Kadri v. Groton Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 22 April 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-1165 (JCH)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: PAUL KADRI, Plaintiff, v. GROTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, KIRSTEN HOYT, ALISHA STRIPLING, BEVERLY WASHINGTON Defendants.

PAUL KADRI, Plaintiff, v. GROTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, KIRSTEN HOYT, ALISHA STRIPLING, BEVERLY WASHINGTON Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-1165 (JCH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

April 22, 2014

RULING RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 17)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paul Kadri ("Kadri") brings this suit against Defendants Groton Board of Education ("Board"), Kirsten Hoyt ("Hoyt"), Alisha Stripling ("Stripling"), and Beverly Washington ("Washington") (collectively, "Defendants"¹). Kadri alleges defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his First Amendment rights of access to courts and free association. He also alleges defamation under the laws of the State of Connecticut. See Complaint ("Compl.") at ¶ 1 (Doc. No. 1). Specifically, Kadri brings claims against the Board and Hoyt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 15, 18. He brings claims against the Board for violation of his First Amendment rights of access to the courts and free association. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22, 25. Kadri also brings defamation claims against Stripling and Hoyt. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.

Before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Def.'s MTD") (Doc. No. 17). Defendants argue that Kadri's Complaint has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.'s MTD at 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To resolve a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether a plaintiff has stated a legally-cognizable claim by making allegations that, if true, would show he is entitled to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (interpreting Rule 12(b)(6), in accordance with Rule 8(a)(2), to require allegations with "enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief'" (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). The court takes the factual allegations of the complaint to be true, Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 5 (2010), and from those allegations, draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009).

To survive a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board, heightened fact pleading standard. Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008). The plausibility standard does not "require[] a complaint to include specific evidence [or]factual allegations in addition to those required by Rule 8." Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (holding that dismissal was inconsistent with the "liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)"). However, the plausibility standard does impose some burden to make factual allegations supporting a claim for relief. As the Iqbal Court explained, it "does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Under the Second Circuit's gloss, the plausibility standard is "flexible," obliging the plaintiff "to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible." Boykin, 521 F.3d at 213 (citation omitted); accord Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 120.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kadri filed his Complaint on August 13, 2013. In the Complaint, Kadri alleges multiple violations by the Board, Hoyt, and Stripling in connection with his termination as Superintendent of Groton Public Schools in early 2013.

Groton Public Schools hired Kadri as Superintendent in 2008 and extended his contract three times, most recently in September 2011. Compl. at ¶¶ 8-9. On May 4, 2012, the Board notified Kadri that it had received a complaint about his conduct, and voted, on May 7, 2012, to conduct an investigation. Id. at ¶ 15. Pending the results of the investigation, Kadri was placed on paid administrative leave. Id. Following the conclusion of the investigation, Kadri was "dismiss[ed] . . . by way of a letter datedSeptember 2012." ("September 2012 Letter).² Id. at ¶ 18. The letter listed three reasons for the Board's consideration of Kadri's termination: (1) "[i]nsubordination against the rules and orders of the [B]oard"; (2) "moral misconduct"; and (3) "other due and sufficient cause." Id. Each of these reasons references a ground for termination in Kadri's employment contract with the Board. Id.

Kadri's employment contract entitled him to appeal a termination decision to the Board, but Kadri instead, through his attorney, requested a hearing before an independent arbitrator because he was concerned the Board's review would not be impartial. Id.; Groton Board of Education and Paul Kadri Arbitration Agreement, October 25, 2012 ("Arbitration Agreement") at ¶ C.³ On October 25, 2012, Kadri signedthe Arbitration Agreement with the Board, and both parties "agree[d] to submit the present dispute to arbitration." Id. at ¶ 1. Under the agreement, the arbitrator's decision was "final and binding." Id. at ¶ 2.

Arbitration hearings were held over a three-month period in late 2012 and early 2013. Compl. at ¶ 21. The arbitrator interviewed nine Board witnesses, which generated hundreds of pages of testimony and exhibits. In the matter of the arbitration between Groton, CT., Board of Education and Paul [Kadri], Arbitration Decision and Award, March 4, 2013 ("Arbitration Decision") at 37.⁴ While the arbitrator noted that Kadri "is a strong, committed administrator, . . . he has been an abusive, insensitive supervisor." Id. The arbitrator upheld Kadri's termination. Id. at 43 ("The Board of Education has demonstrated that Paul [Kadri] has engaged in conduct sufficient to justify termination under Section 9(C) of his contract of employment.").

Kadri alleges he was denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard throughout his termination proceedings, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's right to due process. Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 18. He claims he was placed on paid administrative leave without "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard" and that after receiving the September 2012 Letter, the Board "refused to permit [him] adequate opportunity to rebut the charges, and failed to provide him with timely notice of thecharges against him." Id. He also alleges that, by submitting the dispute to arbitration, he was "forc[ed] . . . to relinquish his rights to turn to the courts for relief" in violation of "both his First Amendment right of access to the courts and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law." Id. at ¶ 20. He further alleges that Hoyt and Stripling made defamatory statements about him, claiming Hoyt "declared openly in the presence of others that she did not believe [Kadri] should remain superintendent of the Groton [S]chools [and] . . . openly called into question his fitness to lead the school district." Id. at ¶ 12. He claims that Stripling made a claim to the Human Resources Director and the Board "that he had discriminated against her on account of her pregnancy and had engaged in conduct that constituted sexual harassment and had otherwise been abusive to her and to others." Id. at ¶ 13. Kadri also alleges that the Board's actions after his termination denied him his First Amendment right to free association. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25.

IV. DISCUSSION

The court first addresses Kadri's allegation that he did not receive "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard" before being placed on paid administrative leave. Compl. at ¶ 15. It is well established that "[a]n employee who continues to be paid cannot sustain a claim for deprivation of property without due process even if relieved from job duties." Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York, 09-CV-5167 SLT RLM, 2011 WL 1225972, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (collecting cases); see also O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[N]o court has held that an employee on fully paid leave has been deprived of a property right merely by virtue of being relieved of his job duties."); MacFall v. City of Rochester, 495 F. App'x 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2012) ((holding that"plaintiffs . . . identified no property interest to which they had a legitimate claim of entitlement . . . . [because they] have at all times retained their full normal salary") (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Kadri's Complaint alleges he was placed on paid leave. Compl. at ¶ 15. Therefore, Kadri has failed to state a claim against either the Board or Hoyt for deprivation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment while being placed on administrative leave.

Kadri also alleges that, after receiving the September 2012 Letter, the Board "refused to permit [him] adequate opportunity to rebut the charges, and failed to provide him with timely notice of the charges against him." Compl. at ¶ 18. According to the September 2012 Letter, the letter served to "notify [Kadri] . . . that termination of [his] Contract [wa...