Kackman v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 910462

• Decision Date: 28 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 910462,910462
• Citation: Kackman v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 488 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1992)
• Parties: Susan KACKMAN, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard L. Kackman, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 623

488 N.W.2d 623

Susan KACKMAN, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard L. Kackman, Appellant, v.NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee.

Civ. No. 910462.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 28, 1992.

Bruce H. Carlson(argued), of McNair, Larson & Carlson, Ltd., Fargo, for appellant.

Dean J. Haas(argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Workers' Compensation Bureau, Bismarck, for appellee.

LEVINE, Justice.

Susan Kackman, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Richard Kackman, appeals from a district court judgment affirming a decision by the Workers Compensation Bureau denying her benefits.We affirm.

In January and March 1986, Susan's husband, Richard, an employee of Midwest Bean Company, suffered work-related injuries to his lower back, for which he received disability benefits from the Bureau.On April 21, 1987, Richard sustained a non-work related back injury.On October 7, 1987, Richard committed suicide and Susan submitted a claim to the Bureau for death benefits, asserting that Richard's work-related injuries caused him to commit suicide.

At an administrative hearing on Susan's claim, two experts testified about the relationship between Richard's work injuries and his suicide.Dr. R.P. Ascano, a psychologist, testified that Richard's chronic illness from his work-related injuries caused his depression, which caused him to commit suicide.Dr. Joseph T. Smith, a law-trained psychiatrist, concluded "with reasonable medical certainty [that] the stress caused by [Richard's] psychotic Delmional (Paranoid) Disorder was the substantial factor contributing to his suicide and that the injuries and back pain he had experienced in the previous year and a half were coincidental rather than causative."

An administrative hearing officer recommended:

"Considering all of the evidence and testimony, it seems more likely that the depression (the Claimant's state of mind--discouragement or melancholy) was caused by circumstances occurring on or after the Midwest Bean Company work injuries.There is simply not enough evidence of (and too much speculation about) emotional agony, suspicions, mistrust, paranoid delusions, etc. before that time.

"The evidence shows, by the greater weight of the evidence, however, that the discouragement or melancholy (depression) experienced by the Claimant prior to taking his life was not evidenced by a psychosis or some physical damage to the brain.Rather, the evidence indicates that to escape the pain and despair of injury, while still possessed of the capacity to know that his defiant act would result in death, the Claimant committed suicide.There is simply not sufficient evidence other than to simply show a derangement sufficient to disable the Claimant from exercising sound discretion so as to control his compulsion.In fact, the suicide seems to be directly related to the Claimant's brooding over his injuries and their consequences, among other things."

The hearing officer thus agreed with Dr. Ascano's view that the suicide was related to Richard's work injuries.But, the hearing officer concluded that the suicide was not a compensable injury under Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C., ¹ because there was insufficient evidence that Richard's depression resulted in psychosis or physical damage to the brain.Under either the "New York" rule or the "English" rule for determining the existence of a causal relationship between work injuries and a suicide, those symptoms are necessary to establish compensability.See fn. 2, infra.The hearing officer rejected the less demanding "chain-of-causation" test, which would have allowed compensation for the suicide if Richard's work injuries directly resulted in his losing normal judgment and being dominated by a disturbance of the mind, thus causing him to commit suicide.

The Bureau denied Susan's claim.But, the Bureau rejected the hearing officer's recommended finding that the suicide was caused by the work-related injuries and concluded, instead, that there was "no cause and effect relationship between [Richard's] work injuries and [his] suicide."The district court affirmed the Bureau's decision and this appeal followed.

Susan argues that the Bureau improperly rejected the hearing officer's recommended findings because the Bureau's decision did not sufficiently explain why it did not follow the hearing officer's recommendations.She contends the Bureau's decision was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

When an administrative agency decision is appealed to a district court and then to this court, we review the agency decision and look to the record compiled before the agency.E.g, Christianson v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 470 N.W.2d 613(N.D.1991).We must affirm an administrative agency decision unless its findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of evidence, its conclusions of law are not supported by its findings of fact, its decision is not supported by its conclusions of law, or its decision is not in accordance with the law.Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C.;Marion v. Job Service North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 609(N.D.1991).In reviewing the factual basis of an agency's decision, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency.Marion, supra.Instead, we determine whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the agency's factual determinations were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.Marion, supra.

If an administrative agency rejects a hearing officer's recommendations, the agency must adequately explain its rationale for not following the hearing officer's recommendations.Marion, supra;Schultz v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 372 N.W.2d 888(N.D.1985).An agency may reject a hearing officer's recommendations on questions affecting credibility.Schultz, supra.

In this case, Dr. Smith and Dr. Ascano expressed dissimilar opinions about the relationship of Richard's work injuries to his suicide.Dr. Smith, a law-trained psychiatrist, concluded that Richard suffered from delusions and a paranoid disorder before he sustained his work injuries and that those preexisting delusions caused Richard to commit suicide.Dr. Smith concluded that Richard's work injuries and back pain were coincidental and did not cause Richard to commit suicide.Dr. Smith's report summarized his findings:

"During the summer of 1987, [Richard] began developing florid symptoms of Delusional (Paranoid) Disorder, a condition that had been less symptomatic, but nevertheless developing, over a period of years.There is strong evidence that he was having interpersonal difficulties likely due to a developing paranoid disorder before he was terminated from his employment at K-Mart in 1982.There is also substantial evidence according to his widow that he began developing serious interpersonal difficulties with the other employees at Midwest Bean a year before...