K.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Health
| Citation | 237 So.3d 1084 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D16–23,3D16–23 |
| Parties | K.M., Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Moyle Law Firm, P.A., and Karen A. Putnal, Jon C. Moyle, and Robert A. Weiss, (Tallahassee), for appellant.
Jay Patrick Reynolds, Chief Litigation Counsel (Prosecution Services Unit), and Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel (Tallahassee), for appellee.
Before LAGOA, EMAS, and LOGUE, JJ.
Appellant, K.M., seeks reversal of a final administrative order dismissing K.M.'s petition for a formal administrative hearing. Because K.M. would not be "substantially affected" by the Department of Health's repeal of Rule 64C–4.003 of the Florida Administrative Code, we find that the administrative law judge did not err in determining that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of K.M.'s petition. K.M. does not have standing under section 120.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), to assert her challenge to the Department of Health's proposed repeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. This opinion does not address the merits of K.M.'s case.
On July 29, 2015, the Department of Health ("DOH"), filed a Notice of Proposed Rule for the purpose of repealing Rule 64C–4.003 of the Florida Administrative Code (the "Rule"). The DOH summarized the Rule as one that required pediatric cardiac facilities approved by Children's Medical Services ("CMS") to comply with the CMS Pediatric Cardiac Facilities Standards mandated by the Rule and to submit a number of forms that were adopted by the Rule. The Rule, titled "Diagnostic and Treatment Facilities or Services—Specific," provides:
Fla. Admin. Code R. 64C–4.003 (2015) (emphasis added). The DOH sought to repeal the Rule because, according to the DOH, the Rule's regulation of pediatric care facilities exceeded the DOH's statutory authority.
Florida's CMS program provides financial assistance for medically necessary services—similar to the benefits available under Medicaid—to children with special health care needs who meet the program's eligibility requirements. The DOH reimburses health care providers for services rendered through the CMS network, a statewide managed system of care in which providers may participate under contract with the program. In order to receive reimbursement under the CMS program, providers and facilities must be credentialed by the DOH.
K.M., a CMS beneficiary, suffers from a serious heart condition requiring pediatric cardiac services. K.M. has received such services from participating CMS providers, including CMS-approved pediatric cardiac facilities that currently must comply with the Rule. K.M. will likely require future pediatric cardiac care from CMS-approved providers, including facilities currently regulated by the Rule.
On October 22, 2015, K.M. filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Proposed Rule (the "Petition")1 with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes (2015). K.M. alleged that the DOH's proposed repeal of the Rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under Florida's Administrative Procedure Act and would reduce the quality of care available within the CMS program.
The final hearing was held on November 20, 2015. K.M. called two pediatric cardiologists—Louis B. St. Petery, Jr. ("Dr. St. Petery") and Ira H. Gessner ("Dr. Gessner")—to testify. Dr. St. Petery testified regarding K.M.'s medical condition, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, including K.M.'s need for additional cardiac surgery and diagnostic services. Although not offered by K.M. to support K.M.'s standing argument, Dr. St. Petery concluded his testimony with his opinion that the quality of care provided at CMS clinics was related to the Rule's volume requirements for procedures performed in regional and satellite clinics.
Dr. Gessner, who currently serves on the CMS Cardiac Technical Advisory Panel and was a statewide consultant to the CMS program for pediatric cardiology services for over thirty-eight years, was identified by K.M. as the witness who would testify, for standing purposes, regarding the injury K.M. would suffer from repeal of the Rule. Dr. Gessner testified that the Rule's reporting requirement was "meaningful" with respect to assuring quality in programs certified by the CMS pediatric cardiac services program. Dr. Gessner also testified that if the Rule were repealed, there was a "risk of changes in programs developing and continuing in a way that is not consistent with the current standards [and] would allow circumstances to exist within a given program that raise the potential for deterioration of aspects of a program ... as to make it risky for patients to be cared for within that program." Dr. Gessner further testified:
Following the testimony, the administrative law judge (the "ALJ") found that K.M. failed to prove the proposed deregulation of CMS-approved pediatric cardiac facilities would, in fact, have a real or immediate effect on the quality of care available through the CMS network. As such, the ALJ concluded that K.M. lacked standing to challenge the Rule's repeal and dismissed K.M.'s Petition for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
In an appeal from a final administrative order, we review the ALJ's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Peace River/Manasota Reg'l Water Supply Auth. v. IMC Phosphates Co., 18 So.3d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) ). "If an administrative law judge's final order depends on any fact found by the administrative law judge, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative law judge as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact." § 120.68(10), Fla. Stat. (2015). However, "findings that are interpretations of relevant law are subject to a de novo review." Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med., 917 So.2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Fla. Bd. of Med. v. Fla. Acad. of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc., 808 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ); accord Office of Ins. Regulation & Fin. Servs. Comm'n v. Secure Enters., LLC, 124 So.3d 332, 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ().
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, "[a]ny person substantially affected by a rule or a proposed rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." § 120.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). As such, in order to have standing to challenge the validity of a rule or proposed rule, the party must be "substantially affected" by the rule. See, e.g., NAACP, Inc. v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 863 So.2d 294, 296 (Fla. 2003) ; Sarnoff v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 825 So.2d 351, 356 (Fla. 2002).
In Jacoby, the First District Court of Appeal held that a person is "substantially affected" by a rule if the petitioner has established: "(1) that the rule or policy will result in a real and immediate injury in fact, and (2) that the alleged interest is within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated." 917 So.2d at 360 ; accord Lanoue v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 751 So.2d 94, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ; Ward v. Bd. of Tr. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 651 So.2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). "Thus standing depends on the nature of the injury asserted and the purpose and scope of the administrative proceeding." Peace River, 18 So.3d at 1083. Petitioner bears the burden of establishing standing. Id. at 1084.
We find that K.M. does not meet the real and immediate injury prong of the "substantially affected" test. Although the Florida Supreme Court has noted that a petitioner need not demonstrate that it already has suffered actual harm in order to have standing in an administrative rule challenge proceeding, see NAACP, 863 So.2d at 300, the prospective injury asserted must not be the product of pure speculation and conjecture, see Ward, 651 So.2d at 1237 ; see, e.g., Prof'l Firefighters of Fla., Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., State of Fla., 396 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). K.M. primarily relies on NAACP and Peace River to establish standing to challenge the DOH's proposed rule repeal. Both cases, however, are distinguishable.
In NAACP, a civil rights organization challenged proposed rule amendments eliminating "certain affirmative action policies by Florida's state...
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