Kaczynski v. Kaczynski

• Decision Date: 29 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 28077.,28077.
• Citation: 951 A.2d 690,109 Conn.App. 381
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Bernadetta KACZYNSKI v. Dariusz KACZYNSKI.

951 A.2d 690

109 Conn.App. 381

Bernadetta KACZYNSKI v. Dariusz KACZYNSKI.

No. 28077.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 12, 2008.

Decided July 29, 2008.

William F. Gallagher, Syracuse, NY, with whom was Jacqueline F. Barbara, Shelton, for the appellant (defendant).

Richard C. Stewart, New Canaan, for the appellee (plaintiff).

McLACHLAN, LAVINE and WEST, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.

The defendant, Dariusz Kaczynski, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Bernadetta Kaczynski. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found that the evidence was replete with fraudulent deeds without applying the required standard of proof to these findings, (2) made an alimony award that was not supported by evidence and the applicable law and (3) entered financial orders that unreasonably and disproportionately favor the plaintiff. While it would appear, without deciding the issue, that the financial orders are within the broad discretion appropriately exercisable by the court in dissolution of marriage actions, because the court did not enunciate the required standard of proof, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.¹

The record discloses the following relevant information. The plaintiff and the defendant, who were married on July 17, 1993, have three minor children: a son born on February 15, 1996, and twin daughters born on March 11, 1999. At the time of the marital dissolution hearing in June, 2006, the plaintiff was thirty-nine years of age and the defendant was forty-two. The plaintiff was born and educated in Poland. She had attended college in Warsaw, Poland, for four years, and had attended Housatonic Community College in Bridgeport. She worked as a housecleaner until her first child was born. At the time of the dissolution hearing she had been working, full-time, as an accounting assistant for one year, earning $428 per week.

The defendant, at the time of the dissolution hearing, had worked for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for nineteen years, earning a salary of about $60,000 (gross) a year. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the defendant was very skillful and had obtained a significant amount of income from self-employment such as lawn maintenance and carpentry. The defendant had been hospitalized for depression and at the time of the dissolution hearing was being treated with medication and therapy.

The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 9, 2006, seeking dissolution of the marriage and adding causes of action alleging that the defendant had engaged in fraudulent transfers of marital property with members of his family; however, she did not seek to add any additional parties as defendants. On July 3, 2006, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, finding that the defendant caused the breakdown of the marriage. Although the court stated that the "evidence is replete with fraudulent transfers, false tax returns and property deeds devoid of truth," the court did not order a remedy to correct these fraudulent acts. Instead, the court issued several orders. The court ordered the defendant to pay child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $237 per week and to pay the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $250 per week for seven years. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to provide the current insurance coverage for the children and to pay 60 percent of the children's unreimbursed medical and dental expenses.²

With respect to the parties' assets, the court found that the defendant "in complicity with his sisters sought to take financial advantage of the [plaintiff] by deceitfully clever means." The court considered the value of the assets that the defendant transferred to his sisters "as part of the marital assets" in making its financial orders but did not create a constructive trust for these assets. The court ordered the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff by quitclaim deed the jointly owned residence located at 31 Winfield Drive in Shelton.

The court also issued orders concerning the parties' personal property. Those orders included a provision that the defendant's pension plan and 401(k) plan be divided equally. The court distributed the parties' automobiles. The defendant was to have the 1987 Ford pickup truck, the 1992 BMW and the 2006 Infiniti.³ The plaintiff was awarded the 1999 Honda. The court ordered that the plaintiff retain the household furnishings used by the plaintiff and the children and that the defendant retain any furniture that he had recently purchased. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to contribute $25,000 to the plaintiff for attorney's fees.

On July 12, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to reargue, which the court subsequently granted. On September 14, 2006, the court modified its July 3, 2006 judgment. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay 58 percent of the children's unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and that the defendant pay 42 percent. The court also ordered that instead of the defendant's maintaining a $150,000 life insurance policy, he must maintain at least $81,000 in life insurance. The court vacated the household furnishings award and determined that the distribution of the furnishings would be arbitrated by attorney Stanley Goldstein. Last, the court stated that "the court's orders in this case would be clearly undermined absent the award of attorney fees. Failure to award at least $25,000 in attorney fees will result in other necessary financial awards being affected." This appeal followed.

At the outset, we note that "[t]he issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.... Furthermore, trial courts are endowed with broad discretion to distribute property in connection with a dissolution of marriage." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 354, 880 A.2d 872 (2005).

"The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of correctness of its action.... Appellate review of the trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chyung v. Chyung, 86 Conn.App. 665, 667-68, 862 A.2d 374 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 904, 868 A.2d 744 (2005). Although this is a deferential standard, there are cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law. See Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn.App. 416, 420, 479 A.2d 826 (1984).

The defendant first claims that the court improperly found that the evidence was replete with fraudulent transfers, fraudulent tax returns and fraudulent deeds under circumstances where the court failed to articulate the applicable standard of proof for finding fraud. Particularly, the defendant argues that the court did not explicitly state or otherwise implicitly indicate whether the plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that he had engaged in fraudulent transfers of property. According to the defendant, because the court did not articulate the standard of proof it used in finding fraudulent transfers, the court should not have considered those transfers in its valuation of the marital property.⁴

"The party seeking to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent bears the burden of proving either: (1) that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered the transferor unable to meet his obligations; or (2) that the conveyance was made with a fraudulent intent in which the grantee participated ... If the fraudulent conveyance claim is joined with a marriage dissolution action ... the court is not concerned with whether the transfer renders the transferor insolvent or unable to meet his or her obligations. In such a situation, the issue is whether the conveyance removed property from the marital estate that would otherwise have been subject to claims of equitable distribution." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobowitz v. Jacobowitz, 102 Conn.App. 332, 340-41, 925 A.2d 424 (2007).

"A fraudulent conveyance must be proven by clear and convincing evidence ... and whether the trial court has applied a lesser standard of proof is reviewable on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tessitore v. Tessitore, 31 Conn.App. 40, 43, 623 A.2d 496 (1993). In cases in which the trial court fails to state the standard of proof that it used, we assume that the usual civil preponderance of the evidence standard was used. Id. In cases in which the trial court has failed to state explicitly the standard of proof but the memorandum of decision implies that the court applied the proper standard of proof, we need not reverse the decision. Patrocinio v. Yalanis, 4 Conn.App. 33, 36, 492 A.2d 215 (1985). With this in mind, we address the court's consideration of the fraudulent transfers in fashioning its financial and property awards.

In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: "After six days of trial, the court is satisfied that the...