Kacavisti v. Sprague Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1959
• Citation: 102 N.H. 266,155 A.2d 183
• Parties: Bessie M. KACAVISTI v. SPRAGUE ELECTRIC CO. and another.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 183

155 A.2d 183

102 N.H. 266

Bessie M. KACAVISTI v. SPRAGUE ELECTRIC CO. and another.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued Oct. 6, 1959.

Decided Nov. 3, 1959.

Earley & Flynn and Nicholas Pantelas, Nashua, Margaret Q. Flynn, Nashua, for plaintiff.

Booth, Wadleigh, Langdell, Starr & Peters and Charles J. Dunn, Manchester, for defendant.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The plaintiff contends that the defendants, who took no exceptions during the trial nor to the denial of their motion for a 'directed verdict,' and who made no motion to set aside the decree, now have no right to appeal the decision of the Superior Court. Perreault v. Lyons, 98 N.H. 317, 99 A.2d 916. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, especially in cases tried before the court without a jury where a single issue is plainly raised. Eastman v. Waisman, 94 N.H. 253, 51 A.2d 151. In the present case, the record, including the defendants' exceptions to the failure of the Court to grant their request for findings and rulings, and to certain findings and rulings made, shows that the question of whether the plaintiff suffered an accidental injury within the meaning of RSA 281:2, subd. III was the basic issue before the Court. Under our discretionary procedure, we shall therefore consider it. Wilson v. Goodnow, 98 N.H. 110, 95 A.2d 112.

There seems little point in reviewing the innumerable conflicting cases and doctrines, based on different policies and statutes, discussing what is an accident within the meaning of Workmen's Compensation Laws (Annotation 122 A.L.R. 839), since they are not controlling here. We shall therefore confine ourselves to an examination of the facts most favorable to the plaintiff which could be found on the record before us, and the application of our law to these facts. In so doing, we have in mind the rule that the Court's findings of fact must stand unless no reasonable person could have made them. Perreault v. Lyons, 98 N.H. 317, 99 A.2d 916.

The evidence warranted a finding that the plaintiff possessed a normal thumb before going to work for the defendant, Sprague Electric Company. While she worked for this defendant, beginning in March, 1956, and in the course of her employment, the under portion of the first phalanx of her right thumb was subjected to repeated trauma by a hard, small roundish metal knob which was pressed, twisted and turned in the yielding flesh of the under part of the thumb. This procedure, necessitated by her duty to clean little wires known as 'leads,' shortly began to cause pain in her thumb. It became sore, blisters appeared, and when she pressed the knob to clean the wires, it hurt her 'a lot.' In August, 1956, the thumb 'started to snap.' The climax was reached on September 29, when after experiencing much pain, the hand swelled up so that she went to a doctor that evening. He recommended an immediate operation, to which the plaintiff submitted, and she did not return to work until the following January 7, 1957.

We have, then, a situation where repeated trauma, applied by an external force, all arising out of and in the course of her employment, resulted in pain and swelling on a particular day, which became so intolerable on that day as to be disabling and to result in incapacity to work. Such has been held an accident within the meaning of RSA 281:2, subd. III. Walter v. Hagianis, 97 N.H. 314, 317-318, 87 A.2d 154. Even though the causation of her disability was gradual and she experienced pain prior to September 29, the acute manifestation of the injury, arising on that specific date and thereafter disabling her from her work, was an accidental injury. Walter v. Hagianis, supra, ...