K & a Radiologic Technology Services, Inc. v. Wing, 96-CV-62 FJS GJD.

Decision Date01 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-CV-62 FJS GJD.,96-CV-62 FJS GJD.
Citation13 F.Supp.2d 264
PartiesK & A RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, INC. and Diagnostic X-Ray Services, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Brian J. WING, individually and as Acting Commissioner of Social Services of the State of New York, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

MacKenzie Smith Lewis, Michell & Hughes, LLP, Peter D. Carmen, of counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, Karen Marcoux Mankes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

SCULLIN, District Judge.

Introduction

This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to remedy a deprivation of the Plaintiffs' right to receive payments under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) and (a)(37), and the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ccc(a)(2)(A), for services rendered to Medicaid and Medicare recipients. The Plaintiffs, K & A Radiologic Technology Services, Inc. ("K & A") and Diagnostic X-Ray Services, Inc. ("Diagnostic X-Ray"), are two small businesses which provide, upon the request of a physician, portable x-ray and other services to individuals who reside in New York and who are Medicare and/or Medicaid recipients.1 The Defendant, Brian J. Wing, is the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of the State of New York ("DSS"), which is the state agency in charge of the state Medicaid program.2 The Plaintiffs are suing the Defendant both in his individual capacity and official capacity.

In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs request that the Defendant be enjoined from withholding the 20% Medicare co-insurance payments for portable x-ray services rendered to Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries ("QMBs") and for an order directing the Defendant to reimburse all Medicare co-insurance amounts for past-rendered portable x-ray services to QMBs, as well as a declaration that such x-ray services are covered under the Medicaid Act.

Statutory Background

This case concerns the interplay between the Medicare Act and the Medicaid Act, which set up two separate federal health care programs. The Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ddd, was enacted to provide medical care to individuals sixty-five years of age or older and certain disabled individuals. All Medicare-eligible individuals are automatically enrolled in Medicare Part A.3 Medicare Part B provides Medicare-eligible individuals with the option of receiving supplementary insurance for medical services Part A does not cover. To enroll in Part B, the individual must pay insurance premiums. See id. §§ 1395o-1395s. Once enrolled, the federal government pays 80% of the reasonable costs and charges for the service, and the individual patient pays the remaining 20% of the Medicare services they receive plus an annual deductible, or the "co-insurance" amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(2)(A).

The Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v, is a joint federal and state funded program which provides medical care for poor people, regardless of age. A state is not mandated to participate in the joint system. However, if the state chooses to participate, the state must adopt a Medicaid plan which meets enumerated minimum requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d.

Certain individuals meet the eligibility criteria for both Medicare and Medicaid, and thus are termed "dual eligibles." See New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Perales, 954 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir.1992). Individuals who qualify for Medicare and who have incomes below the federal poverty line but are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid are referred to as "pure QMBs." Both "pure QMBs" and "dual eligibles" are considered to be QMBs under the Medicare Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(1). A state must make funds available for the 20% co-insurance amounts on behalf of such QMBs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(E).

Procedural Background

This lawsuit was filed on January 16, 1996. On February 14, 1996, the parties entered into a court-approved settlement ("Stipulation") in which the Defendant agreed to be permanently enjoined from withholding the 20% co-insurance payments for all portable x-ray services that the Plaintiffs would render to QMBs prospectively as of February 12, 1996. As a result of this settlement, only two claims remained: (a) the Plaintiffs' request for an order directing Defendant to reimburse them for the services rendered prior to February 12, 1996, both in his official and/or individual capacity, and (b) the Plaintiffs' request for an order declaring that portable x-ray services were covered under the Medicaid Act and that they are entitled to be enrolled as Medicaid providers. Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment on these remaining claims, and the Plaintiffs' renewed motion to hold the Defendant in contempt of the Stipulation.

I. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is warranted if, when viewing the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 457, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Commander Oil v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir.1993). A genuine issue of fact is one that could be decided in favor of either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where, as here, the Court is faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, a court is not obligated to grant either motion. Instead, each motion must be evaluated on its own merits, "`taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.'" Heublein Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Schwabenbauer v. Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.1981)).

A. Reimbursement for Prior Services

As stated, the Plaintiffs seek payment from the Defendant in his official capacity and individual capacity for the portable x-ray services they rendered to QMBs during the period of 1988 to February 12, 1996.

1. Official Capacity

The Plaintiffs contend that they are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing the Defendant in his official capacity because the relief being sought is prospective in nature. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant's obligation to pay did not arise until they submitted their claims and that had not occurred at the time they filed this lawsuit.4

The Defendant argues that the obligation to pay for the services accrued on the date the services were rendered, thereby categorizing the relief as retroactive and barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

"Official capacity suits brought in federal court against a state, state agencies, or state officials must overcome the immunity accorded the states under the Eleventh Amendment." Yorktown Med. Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir.1991); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1973). The Eleventh Amendment permits a federal court to order prospective relief even if such relief does have some effect on the state treasury. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347; Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 774 (2d Cir.1991). However, a federal court is deprived of jurisdiction to award retroactive monetary relief. See id.

In this case, the Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for the portable x-ray services rendered to QMBs prior to the date the parties executed, and the Court approved the Stipulation. This type of relief is properly categorized as retroactive relief, and, as such, the Court is barred from granting such relief by the Eleventh Amendment. See New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Perales, 50 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.1995); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347; Yorktown Med. Laboratory, Inc., 948 F.2d at 86 (citing Tekkno Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 933 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (2d Cir.1991)). Thus, the Court grants the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this issue.

2. Individual Capacity

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant, Brian Wing, was primarily responsible for the administration of the New York State Medicaid program. The Plaintiffs further assert that through his attorney, the Defendant entered into a Stipulation which imposed an injunction against him personally, and then subsequently agreed to pay for the Plaintiffs' attorney's fees.

The Defendant argues that he cannot be held responsible for the DSS's withholding of 20% co-insurance amounts before he became Acting Commissioner in April 1995. Moreover, Defendant maintains that the only "personal involvement" he had pertaining to this lawsuit while he was Acting Commissioner was through his attorney.

Personal involvement on the part of a state official being sued in his individual capacity is a prerequisite to an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir.1991)). An individual who occupies a supervisory position may be found personally involved by: (1) direct participation in the infraction; (2) failure to remedy the wrong after learning of the violation through a report or appeal; (3) creation of the policy or custom under which the violation occurred, or allowing the policy or custom to continue; or (4) gross negligence in managing the subordinates whose conduct caused the violation. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 501.

Defendant Wing is neither alleged nor supported by the evidence to be a direct participant in the deprivation of the Plaintiffs' rights. While serving as Acting Commissioner of the DSS, Defendant Wing did not implement any regulation regarding...

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  • K&A Radiologic Tech. v. Comm'r Dept. Health
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 1, 1998
    ...J. Scullin, Jr., Judge) granted both summary judgment motions in part, and denied the contempt motion. K&A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Wing, 13 F. Supp. 2d 264 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). Defendant appeals from the judgment insofar as it declares that (1) he is required to reimburse plaintiffs fo......

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