K.M. v. Alabama Dept. of Youth Services
Decision Date | 09 March 2005 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:02cv322.,Civil Action No. 2:02cv320.,Civil Action No. 2:02cv321.,Civil Action No. 2:02cv323-T. |
Citation | 360 F.Supp.2d 1253 |
Parties | K.M., a minor child, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, et al., Defendants. C.B., a minor, Plaintiff, v. Alabama Department of Youth Services, et al., Defendants. T.A.B., a minor, Plaintiff, v. Alabama Department of Youth Services, et al., Defendants. K.T., a minor, Plaintiff, v. Alabama Department of Youth Services, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Michael J. Crow, Beasley Allen Crown Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff/Consol Plaintiffs.
Robert Dean Drummond, Jr., Fairhope, AL, for Consol Plaintiffs.
Andrew W. Christman, Steven Keith Herndon, Gidiere, Hinton & Herndon, Montgomery, AL, for Intervenor Plaintiff.
Christina Harris Jackson, Christopher Kyle Whitehead, Henry Lewis Gillis, Kenneth Lamar Thomas, Monet McCorvey Gaines, Ramadanah Maryum Salaam, Thomas Means Gillis & Seay PC, Montgomery, AL, John Wesley Adams, Jr., Kennedy, Bell & Adams, Mobile, AL, Tamica Clemons Richard, Bentonville, AR, William James Samford, II, Alabama Department of Youth Services, Mt. Meigs, AL, Frederic Allen Bolling, James L Richey, Valerie LaShawn Acoff, Thomas Means Gillis & Seay PC, Andrew Clay Allen, Peter Harrington Burke, William Todd Harvey, Whatley Drake, LLC, Vivian Vines Campbell, Emond Vines Gorham & Waldrep PC, Stephen Cochran Wallace, William Monroe Dawson, Jr., Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.
Adrian Carrie Payne, Hand Arendall, LLC, James M. Wooten, Mark Thomas Waggoner, Roger L. Bates, Hand Arendall, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Allen R. Stoner, Allen R Stoner, PC, Decatur, AL, for Consol Defendant.
Jack Allen Blumenfeld, Dothan, AL, Sharon E. Ficquette, Alabama Department of Human Resources, Montgomery, AL, Sara Thomason Baker, District Attorney's Office, Cullman, AL, David W. Langston, Harris, Caddell & Shanks, P.C., Decatur, AL, David Wyatt Huddleston, Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, Tuscaloosa, AL, Edward Hamilton Wilson, Jr., Ball Ball Matthews & Novak PA, Montgomery, AL, Bret M. Gray, Griffin & Associates, Hoover, AL, William E. Shinn, Jr., Harris, Caddell & Shanks, P.C., Decatur, AL, Kenny Mallow Williamson, Robert Marc Givhan, Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Movant.
These consolidated cases are now before the court on defendant Peter Aseme's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the summary-judgment motion should be denied.
Plaintiffs K.M., C.B., T.A.B., and K.T. bring these consolidated cases against the following defendants: the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS), DYS Executive Director Walter Wood, former DYS Chalkville Campus Superintendent James Caldwell, and former DYS employees Aseme and John Zeigler. Plaintiffs are former juvenile detainees who claim that, while they were in the custody of DYS and housed at Chalkville, they were sexually and physically assaulted and harassed by Aseme and Zeigler. Plaintiffs claim that not only are Aseme and Zeigler liable to them, but that Wood, Caldwell, and DYS are responsible for allowing the assaults and harassment to take place.
Plaintiffs base their legal claims against Aseme on the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process and the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel-and-unusual punishment, both rights as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and on the state-law torts of negligence, wantonness, assault and battery, and outrage.
The jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343 (civil rights), & 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
The evidence-presented in the light most favorable to plaintiffs because they are the nonmoving parties and because these cases are before the court on a summary-judgment motion, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) — is as follows.
Chalkville is a juvenile detention center for young women between the ages of 12 and 18. These cases arise in the context of public, widespread allegations of sexual abuse and harassment by employees at the Chalkville campus against detainees. As stated, the four plaintiffs were juvenile detainees, in the custody of DYS and housed at Chalkville, at the time of the alleged assaults.
Aseme was a youth services aid/child care worker at Chalkville during the dates at issue. His responsibilities included "observ[ing] students so that visual contact is maintained at all times through head checks and cottage counts," monitoring and documenting consumption of medicine, restraining students when necessary, searching students and their belongings, and administering first aid.1
T.A.B. is the only plaintiff in this case to state a claim against Aseme. She alleges that, while she was at Chalkville, between December 1999 and May 2001, she was sexually assaulted by Aseme. According to T.A.B., at some point between January and May 2001, Aseme approached her while she was alone in the laundry room and touched her vagina. T.A.B. did not tell anyone about the abuse by Aseme until after DYS launched an official investigation into the matter.
Federal Claim: As stated, T.A.B. alleges that Aseme sexually assaulted her, that is, that while she was in the laundry room, he allegedly touched her vagina without her consent. T.A.B. claims that, in doing so, Aseme violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel-and-unusual punishment and her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process, as the rights are enforced through § 1983. In his defense, Aseme contends: (1) T.A.B. has not alleged that he violated any right protected by the Constitution; (2) T.A.B. has not produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment2
There is clearly a right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to bodily integrity. Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1280 (M.D.Ala.2003) (Thompson, J.) (citing Romero v. City of Clanton, 220 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1316 (M.D.Ala.2002) (Albritton, C.J.); Johnson v. Cannon, 947 F.Supp. 1567, 1572-73 (M.D.Fla.1996) (Kovachevich, C.J.); Battista v. Cannon, 934 F.Supp. 400, 404 (M.D.Fla.1996) (Kovachevich, C.J.)).
Substantive-due-process analysis would not be appropriate if the claim can be addressed through enforcement of T.A.B.'s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel-and-unusual punishment. This is because, "if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the ... Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1228 n. 7, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). Under Lanier, this court must determine if the interest T.A.B. alleges was impaired is protected by the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. If more than one constitutional provisions protects the right at issue, the court must apply the analysis for the more specific constitutional provision, which is, in this case, the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment applies in only the criminal context. Thus, "[i]n the few cases where the [Supreme] Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-668, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1410, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). The Supreme Court explained why the Eighth Amendment does not apply to schoolchildren:
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669-670, 97 S.Ct. at 1411 (1977).
Determining if the Eighth Amendment applies to juvenile detainees is complicated; it essentially poses the question of whether a juvenile detainee is more like a convicted criminal or more like a schoolchild. While a juvenile detention facility is partially a correctional institution, it is also a school; it is meant to discipline as opposed to punish; its facilities are also intended to be rehabilitative and educational. The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, which authorizes the detention of juveniles, is intended to "facilitate the care, protection, and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, while acknowledging the responsibility of the juvenile court to preserve the public peace and security." 1975 Ala.Code § 12-15-1.1.
The Alabama Code further clarifies the...
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