P.D. “would overtly threaten him” with the gun if Plaintiff refused. [Am. Compl. ¶ 50]. J.P.D. told Plaintiff that this would be “their secret” and that nobody needed to know. [Am. Compl. ¶ 51]. When Plaintiff told J.P.D. that he intended to tell his mother, J.P.D. said that he had already told her and said [Am. Compl. ¶ 53]. Out of fear, Plaintiff did not tell. From there, J.P.D. continued to sexually abuse Plaintiff by performing oral sex on Plaintiff, forcing Plaintiff to perform oral sex on J.P.D., and sodomizing Plaintiff. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 62-64]. “[M]ost all of the sexual abuse occurred in Defendant J.P.D.'s bedroom,” [Am. Compl. ¶ 57], and J.P.D. “always kept his police issued handgun on top of or inside of the bedside nightstand.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 58]. J.P.D. sometimes began the abuse by instructing Plaintiff to load bullets into the magazine of J.P.D.'s gun and, on one occasion, J.P.D. loaded a round into the chamber. [Am. Compl. ¶ 59]. The abuse continued until the summer of 1996. [Am. Compl. ¶ 65]. Plaintiff avoided further abuse until 1999, when he was sent on one occasion to J.P.D.'s house, where J.P.D. abused Plaintiff. [Am. Compl. ¶ 67]. Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress because of this abuse. [Am. Compl. ¶ 68].
In October of 2020, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit against J.P.D., K.M., and Galloway. [Dkt. 1]. After Galloway filed a motion to dismiss, [Dkt. 12], Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”), which is the operative pleading. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges the following claims against the following defendants: violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights against J.P.D. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); failure to train and supervise in violation of § 1983 against Galloway (Count II); violation of New Jersey's Child Sexual Abuse Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:61B-1 against J.P.D. (Count III); violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12, against all Defendants (Count IV); assault and battery against J.P.D. (Count V); false imprisonment against J.P.D. (Count VI); intentional infliction of emotional distress against J.P.D. (Count VII); negligent supervision against Galloway (Count VIII); negligence against all Defendants (Count IX); gross negligence against all Defendants (Count X); civil conspiracy against J.P.D. and K.M. (Count XI); vicarious liability against Galloway (Count XII); Count XII (fictitious parties). Galloway filed the present motion to dismiss. [Dkt. 44].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim. Id. In general, only the allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint, are taken into consideration when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Chester Cnty Intermediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (3d. Cir. 2007). Instead, the Court simply asks whether the plaintiff has articulated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility[2] when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The Court need not accept “‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,'” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), however, and “[l]egal conclusions made in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presumption of truthfulness.” Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., 448 F.Supp.2d 607, 609 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) . Accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80 ( that pleadings that are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth).
Further, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted unless the plaintiff's factual allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but provides a remedy for violations of a plaintiff's constitutional...
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