K.R.S. v. Bedford Cmty. Sch. Dist.

Decision Date20 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 4:13–cv–00147–HCA.,4:13–cv–00147–HCA.
Parties K.R.S., a minor, by his Guardian, Connie McClarnon, Plaintiff(s), v. BEDFORD COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Joe Drake, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Bedford Community School District, Dana Nally, Individually and in her official capacity as Principal of Bedford High School, Deb Bonde, Individually and in her official capacity as Dean of Students/Special Services Coordinator, Robert McCoy, Individually and in his official capacity as football coach of Bedford High School, and Andrea Schuelke, R.N., Individually and in her official capacity as school nurse, Defendant(s).
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Thomas P. Slater, Michael T. Norris, Slater Norris PLC, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff(s).

Gregory G. Barntsen, Smith Peterson Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendant(s).

RULING GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HELEN C. ADAMS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment [34], filed November 4, 2014. Plaintiff has resisted the motion [47, 48 and 55] and defendants have replied to the resistance [52–54 and 57]. Oral argument was held on January 5, 2015. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims raised under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The motion is submitted on the oral arguments and the motion papers.

Plaintiff's original Complaint (and subsequent amended complaints) asserted plaintiff K.R.S. was a special education student at defendant Bedford Community School District who was subjected to peer-on-peer bullying and harassment culminating in an incident in October 2012 in which K.R.S. sustained personal injury after football players on plaintiff's own team threw footballs at his head. Plaintiff sued the Bedford Community School District ("School District") and several school district staff in their individual and official capacities: Superintendent Joe Drake, Principal Dana Nally, Dean of Students/Special Services Coordinator Deb Bonde, Football Coach Robert McCoy, and School Nurse Andrea Schuelke, R.N. In his Second Amended Complaint [26] (which is the relevant pleading for purposes of this motion), plaintiff alleged defendants' conduct in allowing the bullying violated § 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 and 794(a), and the Americans with Disabilities Act1 (Division IV)(the " § 504 claim"), violated plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection Clause as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Division V), breached state law fiduciary and professional duties (Division VI), amounted to intentional infliction of severe emotional distress under state common law (Division VII), violated Iowa Code § 280.13C by virtue of defendants' failure to remove K.R.S. from participation in athletic competition (Division VIII), and was negligent in (a) failing to remove K.R.S. from participation in athletic competition under common law duties (Division IX), and (b) failing to provide reasonable medical care (Division X). Defendants have denied plaintiff's claims, asserting as affirmative defenses that they acted in good faith, were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and to statutory immunity on the state law claims.

Defendants' summary judgment motion challenges all of plaintiff's claims. In partial response, the parties stipulated [56] that Division IV (the § 504 claim) is dismissed against the named individual defendants, that Division V (the § 1983 claim) is withdrawn, and that the remaining claims in Divisions VI–X should be dismissed without prejudice against defendants Joe Drake, Dana Nally, Deb Bonde and Robert McCoy. Plaintiff has resisted defendants' summary judgment motion as narrowed by the stipulated dismissal of claims, which leaves the School District and Andrea Schuelke as defendants on the state law claims in Division VI—X and the School District as the sole defendant on the § 504 claim, Division IV.

I.STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (moving party has initial responsibility of demonstrating absence of genuine issue of material fact). "If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.2011) (en banc) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). "A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). "An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At this stage, the court's function is not to determine credibility, weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Instead, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.

II.FACTS

The material facts are largely undisputed. Where they are in dispute, the Court has drawn inferences in favor of plaintiff for purposes of the summary judgment motion.

K.R.S. School History

At the time of the incidents alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, K.R.S.2 was a 16–year–old male who attended the ninth grade at Bedford Community High School. (Def. App. [342] at 3, [34–13] at 351). Defendant Andrea Schuelke, R.N., was the school nurse. (Id. [34–13] at 351). The Bedford School District ("School District") is small with approximately 200 students in the high school, breaking down into about 35–40 students in each class from grades 9–12. (Pl. App. [45–1] at 89–90).

K.R.S. had taken eighth grade twice. In March 2012 when he completed eighth grade a second time it became apparent based on his Iowa Assessment scores that K.R.S. was having difficulties in his English class and with written language. (Def. App. [34–19] at 378). The School District, through its special education services, met with K.R.S's grandmother, Connie McClarnon, and K.R.S. to develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) with the goal of improving his written language deficiencies. (Id. at 379).

K.R.S. was to receive most of his education in a regular education setting, with limited time in a special education setting for his written language issues. (Id. at 382). The IEP noted he would participate in regular extracurricular activities and would not attend a special school. (Id. at 382–383). Although not referenced in the IEP, K.R.S. had been treated with medication for ADHD. (Def. App. [34–3] at 41, 42). K.R.S's behavior, communication and language, and health were not a concern raised in the IEP. (Id. )

From the time he was in eighth grade to the time of his injury, K.R.S. testified he was teased by other students, who would call him terms such as "dumb-ass," "stupid," "gay." (Def. App. [34–2] at 13). When K.R.S. was on the bus they would call him names (such as "stupid" and "moron") and make fun of him for playing Minecraft and Pokemon. (Id. at 14–15). He testified that in eighth grade he reported the name calling to one teacher, Mrs. Drake, and to the bus driver. (Id. ) Mrs. Drake did tell the students in class to stop. (Id. at 17). In ninth grade K.R.S. reported the name calling to another teacher, Mrs. Burn. (Id. at 15). He testified two other teachers, Mr. Ruttenberg and Mr. Standerford, also would stop the teasing in class. (Id. at 21). K.R.S. told his grandmother, Ms. McClarnon, about the teasing and she told him to stick up for himself. (Id. at 15–16). Ms. McClarnon testified that she reported the bullying in IEP meetings that she attended with school officials. (Def. App. [42.2–43.1] at 50).

A former classmate, S.D., was in the eighth and ninth grades with K.R.S. She provided an affidavit3 stating that during the 20112012 school year she observed other kids call K.R.S. names in the hallways or at lunch and sometimes push him in the hallways. (Pl. App. [45–1] at 2). S.D. was in a class with K.R.S. where Mr. Ruttenberg was the teacher. S.D. stated Mr. Ruttenberg several times told K.R.S. it would be better if he did not say anything during class discussions and Mr. Ruttenberg did nothing when other kids called K.R.S. names in class on "an almost daily basis." (Pl. App. [45–1] at 2). S.D stated kids called K.R.S. names...

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