Kadonsky v. Ahsan
| Decision Date | 28 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-7248 (MAS) (LHG) |
| Parties | STEVEN KADONSKY, Plaintiff, v. ABU AHSAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil rights Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as related state-law tort claims. Presently before the Court is a hybrid motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by Defendants ("Motion"). (ECF No. 47.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted in part, denied in part, and the Complaint is dismissed.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's statement of facts (ECF No. 54-1), or from Defendants' statement of facts (ECF No. 47-3), to the extent they are not disputed by Plaintiff. All facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the party opposing the Motion. On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff awoke in bed with excruciating pain in his neck. He immediately sought medical attention from the prison's medical personnel. Numerous tests were performed, but no cause for the pain was identified. Thereafter, based upon his own research, Plaintiff furnished the medical personnel with his self-diagnosis of stroke. Plaintiff then demanded an MRI of his head and to be seen by a neurologist. For the next year, many diagnostic tests were performed, and all came back negative for stroke. Finally, a precautionary MRI was performed, which revealed the real source of Plaintiff's pain: two degenerative vertebrae in his neck. Treatment for the condition soon began, and based on the record, pain management appears to be ongoing, although Plaintiff claims that the treatment has been ineffective.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on September 10, 2014 in state court, and the matter was removed to this Court on November 20, 2014. After protracted motion practice, Plaintiff filed the Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the operative pleading, on July 26, 2016. (ECF No. 34.) The Court construes the FAC as raising an Eighth Amendment denial of medical services claim, a state-law medical malpractice claim, and other state-law tort and statutory claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim, and moved to dismiss the medical malpractice claims based on Plaintiff's failure to submit an Affidavit of Merit ("AOM") as required by state law. The Court converted the AOM dismissal defense to a summary judgment defense pursuant to Nuveen Municipal Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond Fund v. Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 303 n.13 (3d Cir. 2012), and allowed supplemental briefing on the AOM defense. (Order, Oct. 23, 2017, ECF No. 63.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party," and it is material only if it has the ability to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engagein any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002).
The burden of establishing that no "genuine dispute" exists is on the party moving for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. "A nonmoving party has created a genuine [dispute] of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial." Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001). The non-moving party must present "more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial." Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). To do so, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 2013). In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Vento v. Dir. of V.I. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 715 F.3d 455, 477 (3d Cir. 2013).
There can be "no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact," however, if a party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's casenecessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323; Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2011). While courts must hold pro se pleadings to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at summary judgment, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative evidence, i.e. not just mere allegations, to establish a prima facie case, and to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Barnett v. N.J. Transit Corp., 573 F. App'x 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) () (citation and quotation omitted); Mitchell v. Gershen, 466 F. App'x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2011) (); Siluk v. Beard, 395 F. App'x 817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) ().
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 328 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Under Estelle, in order to state a valid claim for denial of medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Barkes, 766 F.3d at 321; Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Mere allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Allahv. Hayman, 442 F. App'x 632, 635-36 (3d. Cir. 2011) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Deliberate indifference is more than mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent to the reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1994); Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (). The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: "(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment." Velasquez v. Hayman, 546 F. App'x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of denial of medical services. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. As Plaintiff concedes, at no point did Defendants discontinue the diagnosis or treatment of Plaintiff's condition. Here, the medical treatment may have been ineffective at times and there was a delay in diagnosing Plaintiff's real condition, but that was at least partly due to Plaintiff's insistence on being treated for a stroke.1 While Defendants' actions sound in negligence, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendants were aware of his neck injury prior to its discovery during the precautionary MRI, let alone that Defendants intentionally refused to provide or delayed treatment for said injury.Defendants may have intentionally refused to provide treatment for a stroke, but that was because there was no evidence of a stroke, which turned out to be correct.
The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's frustration with what he perceives to be inadequate treatment. Plaintiff, nevertheless, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. "Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second...
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