Kaden v. Pucinski
| Decision Date | 30 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | 1-93-1243,Nos. 1-93-1236,s. 1-93-1236 |
| Citation | 200 Ill.Dec. 129,263 Ill.App.3d 611,635 N.E.2d 468 |
| Parties | , 200 Ill.Dec. 129 Barbara B. KADEN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aurelia PUCINSKI, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendant-Appellant (The County of Cook, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant). Barbara B. KADEN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Aurelia PUCINSKI, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendant-Appellee (The County of Cook, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Lee J. Schwartz, Chicago, Bernard Z. Paul, DeKalb, for appellee (1-93-1236) and appellant (1-93-1243): Kaden.
Jack O'Malley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Karen Covy, Patricia M. Shymanski, Patricia M. Moser, Laura L. Fese, of counsel), for appellants (1-93-1236) and appellees (1-93-1243): Aurelia Pucinski and The County of Cook.
Plaintiff and defendants have both appealed orders of the circuit court of Cook County. This court, by its own motion, consolidated both appeals.
Plaintiff appeals an order which denied her motion to stay the instant proceedings in the circuit court of Cook County due to another case based upon substantially similar issues pending before the Appellate Court, Second District on appeal from the circuit court of DuPage County. The sole issue presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a stay of the Cook County proceedings.
Defendants appeal the trial court's order, considered after plaintiff's appeal, which denied their motion to reinstate briefing schedules on all outstanding motions and found that the interlocutory appeal by plaintiff deprived it of jurisdiction to rule on defendants' motion.
Defendants' appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the appellate court has jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (134 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)) to consider the trial court's order denying defendants' motion to proceed with the instant case, and (2) whether the trial court loses jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of a case where an interlocutory appeal is pending on the trial court's denial of a stay of proceedings.
As to plaintiff's appeal, we affirm the trial court's denial of a stay of the Cook County action and remand for further proceedings. In light of our disposition in plaintiff's appeal, we dismiss defendants' appeal as moot.
On March 20, 1992, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint as a class action on behalf of all taxpayers in Illinois to challenge the constitutionality of section 2 of the Fee Deposit Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 85, par. 722) and section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 25, par. 27.5). In September 1992, defendant County of Cook was granted leave to intervene as a matter of right. The complaint maintains that the funds collected pursuant to these two Acts are State rather than county funds and should be part of the General Assembly's appropriation process.
After filing the complaint in Cook County, plaintiff filed substantially identical complaints against the county treasurers and circuit clerks of four other counties: Lake County (May 11, 1992); Will County (June 26, 1992); Winnebago County (July 1, 1992); and DuPage County (June 30, 1992). Like the Cook County case, each of these four complaints challenged the constitutionality of section 2 of the Fee Deposit Act. Unlike the Cook County case, none of the other four complaints contested the constitutionality of section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.
Subsequently plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her three complaints pending in Lake, Will and Winnebago Counties.
On October 22, 1992, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the Cook County case. To date, no action has been taken on this motion by the trial court.
On January 26, 1993, the circuit court in DuPage County entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 2-615) brought by the defendant in that case and expressly found that "the funds in question are not State funds." On February 5, 1993, plaintiff appealed this order to the Appellate Court, Second District. To date, plaintiff's appeal of the DuPage County order is still pending in the second district.
On January 27, 1993, plaintiff filed her motion to stay proceedings in the instant Cook County action based on the pendency of the DuPage County appeal. At an evidentiary hearing, defendants presented the testimony of Phillip W. Peloquin who is an executive vice-president of Public Sector Group Incorporated which serves as a financial advisor for public entities including the County of Cook. The role of financial advisor includes helping the county to develop their financial plans and to structure its debt issues, such as notes or bonds. Plaintiff questioned Peloquin's credentials and suggested a bias based on his company's employment as an advisor to the county on financial matters. The court observed that these matters would go to the weight of the witness' testimony.
Peloquin testified that the case at bar calls into question about 80 million dollars in annual revenue for the county. The impact of a judgment adverse to the county would create an 80 million dollars deficit in the county's budget on an annual basis. As stated by Peloquin, "this would not be a one time hit on the county's budget; but would be a problem that would occur this year and every year for sometime in the future." This litigation has been disclosed to the bond rating and bond insurance agencies. The continued pendency of the litigation continues to raise doubts about the county's ability to meet its financial obligations.
Peloquin further testified that the mere pendency of the instant case could cause a drop in Cook County's bond rating which represents the perception held by the rating agencies of the county's ability to meet its obligations. The downgrading of a bond rating increases the interest rate paid by the county, deters potential bond investors and negatively impacts on the ability of the county to meet its long-term obligations.
Plaintiff presented no evidence or witnesses. Following the hearing, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a stay on April 6, 1993, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.
On April 8, 1993, defendants filed a motion requesting the trial court to reinstate the briefing schedules on motions previously filed by the parties to the Cook County action. Pending motions include plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss, defendants' section 2-615 motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motions for certification of a plaintiff class and a defendant class, and plaintiff's motion to create a special fund.
On the same day (April 8), the trial court entered an order declining to rule on defendants' motion to reinstate briefing schedules on all outstanding motions "because the Court finds that plaintiff's filing of the notice of Interlocutory Appeal [from the court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a stay of proceedings] has deprived the Court of jurisdiction to rule on defendants' motion." Defendants' appeal of the April 8, 1993, order is the subject of the second appeal.
The sole relevant issue in plaintiff's appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a stay of proceedings.
Plaintiff asserts that the principles of comity, judicial efficiency and stare decisis justify the stay of the Cook County proceedings due to the appeal of the DuPage County order pending in the Appellate Court, Second District. Plaintiff also argues that there is no substantial likelihood that the mere pendency of this case, while stayed, would lead to a downgrading of Cook County's credit rating.
Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to satisfy the burden placed on the party seeking a stay as established in Landis v. North American Co. (1936), 299 U.S. 248, 255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed. 153, 158, and adopted by this court in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 591, 595, 157 Ill.Dec. 655, 572 N.E.2d 1119.
The scope of review in an interlocutory appeal is ordinarily limited to determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting or refusing the requested interlocutory relief. Zurich Insurance, 213 Ill.App.3d at 594, 157 Ill.Dec. 655, 572 N.E.2d 1119; see People v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 1104, 97 Ill.Dec. 344, 492 N.E.2d 1003 ().
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court does not decide whether it agrees with the circuit court's decision, but rather, determines whether the circuit court "acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted." Zurich Insurance, 213 Ill.App.3d at 594-95, 157 Ill.Dec. 655, 572 N.E.2d 1119, quoting In re Marriage of Aud (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 320, 326, 96 Ill.Dec. 615, 619, 491 N.E.2d 894, 898.
A stay order seeks only to preserve the status quo existing on the date of its entry and does not address in any way the merits of the underlying dispute. (Douglas Transit, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Commission (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 115, 99 Ill.Dec. 173, 495 N.E.2d 620.) The inherent power of a trial court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket gives courts the authority to stay proceedings. Landis, 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. at 166; Couri v. Korn (1990), 203 Ill.App.3d 1091, 149 Ill.Dec. 771, 562 N.E.2d 235; Estate of Lanterman...
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