K.K. v. Berks Cnty., 5:15-cv-00475
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:15-cv-00475,5:15-cv-00475 |
| Parties | K.K.; B.P.S.; C.S.; G.K.; T.K., by their next friends and parents K.K & B.P.S.; O.H., by her next friend and natural mother C.S., Plaintiffs, v. BERKS COUNTY; ASHLEA MELLINGER; SHANNON CASE; CHRISTINE YUHASZ; KARLA SANDERS; GEORGE M. KOVARIE; BRANDY NEIDER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14 - Granted
This action arises out of a decision of Berks County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") to remove two children from the care of their foster parents. Plaintiffs—the foster parents, the two foster childen, another child who is the biological son of the foster parents, and the biological mother of one of the foster children—claim that in doing so, Berks County, together with a number of CYS employees, violated their constitutional rights. Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted.
Plaintiff T.K. was born in October 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 3. His biological father has a history of perpetrating sexual assaults and was molested as a child, and his biological mother reportedly struggled with alcohol consumption during her pregnancy. Id. ¶ 17. After he was born, T.K. lived with his biological father and his grandmother pursuant to a safety plan. Id. ¶ 18. When he was ten months old, his family decided it would be in his best interest to live with his aunt and uncle, Plaintiffs B.P.S. and K.K. (for ease of comprehension, T.K will be referred to as "nephew," and B.P.S. and K.K. will be referred to as "aunt and uncle," respectively). Id. ¶ 19. Two months later, the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County granted a dependency petition filed by CYS, deeming nephew to be a dependent child in the legal custody of the state. See id. ¶ 20; Defs.' Mot. Ex. B.1 Aunt and uncle then became their nephew's foster parents. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24, 26. Uncle has a criminal record reflecting an arrest in 2011 for assault and weapons charges, which was dismissed, and a history of minor traffic offenses, but CYS nonetheless approved him as a foster parent. See id. ¶ 26. That same month, aunt and uncle gave birth to Plaintiff G.K ("son"). Id. ¶ 23. From that point on, aunt and uncle, together with their nephew and their son, lived together in the same household.
Eight months later, in June 2012, Plaintiff O.H. was born to nephew's father—uncle's brother—and Plaintiff C.S., her mother. Id. ¶ 31-32. Immediately after her birth, CYS placed O.H. with her aunt and uncle (O.H. will now be referred to as "niece"). Id. ¶ 33-34. As a result, aunt and uncle's household expanded to include their niece and nephew, as their foster children, and their biological son.
In February 2013, CYS received a copy of a three-year-old police report containing a rape allegation that had been made against uncle by a woman who was seventeen years old at thetime.2 Id. ¶¶ 36-37. After receiving the report, the individual Defendants, who are all CYS employees holding various positions with the agency, met to discuss it. Id. ¶ 41. They decided that niece and nephew should be removed from aunt and uncle's home, and on or about February 13, 2013, CYS removed them and placed them with alternative foster parents. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42. Three days later, CYS informed aunt and uncle that nephew could return to their home only if uncle moved out, agreed to have no contact with him, and submitted to a psychosexual evaluation. See id. ¶ 46. Aunt and uncle agreed, and nephew was returned to his aunt that day. See id. at ¶ 2. Within the next two weeks, CYS learned from the police departments that had investigated the rape allegation that it had been baseless. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. Despite that new information, CYS did not terminate the safety plan that required uncle to have no contact with his nephew, nor did CYS return niece to her aunt and uncle's home. See id. ¶¶ 50-54. Instead, on February 28, 2013, CYS referred uncle for the psychosexual evaluation, and the examiner concluded that it did "not appear that minors in his care [were] at risk." Id. ¶¶ 57-59. CYS received the results of the examination that same day, but still did not terminate the safety plan or return niece to her aunt and uncle. Id. ¶ 60.
One month later, CYS agreed to lift the safety plan, and later that year, aunt and uncle formally adopted their nephew. Id. ¶ 63. However, as of the date this action was filed, niece has remained with her alternative set of foster parents. See id. ¶ 64.
Plaintiffs claim that the actions of CYS violated a number of their constitutional rights. Specifically, they claim that they were never afforded an opportunity to challenge any of these decisions in violation of their procedural due process rights, that the decision to remove niece and nephew on the basis of a baseless rape allegation violated their substantive due process rights, that CYS interfered with their rights of association under the First Amendment, that theremoval of niece and nephew was an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that these decisions were made pursuant to a policy of CYS, which means that Berks County shares liability for these violations. See id. ¶ 66.3
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). This Court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court recognized that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court subsequently laid out a two-part approach to reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
First, the Court observed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. at 678. Thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do notsuffice" to survive the motion; "instead, 'a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.'" Id.; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8). While Rule 8, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," was "a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). For "without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3).
Second, the Court emphasized, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Only if "the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This is because Rule 8(a)(2) "requires not merely a short and plain statement, but instead mandates a statement 'showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See id., 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). If "the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, id. at 678(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), but a claim must be "nudged . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible," id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
A. Unless a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, individual state actors are protected from suits for damage. The constitutional rights of kinship foster parents and their foster children in this case were not clearly established.
Parents have "constitutionally protected liberty interests" in the "custody, care and management of their...
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