Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-427,77-427 |
| Citation | 16 Ill.Dec. 927,375 N.E.2d 1034,59 Ill.App.3d 716 |
| Parties | , 16 Ill.Dec. 927 James E. KAHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DON E. WILLIAMS COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard M. Batcher, Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, Moline, for plaintiff-appellant.
Marvin L. Schrager, East Moline, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff, James Kahler, commenced this action against his former employer, Don E. Williams Co., to recover accrued vacation pay, bonus, and amounts standing in his name in a profit sharing plan. The circuit court of Rock Island County granted defendant's motion to dismiss and plaintiff appealed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether a prior small claims action bars plaintiff from maintaining the present action.
Plaintiff commenced his employment with defendant on June 1, 1970. Based upon an oral agreement, plaintiff received a salary, vacation pay, bonus and profit sharing contributions as compensation. On April 13, 1973, plaintiff ceased receiving a salary. From April 13 thru April 30th, pursuant to an agreement with defendant, plaintiff worked as a salesman earning a commission on all sales and reimbursement for out of pocket expenses. On April 30, 1973, the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant ended. It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that defendant's fiscal year ended on April 30th and that it had been defendant's practice to pay bonuses to employees and determine the profit sharing contributions as of that date. The complaint also alleges that plaintiff's employment was terminated without just cause.
After April 30, 1973, plaintiff failed to receive either his commissions for all the sales generated between April 13th and April 30th or reimbursement for all the expenses incurred during that period. On June 19, 1973, plaintiff, without benefit of counsel, filed a small claims complaint against defendant in the circuit court of Tazewell County. The complaint alleged that defendant was indebted to plaintiff as follows:
"$651.70 For Prepaid expenses $250.84 Total $660.96
Apex parts 40.58 Less 9.26
Specified earnings 369.54 Net $651.70
Total $660.96 "
After plaintiff learned that defendant was represented by counsel, plaintiff engaged an attorney to represent him in the small claims matter. Immediately prior to trial, the parties effected a settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The agreed settlement of $340 was paid by defendant. The present action was commenced on April 14, 1975. The trial court ruled that plaintiff's action was barred by reason of the plaintiff's prior small claims action against defendant which had been dismissed with prejudice. We disagree and accordingly, reverse and remand.
Plaintiff's argument originates with his basic contention that two contracts existed between plaintiff and defendant. The first contract between plaintiff and defendant related to plaintiff's employment as a salaried employee and the second contract related to plaintiff's position as a commissioned salesman. Since two contracts existed, a breach of each would give rise to two separate causes of action. Plaintiff argues that the small claims action was only for the breach of the second contract and it follows according to plaintiff, that the cause of action for breach of the first contract is not barred by res judicata.
Defendant responds by claiming that there was only one contract of employment. Defendant contends that if the plaintiff had any causes of action against defendant, they accrued from his total employment with the company and not from two separate contracts. All claims arising from that employment were or should have been alleged in one action. Defendant also appears to argue that because the small claims complaint sued for "earnings", any claims for items that might be considered earnings, such as bonuses, profit sharing, and vacation pay, were concluded by the first action. Though res judicata is a basic tenant of the law, it would do well to review some of its precepts.
Res judicata has two components. The component of estoppel by judgment provides that when a cause of action has been litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction to a final judgment on the merits, the parties to that action and their privies are thereafter estopped from relitigating in a subsequent action in the same or any other court, not only the issues which were in fact raised and decided in a prior action, but also all other issues which might have been raised in that prior action. (Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413, 161 N.E. 723.) The "might have been" dimension of res judicata applies only where the cause of action in the first and second suit is the same. (Turzynski v. Liebert, 39 Ill.App.3d 87, 350 N.E.2d 76.) When comparing the two cases to determine if the first is res judicata to the second, the test to be applied is...
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...Inc. v. Griffith, 68 Ill.App.3d 528, 532, 24 Ill.Dec. 859, 861, 386 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1978); Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co., 59 Ill.App.3d 716, 718, 16 Ill.Dec. 927, 929, 375 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (1978); and National Tea Co. v. Confection Specialties, Inc., 48 Ill.App.3d 650, 654, 362 N.E.2d 1150,......
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...cite, inter alia, Schmitt v. Woods, 73 Ill.App.3d 498, 29 Ill.Dec. 498, 392 N.E.2d 55 (1979), and Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co., 59 Ill.App.3d 716, 16 Ill.Dec. 927, 375 N.E.2d 1034 (1978). In these cases, the courts do not acknowledge the transactional test. Instead, these courts based thei......
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...in the first proceeding, but also to any issues which might have been raised in that proceeding. (Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co. (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 716, 16 Ill.Dec. 927, 375 N.E.2d 1034.) Where the doctrine of estoppel by judgment properly applies, it operates without regard to whether th......
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